Susan Thompson and All Other Occupants v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC as Successor by Merger to Walter Mortgage Company, LLC ( 2013 )


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  •                              NUMBER 13-12-00769-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    SUSAN THOMPSON
    AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS,                                                              Appellants,
    v.
    GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC
    AS SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO
    WALTER MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC,                                                        Appellee.
    On appeal from the County Court at Law
    of San Patricio County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Perkes
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
    In this forcible-detainer case, appellant, Susan Thompson 1 appeals the trial
    court’s judgment denying her a trial de novo in her appeal from justice court and
    1
    Susan Thompson and All Other Occupants were named as defendants in the original eviction
    lawsuit filed in justice court and are appellants on appeal. We will collectively refer to appellants as
    “Thompson.”
    purporting to “confirm” the justice court’s judgment in favor of appellee Green Tree
    Servicing, LLC as Successor by Merger to Walter Mortgage Company, LLC (hereinafter
    “Green Tree”). We reverse and remand for a trial de novo.
    I.       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
    Green Tree sued Thompson in the Justice Court, Precinct Two of San Patricio
    County, Texas, to evict her from the premises located at 6186 CR 2313, Odem, Texas
    78730. On October 31, 2012, the justice court awarded possession of the premises to
    Green Tree and entered judgment against Thompson. Thompson timely appealed to
    the County Court at Law of San Patricio County (the trial court).
    On November 21, 2012, the trial court convened for a trial de novo. However,
    before Green Tree presented its case, Thompson’s counsel challenged the trial court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction—arguing the case belonged in district court because it
    presented a question of property ownership and not a question of mere possession.
    Thompson moved the trial court to dismiss the appeal on this basis. The trial court
    denied the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stated it was finding for
    Green Tree and would not receive evidence, and directed Green Tree’s counsel to
    prepare an “agreed judgment” memorializing its ruling.3 The trial court gave Thompson
    five days to file any objections to the agreed judgment Green Tree prepared.
    Without objection from Thompson, the trial court entered the following Agreed
    2
    Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
    recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for
    it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    3
    The trial court did not receive evidence on Thompson’s subject-matter jurisdiction challenge as
    would enable this Court to determine Thompson’s challenge to the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
    2
    Judgment,4 which Thompson now appeals:
    On this 21st day of November, 2012, came to be heard the
    above-entitled and numbered cause on appeal from the Judgment entered
    in the Justice Court on October 31, 2012, in favor of Plaintiff. The parties
    appeared in person or by and through their counsel of record and
    announced ready for trial. Prior to any evidence being presented by the
    parties, Defendant Susan Thompson requested that the case be dismissed
    for lack of jurisdiction of the Court. The Court denied Defendant’s request
    to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction of the Court.
    Defendant then requested that the Court dismiss her appeal. Upon
    considering Defendant’s additional request to voluntarily dismiss her
    appeal, and finding no opposition to Defendant’s request for voluntary
    dismissal of the appeal, the Court finds that the case should be dismissed.
    IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
    Defendant’s request to dismiss her appeal is granted, the appeal is
    dismissed and, accordingly, the Judgment of the Justice Court is final.
    This Order is final, disposes of all claims between the parties and is
    appealable.
    II.     ISSUES PRESENTED
    Thompson presents two issues for review:
    (1) Did the trial court err in not holding a trial de novo after Thompson’s appeal
    from justice court was perfected?
    (2) Did the trial court err in reinstating the justice court’s judgment?
    III.    ANALYSIS
    By her first and second issues, Thompson argues she was entitled to trial de novo
    in county court, and because her appeal to county court annulled the justice court’s
    judgment, the trial court could not confirm or enter judgment on the justice court’s
    judgment. We agree.
    4
    Although the judgment is entitled “agreed judgment”, the judgment is not signed by the parties,
    and the record is devoid of any indication that the parties agreed upon the terms of the judgment.
    3
    Whether Thompson was entitled to trial de novo once she perfected her appeal to
    the county court presents a legal question which we review de novo. See Mayhew v.
    Town of Sunnyvale, 
    964 S.W.2d 922
    , 928 (Tex. 1998); see also Salmeron v. T-Mobile
    West Corp., No. 01-07-00532-CV, 
    2008 WL 1828616
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] Apr. 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Villalon v. Bank One, the First Court of
    Appeals succinctly explained the rule of law that is determinative of this case:
    [I]t is well-settled that perfection of an appeal to county court from a
    justice court for trial de novo vacates and annuls the judgment of the
    justice court. Once a county court acquires jurisdiction by perfection of
    an appeal from justice court, the rules of procedure permit only that the
    county court try the case de novo or dismiss it if it is not prosecuted. A
    county court cannot affirm or reverse the judgment of the justice court
    nor can it remand the cause to the justice court.
    
    176 S.W.3d 66
    , 69–70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In In re Garza,
    this Court explained that once a justice court’s judgment is annulled by perfection of
    appeal to the county court, the burden is on the appellee in the county court to obtain a
    new judgment.      
    990 S.W.2d 372
    , 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999) (orig.
    proceeding). While In re Garza was decided under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 574b,
    which was repealed effective August 31, 2013 and no longer applies to pending cases
    unless justice so requires, see Misc. Docket No. 13-9049 (Tex. April 15, 2013), both Rule
    574b and the new rule 506.3 provide for trial “de novo in the county court” when an appeal
    from justice court is perfected. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 574b (“The cause shall be tried de
    novo in the county or district court; and judgment shall be rendered.”); see also TEX. R.
    CIV. P. 506.3 (“The case must be tried de novo in the county court. A trial de novo is a
    new trial in which the entire case is presented as if there had been no previous trial.”).
    4
    Because Thompson was entitled to trial de novo in the county court, the trial court
    erred as a matter of law by denying her a trial de novo and rendering judgment that
    purported to confirm the justice court’s judgment. See In re 
    Garza, 990 S.W.2d at 374
    ;
    see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.3. We find Green Tree’s argument that Thompson waived
    any error by not filing objections to the agreed judgment unpersuasive. As this Court
    explained in In re Garza, “[l]language in a trial court’s dismissal order cannot resurrect the
    justice court’s 
    judgment.” 990 S.W.2d at 374
    . At the November 21, 2012 hearing,
    Thompson asked the trial court multiple times to receive evidence in a trial de novo even
    if it rejected her subject-matter jurisdiction argument, and Thompson clearly informed the
    trial court on the record that under the case law, the justice court’s judgment was a nullity
    that could not be “affirmed.”     See id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.        We sustain
    Thompson’s issues on appeal.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court for trial
    de novo. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d).
    GREGORY T. PERKES
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    3rd day of October, 2013.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-12-00769-CV

Filed Date: 10/3/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015