James Baldwin v. State ( 2012 )

NUMBER 13-11-00119-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JAMES BALDWIN, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
By five issues, which we have reorganized and renumbered, appellant, James
Baldwin, appeals his conviction and 15-month sentence for the state jail felony offense
of injury to a child by criminal negligence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1), (g)
(West Supp. 2011). We affirm.1
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Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons
for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his first issue, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction for injury to a child.
A. Standard of Review
Under the Jackson standard, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899-99 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (characterizing the Jackson standard as: “Considering
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, was a jury rationally justified
in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of
the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Anderson v.
State, 322 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (citing
Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Reconciliation of
conflicts in the evidence is within the fact-finder’s exclusive province. Id. (citing Wyatt v.
State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). We must resolve any inconsistencies
in the testimony in favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we look at events occurring before,
during, and after the commission of the offense, and we may rely on actions of the
appellant that show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act. See
Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Each fact need not point
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directly and independently to the appellant’s guilt, so long as the cumulative effect of all
the incriminating facts is sufficient to support the conviction. Id.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Coleman v. State, 131 S.W.3d 303, 307
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. ref'd) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes
the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d
321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
B. Discussion
Under a hypothetically correct jury charge, the State was required to prove that
appellant, acting with criminal negligence, caused a child serious bodily injury. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1). Appellant complains that the State failed to meet
this burden because there was no eyewitness testimony offered at trial and because the
State’s evidence against him is therefore purely circumstantial. But see Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Circumstantial evidence is as
probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial
evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.”).
At trial, the State offered evidence and testimony that appellant caused serious
bodily injury to a child, age two months or younger, by grabbing the child with his hands
and shaking the child, thereby causing the child to suffer trauma to his head and torso.
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The evidence showed that appellant was home alone with the child at the time the child
sustained these serious bodily injuries.
There was also expert medical testimony offered by the State showing that the
head injuries caused to the child in this case are seen in babies who have been ejected
from cars and babies who have been the victims of abusive trauma. There was also
expert medical testimony offered by the State showing that the torso injuries suffered by
the child in this case (rib fractures) may be caused by the whiplash from acceleration
and deceleration. Finally, there was the following testimony from an employee of
Driscoll Children’s Hospital, where the child was taken to be treated after the injuries:
[Appellant] said that he did have some concern with his style of burping
the child, He said that he’s unsuccessful when he carries the child up near
his shoulder, so he will hold the child while supporting his head and he
pats him while the child is sitting up. And [appellant] said, “If that’s what
caused all of this, it was me. I will never do that again.”
We conclude that the foregoing evidence is sufficient to prove appellant’s guilt.
The evidence established that the child suffered serious bodily injuries. There was
evidence that appellant was alone with the child at the time the child sustained the
injuries. In addition, the expert testimony established that the injuries were consistent
with physical abuse. See Barcenes v. State, 940 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1997, pet. ref’d) (stating that medical testimony and circumstantial evidence are
sufficient to prove causation) (citing Barrera v. State, 756 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1988, pet. ref’d)).
To the extent appellant’s complaint that there was no eyewitness testimony
pertains to the jury’s finding of a culpable mental state, we note that a culpable mental
state generally must be established by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred
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from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. See id. Moreover, “[intent] may also
be inferred from the extent of the injuries and the relative size and strength of the
parties.” Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). In this case,
the jury’s finding that appellant acted with criminal negligence is supported by the
foregoing factors, in addition to appellant’s statement, “If that’s what caused all of this, it
was me. I will never do that again.”
Accordingly, appellant’s first issue is overruled.
II. EVIDENTIARY ERROR
In issues two, three, four, and five, appellant complains of evidentiary error by the
trial court.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a trial court's ruling under the rules of evidence is
abuse of discretion. Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If
the ruling was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, in light of what was
before the trial court at the time the ruling was made, then we must uphold the
judgment. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Weatherred v.
State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539,
543-544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
B. Discussion
In his second, third, fourth, and fifth issues, appellant complains that the trial
court erred in admitting evidence of extraneous bad acts involving injury to a child.
Before trial, appellant filed a motion in limine, which the trial court denied. When the
evidence was offered at trial, appellant did not object to its admission.
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The trial court’s pre-trial ruling on a motion in limine is a preliminary ruling only
and normally preserves nothing for appellate review. See Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d
11, 14-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In this case, appellant’s motion in limine was a true
motion in limine, requesting that “the Court enter an order instructing the State, its
agents, its employees and its witnesses not to mention, allude to or refer to, in any
manner, [the complained of evidence] in the presence of the jury . . . [until] a hearing [is]
. . . held outside the presence of the jury for determination [of] whether [the evidence is
admissible].” See Draughon v. State, 831 S.W.2d 331, 333 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)
(noting that the defendant’s motion was not a true motion in limine because “it does not
constitute a request that the admissibility of evidence or disposition of other matter by
the court be determined outside the jury’s presence . . . . Ordinarily, we do not consider
a motion in limine sufficient to preserve for appellate review the exclusion of evidence,
because there is no adverse ruling on the admissibility of such evidence until it is
tendered and an objection interposed”) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, even
though the trial court denied appellant’s motion in limine before trial, it was still
necessary for appellant to object to the evidence when the State tendered it for
admission during trial. See Gonzales v. State, 685 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985) (stating that “for error to be preserved with regard to the subject matter of the
motion in limine it is absolutely necessary that an objection be made at the time when
the subject is raised during trial”). Appellant failed to make an appropriate objection at
trial and therefore failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review. See Martinez v.
State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (explaining that to preserve error, an
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objection must be timely, specific, pursued to an adverse ruling, and
contemporaneous—that is, made each time inadmissible evidence is offered).
Appellant’s second, third, fourth, and fifth issues are overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
__________________
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice
Do not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered and filed the
16th day of August, 2012.
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