Katherine Coplen v. State ( 2010 )


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  •                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    ______________________________
    No. 06-10-00116-CR
    ______________________________
    KATHERINE COPLEN, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 217th Judicial District Court
    Angelina County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 28,761
    Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    After a putative waiver of the right to appeal, Katherine Coplen pled guilty to credit card
    abuse in the 217th Judicial District Court in Angelina County, 1 without the benefit of a plea
    agreement.2 Prior to Coplen’s open plea of guilty, the trial court warned her that her ―punishment
    could be as high as two years in state jail,‖ a warning also present within written admonishments
    signed by her. Coplen was also warned that if she pled guilty, she would be ―giving up the right to
    appeal your case to a higher court except for any error that occurs at sentencing.‖ She entered a
    plea of guilty, after which the following discussion ensued:
    [Counsel for Coplen]: Your Honor -- and I believe we’ve talked about this
    -- even with all three cases, I think the parties agree community supervision would
    be appropriate. We just need -- because there is a big restitution issue. And if I’m
    -- hopefully, I’m not misspeaking.
    [The State]: No, sir. We would hope for a sentence of probation so that
    the money could be repaid to the victim.
    THE COURT: Okay. So you’re saying you both agree on community
    supervision. That’s not an issue between you?
    [The State]: No, the State would want to have that.
    THE COURT: I’m sorry?
    1
    Originally appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
    Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005). We are
    unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Twelfth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant
    issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
    2
    Coplen also pled guilty and was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and fraud, not the subject of this
    appeal.
    2
    [The State]: The State would want to have probation so that restitution
    could be --
    THE COURT: Okay. That’s fine.                  Then it will be community
    supervision, either deferred or probation.
    The trial court recessed without an adjudication of guilt and ordered a presentence investigation
    report. At the next hearing, the State clarified in response to questioning by the trial court that it
    was not agreeing to community supervision; rather, it was merely the State’s position not to
    oppose a request for community supervision. At the conclusion of testimony presented by both
    sides, the court found Coplen guilty and sentenced her to two years’ confinement.
    On appeal, Coplen complains that her plea of guilty was involuntary. She cites the
    discussion referenced above and complains that the trial court violated due process guarantees by
    ―participa[ting] in the plea discussion process.‖ Coplen claims that she was entitled to specific
    performance of the court’s statement ―[t]hen it will be community supervision, either deferred or
    probation.‖ In response, the State claims Coplen waived the right to appeal. We find that
    although Coplen did not waive her right to appeal, she failed to preserve these points of error for
    our review.
    I.     Coplen Did Not Waive Her Right to Appeal
    We first address our jurisdiction to review this appeal. The trial court’s certification of
    right to appeal contains a handwritten notation that Coplen has the right of appeal ―as to
    punishment only.‖ Even if a defendant waives the right to appeal, such a waiver is ineffective if it
    3
    was entered before being made aware what the punishment would be. See Ex parte Delaney, 
    207 S.W.3d 794
    , 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Blanco v. State, 
    18 S.W.3d 218
    , 219–20 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2000) (waiver of appeal enforceable when executed after conviction, but before sentencing,
    in exchange for recommended sentence). A presentence waiver of right to appeal is ineffective
    without some consideration. Sims v. State, No. 06-10-00056-CR, 
    2010 WL 4232711
    , at *1–2
    (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 15, 2010, no pet. h.). Thus, even if Coplen’s plea of guilty could be
    seen as an attempted waiver of appeal, such a waiver would not be effective. Young v. State,
    
    8 S.W.3d 656
    , 666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Thus, we address Coplen’s points on appeal.
    II.    Coplen Failed to Preserve Her Complaints
    ―As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show
    that: (1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion . . . .‖
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). We have previously held that challenges to the voluntariness of a plea
    of guilty must be raised before the trial court to preserve the complaint for review on appeal.
    Sims, 
    2010 WL 4232711
    , at *4 (citing Mendez v. State, 
    138 S.W.3d 334
    , 350 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2004); Cain v. State, 
    947 S.W.2d 262
    , 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Because Coplen failed to
    bring the issue of the voluntariness of her guilty plea to the trial court’s attention, it was not
    preserved, and we may not address the claim on its merits.
    Coplen also failed to raise below her points of error regarding the court’s alleged
    participation in the plea discussion (though no plea agreement existed) and her present argument
    4
    that she was entitled to community supervision based on the court’s initial belief that the State had
    agreed to community supervision. Coplen’s counsel also affirmatively represented there was ―no
    legal reason‖ why the court’s sentence should not be imposed.            Even assuming Coplen’s
    arguments have merit, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a trial court’s intrusion
    into the plea process must be preserved through an objection or request made below. Moore v.
    State, 
    295 S.W.3d 329
    , 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).            Because Coplen failed to raise her
    remaining issues with the trial court, they are not preserved for our review and are overruled.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Bailey C. Moseley
    Justice
    Date Submitted:        November 18, 2010
    Date Decided:          November 19, 2010
    Do Not Publish
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