Grover C. Gibson v. Lehoma Joyce Gibson ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00177-CV
GROVER C. GIBSON APPELLANT
V.
LEHOMA JOYCE GIBSON APPELLEE
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FROM THE 322ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Grover C. Gibson appeals from the divorce decree dividing the
parties’ marital estate and awarding attorney’s fees to Appellee Lehoma Joyce
Gibson. In one point, Grover complains that the trial court erred by awarding
attorney’s fees to Lehoma. We affirm.
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. Background
This is the second appeal relating to the parties’ divorce. Grover and
Lehoma were married in 1955, and Lehoma filed for divorce in 1998. The case
proceeded to trial in September 2000. On May 26, 2003, the trial court issued a
letter ruling setting forth its decision regarding the division of the marital property.
The letter ruling provided that each party was to pay his or her own attorney’s
fees and court costs. The trial court entered a corrected final divorce decree on
January 5, 2004, dividing the marital estate. The corrected decree also stated
that each party was responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees, expenses, and
costs.
Grover appealed. This court affirmed the portion of the judgment granting
the parties a divorce but reversed the trial court’s judgment as to the property
division because the final decree awarded to Lehoma specific partnership
property owned by GCG Partners, L.P., a limited partnership in which Grover
owned a fifty percent community property interest, rather than awarding her an
interest in the partnership. Gibson v. Gibson, 190 S.W.3d 821, 822–23 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). This court remanded the case to
the trial court to redivide the parties’ community estate. Id. at 823.
After remand, the trial court entered two orders sanctioning Grover for
failing to respond to Lehoma’s interrogatories and requests for production
regarding Grover’s current assets and liabilities. Each of these orders, one
signed April 8, 2011, and the other signed September 16, 2011, ordered Grover
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to pay $15,000.00 in attorney’s fees to Lehoma’s attorneys. Grover paid
$30,000.00 in discovery sanctions pursuant to these orders.
On January 24, 2012, the case was called for trial. The trial court
announced on the record that the parties had reached an agreement regarding
the division of the marital property, but the parties had not reached an agreement
regarding Lehoma’s request for attorney’s fees. Lehoma and Grover each
testified that they agreed to divide the marital assets as set forth in the trial
court’s May 26, 2003 letter ruling. Attorneys for both Lehoma and Grover
testified regarding the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred by their
respective clients. The trial court approved the agreement of the parties
regarding the division of the marital assets and adopted the May 26, 2003 letter
ruling as the rendition of the court with respect to the marital assets but delayed
its ruling on attorney’s fees.
The trial court signed the final divorce decree on April 5, 2012. In addition
to dividing the marital property in accordance with the parties’ agreement, the
order awarded Lehoma $92,867.00 in attorney’s fees and $27,500.00 in
conditional appellate attorney’s fees. The trial court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law, finding that the division of the marital assets in accordance
with the May 26, 2003 letter ruling agreed to by the parties was a just and right
division of the marital estate. The trial court further found that Grover failed to
produce any evidence of his current assets and liabilities and that “the effect of
[Grover’s] actions after the credit for the $30,000.00 he paid pursuant to
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discovery sanction orders was to deplete [Lehoma’s] assets awarded to her on
May 26, 2003 by the costs she incurred in this litigation.” The court also found
that Lehoma incurred $92,867.00 in reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees
and expenses after March 26, 2003 and that Lehoma should be awarded
judgment against Grover for these fees as a result of Grover’s conduct and as a
just and right division of the marital estate as well as under chapter 9 of the
Texas Family Code. The trial court additionally found that $27,500.00 were
reasonable and necessary appellate attorney’s fees.
II. Analysis
In his only point on appeal, Grover complains the trial court erred by
awarding attorney’s fees to Lehoma. Grover argues that the trial court had no
authority to award attorney’s fees as part of a just and right division of the
community estate because the property was divided by an agreement of the
parties rather than the court. Grover further argues that the trial court was not
authorized to award attorney’s fees to Lehoma under family code sections 9.014
or 9.205 because the proceeding after remand was not a post-divorce
proceeding. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 9.014, 9.205 (West Supp. 2013).
In its conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that it had the authority
to award Lehoma attorney’s fees as part of the division of the parties’ estate and
as an equitable division or, in the alternative, under chapter 9 of the family code.
We agree with Grover’s argument that neither section 9.014 nor section 9.205 is
applicable in this case. Section 9.014 permits a trial court to award reasonable
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attorney’s fees in a proceeding to enforce a divorce decree, while section 9.205
allows a trial court to award reasonable attorney’s fees in a proceeding to divide
property previously undivided in a divorce decree. See id. The original divorce
decree in this case disposed of the parties’ property, but the decree did not
become final as to the property division because of Grover’s appeal and remand
by this court. See Goetz v. Goetz, 567 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas
1978, no writ). As in Goetz, “[o]ur limited remand of the property division issue
did not change the essential marital character of the dispute.” Id. The dispute
remained a matter of disposition of the marital estate, not a matter of disposition
of undivided property or the enforcement of a decree. See id.; see also
O’Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 313 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.)
(op. on reh’g); Wilson v. Wilson, 44 S.W.3d 597, 599–600 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2001, no pet.). Therefore, application of marital-property law was
required. See O’Carolan, 414 S.W.3d at 313; Wilson, 44 S.W.3d at 599–600;
Goetz, 567 S.W.2d at 895.
In a divorce proceeding, a trial court is charged with dividing the
community estate in a “just and right” manner, considering the rights of both
parties. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (West 2006); Watson v. Watson, 286
S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). While there is no
statute specifically authorizing an award of attorney’s fees in a divorce
proceeding, a trial court may consider reasonable attorney’s fees, along with the
parties’ circumstances and needs, in effecting a just and right division of the
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estate. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981); Mandell v.
Mandell, 310 S.W.3d 531, 541 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied); see
also Tedder v. Gardner Aldrich, LLP, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 557, 2013 WL 2150081,
at *3–4 (May 17, 2013). The trial court has the equitable power to award either
spouse attorney’s fees as a part of the just and right division of the marital estate.
Mandell, 310 S.W.3d at 541.
Grover concedes that the trial court may award attorney’s fees as part of
its just and right division of the parties’ marital estate, but he maintains that the
trial court could not award attorney’s fees as a just and right division in this case
because the division of the community estate was not in controversy and was
divided by agreement. Grover does not cite nor have we found any legal
authority to support this contention. Because the trial court has equitable power
to award either spouse attorney’s fees as a part of the just and right division of
the marital estate, we conclude the trial court did not err by awarding attorney’s
fees to Lehoma. Accordingly, we overrule Grover’s sole point.
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III. Conclusion
Having overruled Grover’s only point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Anne Gardner
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.
DELIVERED: January 23, 2014
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