in the Estate of Gloria Ann Reistino ( 2010 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-09-00351-CV
IN RE THE ESTATE OF GLORIA ANN REISTINO, DECEASED
From the 82nd District Court
Robertson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 78-10-11,729-CV
OPINION
Appellants contend in their sole issue that the trial court erroneously construed
the last will and testament of Gloria Ann Reistino’s father Tony C. Reistino to establish
a testamentary trust which included as remainder beneficiaries the children of Tony’s
nieces and nephews who predeceased Gloria. We will reverse and render.
The parties’ dispute centers on the construction of the following provision in
Tony Reistino’s will:
This trust shall continue until the death of my daughter, Gloria
Ann Reistino, at which time this Trust shall end and terminate, and I
direct that the balance of the fund of this Trust then on hand, if any, shall
then vest in those of my nieces and nephews who shall be living on the
date of the death of my said daughter, per capita, in fee simple, forever,
the same to be distributed and delivered to them each by my said Trustee.
Gloria was Tony’s only child. He had eight brothers and sisters who all predeceased
Gloria. He had nineteen nieces and nephews, three of whom predeceased Gloria. One
of these, Louis Scarpinato, had no children. One of them, Joe Reistino, Jr., is survived
by two daughters, Maria and Malissa. And the third, Gathan Reistino,1 is survived by a
daughter, Misty Lynn Kelly. The parties dispute whether Maria, Malissa and Misty are
entitled to their parents’ shares of the trust.
Appellants are: (1) John, Frank and Carl Reistino and Mary Luster, who are the
children of Tony’s brother Phil; and (2) Joe and Tony Baimonte, who are the sons of
Tony’s sister Mary. Appellees are: (1) Gathan Reistino and Frances Corpora, who are
the surviving children of Tony’s brother Joe; (2) Joyce Walden, Guardian of the Estates
of Maria L. and Malissa Reistino, who are the daughters of Tony’s nephew Joe; (3)
Geneva Herbst, Louise Mathis and Josephine Skains, who are the surviving children of
Tony’s brother Sam; (4) Misty Lynn Kelly, who is the daughter of Tony’s nephew
Gathan; (5) Robert Reistino, who is the sole child of Tony’s brother Frank; (6) Rose Mary
Mayes, who is the daughter of Tony’s sister Mary;2 (7) Marjorie Price, who is the
daughter of Tony’s brother Johnny; and (8) Frances Smith and Debbie Nigliazzo, who
are the daughters of Tony’s sister Josephine.
In construing a will, our focus is on the testator’s intent. San Antonio Area Found.
v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 2000); In re Ray Ellison Grandchildren Trust, 261 S.W.3d
1 Misty’s father Gathan was the son of Tony’s brother Sam. Tony’s brother Joe also has a son
named Gathan who is one of the appellees.
2
Rose Mary Mayes is on the opposite side of this dispute from her brothers Joe and Tony
Baimonte.
In re Estate of Reistino Page 2
111, 117 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). This intent must be ascertained
from the language found within the four corners of the will. Id. We focus not on what
the testator intended to write but on the meaning of the words actually used. Id. “If the
will is unambiguous, a court should not go beyond specific terms in search of the
[testator’s] intent.” Lang, 35 S.W.3d at 639; accord Ellison Trust, 261 S.W.3d at 117.
Appellees cite Lang for the proposition that “a ‘court may always receive and
consider evidence concerning the situation of the testator, the circumstances existing
when the will was executed, and other material facts that will enable the court to place
itself in the testator’s position at the time.’” 35 S.W.3d at 639 (quoting Stewart v. Selder,
473 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tex. 1971)). However, Appellees neglect to mention the very next
sentence in Lang where the Court added, “But this broad approach to the admissibility
of extrinsic evidence applies only when a term is open to more than one construction.”
Id. Thus, extrinsic evidence is admissible only when a term used in a will is ambiguous.
See In re Estate of Tyner, 292 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.); Ellison
Trust, 261 S.W.3d at 117-18; In re Estate of Bean, 206 S.W.3d 749, 762 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).
Here, the parties dispute whether the term “my nieces and nephews” includes
Tony’s grandnieces. Citing Martin v. Palmer, 1 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1999, pet. denied), Appellees contend, “Texas courts hold that the phrase ‘my
nieces and nephews’ does not have such a clear, definite, and technical meaning that it
is susceptible of only one legal interpretation in every will construction case.”
However, merely because the phrase “nieces and nephews” may be ambiguous in some
In re Estate of Reistino Page 3
cases does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the phrase is ambiguous in every
case.
Martin is one of only two Texas cases our research has disclosed addressing the
relational term “nieces and nephews” in construing a testator’s intent. In Martin, the
testator bequeathed his entire estate to “my nieces and nephews.” Martin, 1 S.W.3d at
877. The parties disputed whether the testator’s nieces and nephews included those
related to him by blood as well as those who were the children of his wife’s brothers
and sisters. Id. at 877-78. The First Court held that the term was ambiguous under the
circumstances and concluded in this summary-judgment case that genuine issues of
material fact remained on the question of whether the term included the testator’s
nieces and nephews by blood as well as those by marriage. Id. at 880-82.
We find no Texas authority supporting the appellees’ position that
the phrase “my nieces and nephews” has been given such a clear, definite,
and technical meaning that in every case and, regardless of circumstances, it
must conclusively be construed as meaning only the nieces and nephews
of the testator and not those of the testator’s spouse. Applying the rules of
will construction established by the courts of this state, we conclude that
the phrase “my nieces and nephews” does not have such a clear, definite,
and technical meaning that it is susceptible of only one legal interpretation
in every will construction case.
Id. at 880-81.
The other Texas case our research has disclosed on this issue is Hocker v. Stevens,
18 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1929, writ ref’d). In Hocker, the court construed
a devise to “my brothers and sisters and half brothers and sisters then living at the time
of my death, and unto my nephews and nieces then living at the time of my death, to
each one of them share and share alike absolutely in fee simple.” Id. at 842. The dispute
In re Estate of Reistino Page 4
was whether this included nephews and nieces of the whole blood as well as those of
the half blood, particularly in view of the manner in which the testator specified the
inclusion of “half brothers and sisters.” Id. The court noted that this was a class gift to
the nephews and nieces and held that such a devise “embraces all of that class who are
living at the time of the death of the testator, and without regard as to whether they are
of the whole blood or half blood.” Id. at 843. As in Martin, however, the asserted
ambiguity in Hocker concerned the children of siblings or half-siblings and not their
grandchildren.
The term “nieces and nephews” is not ambiguous on its face. See MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 779, 783-84 (10th ed. 1993) (defining nephew as “a
son of one’s brother or sister or of one’s brother-in-law or sister-in-law” and similarly
defining niece as “a daughter of one’s brother, sister, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law”);
accord BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1138, 1143 (9th ed. 2009) (defining nephew as “[t]he son
of a person’s brother or sister; sometimes understood to include the son of a person’s
brother-in-law or sister-in-law” and similarly defining niece).3
This case does not involve a dispute between Tony’s nieces and nephews and the
nieces and nephews of his wife who predeceased him. Cf. Martin, 1 S.W.3d at 877. Nor
does this case involve a dispute between Tony’s nieces and nephews and any nieces
and nephews of a previous marriage or other relationship. Cf. Hocker, 18 S.W.2d at 842.
3
The editors of Black’s Law Dictionary do add that these terms are “extended in some wills to
include [grandnephews and grandnieces].” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1138, 1143 (9th ed. 2009).
However, our research has not disclosed a single Texas decision in which these terms were extended to
include grandnephews and grandnieces.
In re Estate of Reistino Page 5
Rather, we hold that the rule in this case should be the same as applies when
determining whether a devise to “children” includes grandchildren. “The law in Texas
is well-settled. When the word ‘children’ is used in a will, absent a clear and
unequivocal intent to encompass more remote descendants, the word is restricted to
those descendants of the first degree.” Busby v. Gray, 616 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. Civ.
App.—San Antonio 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Briggs v. Peebles, 144 Tex. 47, 188 S.W.2d
147, 150 (1945); Bartlett v. Terrell, 292 S.W. 273, 277-78 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio
1927, writ ref’d).
Applying this rule to “nieces and nephews” is consistent with how other states
have addressed this issue.
The word, “children” has been held to include grandchildren and the
words, “nephews” and “nieces” have been held to refer to grand-nephews
and grand-nieces, but I think it is safe to say that such construction is
never adopted in the absence of clear evidence of intention obtained from
the language of the will.
Bank of N.Y. v. Shillito, 14 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).
“‘Niece’ and ‘nephew’ in their primary and ordinary sense mean the
immediate descendants of the brothers and sisters of the person named,
and do not include grandnieces and grandnephews, and such
construction will be given to them when used in a will unless it clearly
appears from the context that a different meaning was intended by
testator.”
Frederick v. Hoffman, 7 Ohio App. 2d 27, 218 N.E.2d 478, 479-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966)
(quoting 57 AM. JUR. Wills § 1390 (1948)).
Tony’s will does not express “a clear and unequivocal intent” to include
grandnieces and grandnephews as remainder beneficiaries. See Briggs, 188 S.W.2d at
In re Estate of Reistino Page 6
150; Busby, 616 S.W.2d at 287; Bartlett, 292 S.W. at 277-78. Therefore, the trial court erred
when it construed the will to include Maria, Marissa and Misty as remainder
beneficiaries. Appellants’ sole issue is sustained.
We reverse the judgment and render judgment that the sixteen surviving
children of Tony’s brothers and sisters are the remainder beneficiaries of the
testamentary trust created by his will.4 Each of these remainder beneficiaries is entitled
to a distribution of 1/16 of the funds held by the trust.
FELIPE REYNA
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Reyna, and
Justice Davis
(Chief Justice Gray concurring)
Reversed and rendered
Opinion delivered and filed December 1, 2010
[CV06]
4
The sixteen surviving children are: Gathan Reistino, Frances Corpora, Geneva Herbst, Louise
Mathis, Josephine Skains, Robert Reistino, Johnny Reistino, Mary Louise Luster, Frank Reistino, Carl
Reistino, Joe Baimonte, Tony Baimonte, Rose Mary Mayes, Marjorie Price, Frances Smith, and Debbie
Nigliazzo.
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