Julian Montoya v. State ( 2012 )

NO. 07-11-00428-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
OCTOBER 30, 2012
JULIAN MONTOYA, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2010-428,623; HONORABLE JOHN J. "TREY" MCCLENDON, JUDGE
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Julian Montoya, was charged by indictment with the offense of driving
while intoxicated 1 enhanced by allegations of two previous driving while intoxicated
convictions. 2 Additionally, the indictment contained a punishment enhancement
allegation of a previous conviction for a felony offense. 3 Subsequently, appellant
entered a plea of guilty to the offense alleged, and true to the allegations of the previous
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West Supp. 2012).
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2012).
3
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(a) (West Supp. 2012).
driving while intoxicated convictions and the prior felony conviction. Appellant’s pleas
were entered without benefit of a plea bargain agreement. After hearing the evidence
regarding punishment, the trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement in
the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (ID-TDCJ) for a
period of six years. Appellant appeals his conviction contending that there was
insufficient evidence before the trial court to sustain his plea of guilty. We disagree and
will affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
On June 26, 2010, appellant was arrested for the offense of driving while
intoxicated. Based upon appellant’s previous convictions, a grand jury indicted him for
driving while intoxicated, felony offense. On March 22, 2011, appellant appeared with
trial counsel to enter a plea of guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement. Prior to
accepting appellant’s plea of guilty, and after admonishments regarding citizenship and
competency to enter a plea, the trial court entered into the following colloquy with
appellant:
Mr. Montoya, would you please step forward.
Mr. Montoya, we are here on Cause No. 2010-428,623, the State of Texas
versus Julian Montoya, for the purpose of an open plea.
Mr. Montoya, I have certain paperwork here that appears to bear your
signatures. In signing this paperwork did you understand that you were
giving up certain valuable rights?
Mr. Montoya: Yes, sir.
The Court: And you understand that in—did you sign these papers and
give up those rights freely, knowingly and voluntarily?
Mr. Montoya: Yes, sir.
2
The trial court then went on to further admonish appellant regarding the range of
punishment and, once again, verified that appellant desired to enter a plea of guilty
without benefit of a plea bargain. After accepting appellant’s plea of guilty and pleas of
true to the jurisdictional paragraphs and punishment enhancement paragraph, the trial
court ordered a presentence investigation and adjourned the hearing.
The clerk’s record filed in this case includes a two-page document, both pages of
which are titled, “Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate and Judicial
Confession.” One of the pages contains the following statement,
In open court and prior to entering my plea, I waive the right of trial by jury.
I also waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of
witnesses, and my right against self-incrimination. The charges against
me allege that on or about the 26th day of June, A.D. 2010, in Lubbock
County, Texas, I, Julian Montoya, hereafter styled the Defendant, did then
and there operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated.
The waiver goes on to describe the jurisdictional enhancements of the prior driving
while intoxicated convictions, and the prior felony conviction. The other page of the
waiver contains the following statement, “I understand the foregoing allegations and I
confess that they are true.” In addition, this document again waives certain rights and
makes statements regarding being satisfied with his attorney. The box for “GUILTY” is
checked, as opposed to the box for “NOLO CONTENDERE.” This document then
contains the signature of appellant, appellant’s trial counsel, and the assistant district
attorney. Below those signatures is the trial judge’s signature. Above the trial judge’s
signature is the trial judge’s statement that the “document was executed by the
defendant, the Defendant’s attorney, and the attorney representing the State, and then
filed with the papers of the case.”
3
It was after receiving the plea in question that the trial court conducted a
punishment hearing that resulted in the sentence of confinement for six years in the ID-
TDCJ. Appellant now appeals contending that the evidence was insufficient to support
the plea of guilty. We disagree with appellant’s contention and affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
Article 1.15 Issue
Appellant’s issue is that the evidence introduced at his plea of guilty was not
sufficient to show appellant’s guilt. Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
Art. 1.15. Jury In Felony
No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury
duly rendered and recorded, unless the defendant, upon entering a plea,
has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing in
accordance with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided, however, that it shall be
necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the
guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as
the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be
convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same.
The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in
writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-
examination of witnesses, and further consents either to an oral stipulation
of the evidence and testimony or to the introduction of testimony by
affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any other documentary
evidence in support of the judgment of the court. Such waiver and
consent must be approved by the court in writing, and be filed in the file of
the papers of the cause.
4
TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (West 2005). 4
Appellant’s contention may be summed up that the record does not show any
judicial confession was offered or admitted into evidence and that, if such confession
was made, it was on a separate document page that did not contain the signature of
appellant or his counsel. Further, the trial court never took judicial notice of appellant’s
confession.
This Court has previously addressed this same contention. See Gonzalez v.
State, Nos. 07-11-0166-CR to 07-11-0169-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3395, at *5-7
(Tex.App.—Amarillo Apr. 30, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
In Gonzalez, we held that evidence sufficient to support a plea of guilty could be found
in the document styled, “Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and
Judicial Confession,” wherein the appellant stated he understood the allegations against
him and he confessed to the truth of those allegations. Id. at *5. This was true even
though the confession was not introduced nor did the trial court take judicial notice of
the confession on the record. Id. at *6. The judicial confession need not be introduced
into evidence nor does the trial court need to affirmatively take judicial notice of the
same. Id. at *6-7 (citing Richardson v. State, 475 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex.Crim.App.
1972), and Rexford v. State, 818 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
pet. ref’d)). We cited Rexford for the proposition that, for purposes of article 1.15, as
long as the document was on file with, and approved by the trial court, the document
had been accepted by the trial court and properly utilized as evidence of guilt. Id.
4
Further reference to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure will be by reference
to “article ____.”
5
Today, we are faced with the same contention and the same facts. Appellant
executed the same waiver and the waiver contains the required waiver of trial by jury,
appearance, confrontation, cross-examination of witnesses, and right against self-
incrimination. The document contains appellant’s judicial confession that, on the 26th
day of June, 2010, appellant did then and there operate a motor vehicle in a public
place while intoxicated. The document then contains the jurisdictional allegations of
prior driving while intoxicated convictions and the prior felony conviction. On the page
containing appellant’s signature, appellant states, “I understand the forgoing allegations
and I confess that they are true.” Below this statement is appellant’s signature, trial
counsel’s signature, and the State’s attorney’s signature. Finally, the trial court
accepted the waiver and judicial confession and ordered the documents filed in the
papers of the case. After which, the trial court signed the document.
As can be seen by the forgoing factual recitation, the requirements of article 1.15
have been met. The waivers required by articles 1.13 and 1.14 are present. The
evidence was stipulated to, as required by article 1.15, and the documents were
approved by the trial court and filed in the papers of the case. There was sufficient
evidence adduced at trial to support appellant’s plea of guilty. Accordingly, appellant’s
issue is overruled.
6
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s single issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.
7