Leroy Scott Roach v. State ( 2012 )

NO. 07-11-00059-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
OCTOBER 11, 2012
AMARILLO 'DILLAS BASEBALL CLUB, LLC, APPELLANT
v.
POTTER COUNTY, TEXAS, APPELLEE
FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 99,078-A; HONORABLE DAN L. SCHAAP, JUDGE
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Amarillo ‘Dillas Baseball Club, LLC (Dillas), appeals the trial court’s
granting of a plea to the jurisdiction filed by appellee, Potter County (County), based
upon the County’s assertion of governmental immunity. We will affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
The underlying basis of this dispute is a lease of a baseball stadium in Amarillo,
Potter County, Texas. The Dillas filed suit on November 5, 2010, requesting declaratory
relief and injunctive relief. The request for declaratory relief asks that the trial court
declare that, (1) the lease remains in effect unless the Dillas fail to pay the accrued
rental after the County strictly complies with a paragraph of the lease; and (2) the
purported termination of the lease by the County is not in compliance with the terms of
the lease and is, therefore, void. In its request for injunctive relief, the Dillas request an
injunction enjoining the County from forfeiting or terminating the lease without permitting
the Dillas an opportunity to cure any breach and, for 180 days thereafter, enjoining the
County from entering into a lease with any other person or entity, and not entering into a
lease or purchase of the stadium for a specified period of time set forth in the pleading.
Further, the Dillas original petition requested damages in an amount in excess of the
minimum jurisdictional levels of the court. 1
On November 8, 2010, the County filed a plea to the jurisdiction in open court
that requested that the Dillas’ suit be dismissed. 2 As a basis for this action, the County
asserted that it was a political subdivision of the State of Texas and, as such, entitled to
governmental immunity. The trial court orally granted the plea to the jurisdiction on
November 8, 2010, however, no written judgment appears in the record before us.
Following the trial court’s oral granting of the County’s plea to the jurisdiction, 3
the Dillas filed a motion for new trial and for leave to file another amended petition. The
1
In this appeal, the Dillas are not advancing any claim for monetary damages
against the County.
2
The clerk’s record indicates that the plea to the jurisdiction was filed on
November 9, 2010, however, all parties agree that the same was originally filed in open
court on November 8, 2010.
3
The order granting the plea to the jurisdiction does not appear in the clerk’s
record furnished in connection with this appeal.
2
County subsequently filed an answer to the motion for new trial. The trial court held a
hearing on the motion for new trial on December 23, 2010, and subsequently advised
the parties on January 19, 2011, that the motion for new trial was being overruled and
entered an order overruling the same. This appeal followed.
Through a single issue, the Dillas contend that the trial court’s order granting the
plea to the jurisdiction was reversible error. According to the Dillas, this is because
section 89.004(c) of the Texas Local Government Code waives governmental immunity.
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 89.004(c) (West 2008). 4 Disagreeing with the Dillas, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges the trial court’s
jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of the plea. Timmons v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 331
S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (citing Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136
S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004)). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential for a trial court to
decide a case. Ackers v. City of Lubbock, 253 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tex.App.—Amarillo
2007, pet. denied). The question of whether or not a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325
S.W.3d 622, 625 (Tex. 2010). We will review the pleadings of the party asserting
jurisdiction in the light most favorable to the trial court having jurisdiction. See Leach v.
Tex. Tech Univ., 335 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied).
4
Further reference to the Texas Local Government Code will be by reference to
“section ___,” “Section ____,” or “§ ____.”
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Applicable Law
Both parties recognize that Potter County is a political subdivision of the State of
Texas. Political subdivisions within the State of Texas enjoy governmental immunity,
which protects them from lawsuits for damages. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball
Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009). Governmental immunity involves two
issues: whether the State has consented to suit, and whether the State has accepted
liability. Id. Immunity from suit is jurisdictional and bars suit. Id. A statute shall not be
construed to waive immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous
language. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West Supp. 2012).
Analysis
The Dillas contend that section 89.004(c) contains the clear and unambiguous
language that will lead to the conclusion that the legislature intended to waive immunity
in the situation before the Court. The language keyed in on by the Dillas is contained in
the first sentence of subsection (c) and is as follows, “A person may file suit for
injunctive relief against a county.” § 89.004(c). According to the Dillas, this sentence
clearly establishes permission to file suit. The Dillas’ analysis begins with an
investigation of the use of the word “may” which, under the Dillas’ analysis, must be
interpreted to mean permission pursuant to the Code Construction Act. See TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 311.016(1) (West 2005). Accordingly, the portion of the statute at issue must
be read as “A person [is permitted to] file suit for injunctive relief against a county.”
This, then, satisfies the requirement for legislative permission under the Dillas’ first
theory.
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However, this analysis overlooks some very important keys to statutory
construction. First, “our objective is to determine and give effect to the [l]egislature’s
intent.” Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 842. We look to the plain meaning of
the statute’s words while reviewing the statute as a whole and not just selected portions.
Id.
The entirety of the statute at issue is as follows:
§ 89.004. Presentation of Claim
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (c), a person may not file suit on
a claim against a county or an elected or appointed county official
in the official’s capacity as an appointed or elected official unless
the person has presented the claim to the commissioners court and
the commissioners court neglects or refuses to pay all or part of the
claim before the 60th day after the day of the presentation of the
claim.
(b) If the plaintiff in a suit against a county does not recover more than
the commissioners court offered to pay on presentation of the
claim, the plaintiff shall pay the costs of the suit.
(c) A person may file a suit for injunctive relief against a county. After
the court’s ruling on the application for temporary injunctive relief,
any portion of the suit that seeks monetary damages shall be
abated until the claim is presented to the commissioners court and
the commissioners court neglects or refuses to pay all or part of the
claim by the 60th day after the date of the presentation of the claim.
The Texas Supreme Court has determined that section 89.004(a) is not a clear and
unambiguous waiver of immunity from suit. Travis Cnty. v. Pelzel & Assocs., Inc., 77
S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. 2002). Rather, it is a condition precedent to suit. Id. The
presentment requirement is present to notify the commissioners court of a claim, and to
afford it an opportunity to investigate and settle the claim. Id. (citing Essenburg v.
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Dallas Cnty., 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. 1998) (explaining that the previously
numbered statute was a condition precedent to suit to allow the commissioners an
opportunity to investigate the purported claim)).
If subsection (a) is a condition precedent, then what is the meaning of the
language “Except as provided in subsection (c)?” From the plain words of the statute, a
request for injunctive relief is relieved of the condition precedent of presentment. This
being so, is this a waiver of immunity by clear and unambiguous language? See TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034.
First, when read in the context of the entire statute and using the plain meaning
of the words, we find a presentment statute that contains an exception. See Harris
Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 842. The exception is for the filing for injunctive relief.
Later, in the same subsection (c), the statute provides for the abatement of any portion
of the suit for monetary damages until such time as these matters are presented to the
commissioners court. § 89.004(c). This last part of the statute clearly implicates the
presentment condition precedent contained in subparagraph (a). Since we assume that
the legislature understands the meaning of the words they have chosen and the effect
of those words, subsection (c) can be understood only to except requests for injunctive
relief from the presentment requirement of the entire statute. See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Ruttinger, 55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 912, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 501, at *59 (Tex. Jun. 22, 2012).
Next, when we view the words that the Dillas point us to in order to show that
governmental immunity has been waived (“A person may file a suit for injunctive relief
against a county . . . .”), we do not see language that we can view as express legislative
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permission to file suit. In fact, it is only if we ignore the requirement that we view the
statute as a whole that we could tend to lean toward the Dillas’ position. However, we
cannot interpret the statute in this manner. See Harris County Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d
at 842. Therefore, we decline to construe the language that the Dillas direct us to as
“language permitting suit.”
Next, the Dillas invite the Court to review the legislative history in order to
determine whether the legislature intended to waive immunity. Such an invitation, we
must decline. Initially, we note that no one contends that the language of the statute is
ambiguous or written in a manner that leaves its meaning unclear. We think that the
better practice is to derive the intent of the legislature from the language it actually used
in the statute. See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 Tex. LEXIS 501, at *64. Whereas the
Code Construction Act uses the permissive term “may” when describing what aids the
courts may turn to when construing a statute, we think the better practice is to rely on
the actual language used by the legislature, unless the statute at issue is ambiguous.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2005); Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P.
v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex. 2006).
In the final analysis, the language of the statute is clear to this Court. From that
language, we do not conclude that the legislature has made a clear and unambiguous
waiver of immunity. Accordingly, we overrule the Dillas’ issue on appeal.
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Conclusion
Having overruled the Dillas’ issue on appeal, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
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