Kelly Walls v. Daniel Klein ( 2014 )


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  •                                Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-13-00565-CV
    Kelly WALLS,
    Appellant
    v.
    Daniel
    Daniel KLEIN,
    Appellee
    From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2012-CI-11285
    Honorable Dick Alcala, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
    Sitting:          Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
    Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
    Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: July 9, 2014
    AFFIRMED
    Kelly Walls appeals the trial court’s judgment granting a permanent injunction in favor of
    Daniel Klein and awarding him damages for his breach of contract and defamation claims. On
    appeal, Walls contends: (1) Klein’s attorney engaged in incurable improper jury argument; (2) the
    trial court erred in admitting an exhibit that was not properly authenticated; (3) the injunction is
    unsupported by the jury’s findings and constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech;
    and (4) the trial court erred in failing to rule on Walls’s affirmative defenses. We affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    04-13-00565-CV
    BACKGROUND
    The factual and procedural background regarding the dispute between Walls and Klein is
    set forth in detail in this court’s prior opinion modifying and affirming a temporary injunction in
    Klein’s favor. See Walls v. Klein, No. 04-12-00615-CV, 
    2013 WL 988179
    , at *1-2 (Tex. App.—
    San Antonio Mar. 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). After this court affirmed the temporary
    injunction, a jury trial was held, and the jury answered questions relating to the permanent
    injunction and Klein’s counter-claims for breach of contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy.
    The trial court entered judgment based on the jury’s findings, and Walls appeals.
    IMPROPER JURY ARGUMENT
    In her first issue, Walls asserts “Klein’s jury arguments were so extreme and unsupported
    as to represent incurable error.” “To prevail on a claim that improper argument was incurable, the
    complaining party generally must show that the argument by its nature, degree, and extent
    constituted such error that an instruction from the court or retraction of the argument could not
    remove its effects.” Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Penalver, 
    256 S.W.3d 678
    , 680-81 (Tex. 2008).
    “Examples of incurable improper jury arguments can include appeals to racial prejudice,
    unsupported accusations of witness tampering by the opposing party, and unsupported, extreme,
    and personal attacks on opposing parties and witnesses.” PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo,
    LLC, 
    350 S.W.3d 699
    , 721 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). “Reasonable inferences and
    deductions from the evidence, by contrast, are permissible in closing argument.” 
    Id. at 721.
    “Hyperbole is also generally a permissible rhetorical technique in closing argument.” 
    Id. -2- 04-13-00565-CV
    Having reviewed the closing argument made by Klein’s attorney, we overrule Walls’s
    issue. Several of the arguments Walls cites in her brief were supported by direct evidence. 1 Other
    arguments Walls cites were supported by the attorney’s inferences and deductions from the direct
    evidence 2 and his use of hyperbole. 3 More importantly, however, we hold that none of the cited
    arguments rises to the level of incurable improper jury argument as asserted by Walls in her brief.
    Accordingly, Walls’s first issue is overruled.
    AUTHENTICATION
    In her second issue, Walls contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an
    exhibit that was not properly authenticated. 4 The requirement of authentication “is satisfied by
    evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”
    TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). One method of authenticating a document is by testimony of a witness with
    knowledge “that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” 
    Id. at 901(b)(1).
    “We review a trial court’s
    decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.” In re J.P.B., 
    180 S.W.3d 570
    ,
    575 (Tex. 2005).
    With regard to the exhibit in question, Klein testified that it was a page from Walls’s
    Facebook page which he had seen may times. Klein further testified that he printed off the page
    at a time when he had access to Walls’s Facebook page. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
    in determining that this testimony was sufficient to satisfy the authentication requirement. See 
    id. 1 For
    example, in response to whether Walls was cited with a criminal trespass warning by Temple Beth-El, Walls
    testified that she was issued a letter and asked not to return there. Klein testified that he was aware that Walls had
    been given a criminal trespass warning.
    2
    For example, Klein’s attorney was permitted to draw inferences about the validity of the criminal complaints reported
    by Walls from the authorities’ failure to pursue criminal charges against Klein.
    3
    The reference by Klein’s attorney to Klein’s desire to avoid a “nuclear bomb” is a permissible use of hyperbole.
    4
    Although Walls makes reference in her brief to Klein’s attorney suborning perjury by introducing two additional
    exhibits, her brief refers only to Defendant’s Exhibit 2 as not being properly authenticated. Since Walls’s second
    issue asserts the trial court erred in admitting evidence that was not properly authenticated, we only address the
    admissibility of Defendant’s Exhibit 2. See Hamilton v. Williams, 
    298 S.W.3d 334
    , 338 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    2009, pet. denied) (noting appellate court can disregard any assignment of error that is multifarious).
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    04-13-00565-CV
    Although Walls asserted in her objection that Klein had been blocked from accessing her Facebook
    page prior to the date the page was printed, the trial court, in overruling her objection, responded
    that Walls could impeach Klein about her contention. See In re J.A.S., No. 11-09-00176-CV, 
    2011 WL 704390
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 13, 2011, no pet.) (noting testimony that document
    is what it purports to be is sufficient to authenticate, “while the accuracy of the testimony is for
    the factfinder”). Walls’s second issue is overruled.
    INJUNCTION
    In her third issue, Walls contends the trial court erred in granting the permanent injunction
    in favor of Klein because it was unsupported by the jury’s findings and constituted an
    unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. This court previously rejected Walls’s constitutionality
    argument in our prior opinion affirming the trial court’s temporary injunction. Walls, 
    2013 WL 988179
    , at *2-5. Moreover, the jury found that Walls was liable for defamation and invasion of
    privacy and committed acts with the intent to harass, annoy, intimidate, humiliate, or threaten
    Klein. These findings are sufficient to support the permanent injunction. See Memon v. Shaikh,
    
    401 S.W.3d 407
    , 423 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (holding jury’s defamation
    finding supported permanent injunction); Bostow v. Bank of America, No. 14-04-00256-CV, 
    2006 WL 89446
    , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 17, 2006, no pet.) (holding jury’s finding
    that party engaged in harassing behavior supported permanent injunction) (mem. op.); see also
    Valenzuela v. Aquino, 
    853 S.W.2d 512
    , 513 (Tex. 1993) (suggesting permanent injunction could
    be based on jury finding liability for invasion of privacy). Walls’s third issue is overruled.
    AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
    In her fourth issue, Walls contends the trial court erred in failing to rule on her affirmative
    defenses. In her brief, Walls fails to even identify the affirmative defenses to which her complaint
    relates. In addition, as Klein notes in his brief, Walls had the burden to request jury questions on
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    04-13-00565-CV
    her affirmative defenses, and by failing to make such a request, Walls failed to preserve this
    complaint for our review. See AMS Const. Co. v. K.H.K. Scaffolding Houston, Inc., 
    357 S.W.3d 30
    , 43 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d); Palacios v. Robbins, No. 04-02-00338-
    CV, 
    2003 WL 21502371
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 2, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.);
    Abraxus Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 
    20 S.W.3d 741
    , 763 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.).
    Walls’s fourth issue is overruled.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
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