Willow Vista Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Melissa A. Haight ( 2013 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00432-CV
WILLOW VISTA ESTATES APPELLANT
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC.
V.
MELISSA A. HAIGHT APPELLEE
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FROM THE 352ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Willow Vista Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. (the HOA)
appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for judgment nunc pro tunc, which
sought to correct a final default judgment against appellee Melissa A. Haight.
We reverse and remand.
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Background Facts
The HOA is responsible for collecting assessments from homeowners in
the Willow Vista Estates development. Haight is a homeowner in the
development who is required to pay assessments. When Haight failed to pay
after repeated demands, the HOA sued Haight. After she failed to appear or file
an answer, the HOA moved for default judgment, seeking the right to foreclose
upon Haight’s property.
At the hearing on the HOA’s motion, the trial court explained it was
concerned that Haight “may not have realized that the HOA was attempting to
foreclose on her property.” The trial court stated that it would grant the default
judgment, except for the right to foreclose. It reset the remainder of the
requested relief (that is, the right to foreclose) and requested that the HOA send
Haight another notice making it clear “that the purpose of the hearing was to
foreclose or to consider foreclosure on her home.” The HOA submitted a
proposed interlocutory default judgment stating the amount of damages, which
the trial court said it would sign. However, the trial court inadvertently failed to
sign it.
The HOA sent the notice of the hearing to Haight as the trial court
requested, and Haight again failed to appear at the reset hearing. On September
11, 2012, the trial court granted the default judgment against Haight. The final
default judgment states that the HOA “shall be permitted to foreclose upon the
property as requested,” but it does not state the amount of damages awarded,
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including the assessments due and the attorney’s fees incurred, that was
included in the interlocutory default judgment that the trial court failed to sign.
On October 26, 2012, the HOA filed a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc,
requesting that the trial court correct the error in the judgment to include the
amount of debt that Haight owed. The trial court denied the motion. It stated that
although its failure to sign the proposed interlocutory default judgment was error,
it could not grant the judgment nunc pro tunc because it had lost plenary power
to modify the final default judgment. The HOA then filed this appeal.
Discussion
In its sole issue on appeal, the HOA argues that its motion for judgment
nunc pro tunc should have been granted because clerical errors may be
corrected even after the trial court’s plenary power has expired.
We must first determine whether the complained-of error is clerical or
judicial. A trial court may correct clerical errors in judgments under Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 316. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 316. However, a trial court cannot
correct a judicial error made in rendering a final judgment once its plenary power
has expired. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. 1986). “A judicial
error is an error which occurs in the rendering as opposed to the entering of a
judgment.” Id. That is, a clerical error is a discrepancy between the entry of a
judgment in the record and the judgment that was actually rendered by the court,
and does not arise from judicial reasoning or determination. See Rawlins v.
Rawlins, 324 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)
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“The court can only correct the entry of a final written judgment that incorrectly
states the judgment actually rendered. Thus, even if the court renders incorrectly,
it cannot alter a written judgment which precisely reflects the incorrect rendition.”
Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231–32. Whether an error is judicial or clerical is a
matter of law. Id. at 232.
In this case, the trial court orally agreed to sign the proposed interlocutory
judgment, which set the amount of damages recoverable by the HOA from
Haight to be $1,014.86 in unpaid assessments, $2,500 in attorney’s fees,
additional attorney’s fees contingent upon appeals, and postjudgment interest at
the rate of 5% per annum. The HOA does not argue, and the trial court did not
find, that these amounts are incorrect. The HOA only complains that their
absence from the final judgment makes it impossible for them to foreclose on
Haight’s property. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 309 (“Judgments for the foreclosure of . . .
liens shall be that the plaintiff recover his debt, damages[,] and costs, with a
foreclosure of the plaintiff’s lien on the property subject thereto.”). The trial court
granted the default judgment stating that the HOA could foreclose on Haight’s
property, and it had intended, but failed, to sign the interlocutory summary
judgment, which reflected the amount of damages. The lack of the damages
amount in the final default judgment was therefore a clerical error.
We next address whether the trial court could correct the judgment to
include the amount of damages after its plenary power expired. Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 329b(f) states that “a judgment cannot be set aside by the trial
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court except by bill of review for sufficient cause . . . provided that the court may
at any time correct a clerical error in the record of a judgment and render
judgment nunc pro tunc under Rule 316.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f). The supreme
court has stated, “After the trial court loses its jurisdiction over a judgment, it can
correct only clerical errors in the judgment by judgment nunc pro tunc. In this
regard, the trial court has plenary power to correct a clerical error made in
entering final judgment.” Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231 (citing Comet Aluminum
Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1970)). It thus appears clear that a trial court
retains the power to correct a clerical error under Rule 316 even after its plenary
power to modify, correct, or reform a judgment has expired. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
329b (distinguishing a motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment from a
motion for judgment nunc pro tunc under Rule 316); see also Tex. R. App. P.
4.3(b) (regarding situations in which the trial court has corrected a judgment after
the expiration of its plenary power, thus assuming that such an act may be valid).
The trial court found in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that it had
intended to sign the interlocutory default judgment so that the HOA could
proceed with foreclosure and that its failure to sign it “was error.” See In re
Broussard, 112 S.W.3d 827, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig.
proceeding) (stating that a judgment nunc pro tunc should be granted if the
evidence is clear and convincing that a clerical error was made). The expiration
of its plenary power over the final judgment did not prevent it from entering the
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judgment nunc pro tunc to reflect the relief that it granted to the HOA. We
sustain the HOA’s issue.
Conclusion
Having sustained the HOA’s sole issue on appeal, we reverse the trial
court’s denial of the HOA’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc and remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: August 22, 2013
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