in Re: C.D. Henderson Construction Services, LTD. ( 2013 )


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  • Writ of Mandamus is Conditionally Granted; Opinion Filed August 1, 2013.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-13-00593-CV
    IN RE C.D. HENDERSON CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LTD., C.D. HENDERSON
    CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., NORTHWEST CONSTRUCTION SERVICES,
    L.P., AND NORTHWEST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Relators
    On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 05-6533-D
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Moseley, Francis, and Fillmore
    Opinion by Justice Moseley
    Relators filed this mandamus proceeding after the trial court appointed a receiver over
    them and then expanded the powers of that receiver. We conclude that the trial court’s orders are
    void as to relators, and conditionally grant mandamus relief.
    Real parties in interest Mockingbird Station Partners, L.P. and Simpson Texas Financing
    Limited Partnership initiated an arbitration proceeding against C.D. Henderson, Inc., and
    received an award in their favor in 2005. The trial court signed a judgment based on that award
    in September 2005. In 2011, real parties in interest filed a motion for appointment of a receiver,
    asking that a receiver be appointed not only for judgment debtor and defendant C.D. Henderson,
    Inc. but also over relators and Charles D. Henderson individually. Real parties in interest
    asserted that they were entitled to have a receiver appointed for these entities under the Texas
    Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and the alter ego doctrine. The motion was not served on
    relators or the registered agent of any relator, and relators filed no response to the motion and did
    not appear at the hearing on the motion.
    In November 2011, the trial court appointed a receiver for C.D. Henderson, Inc. That
    receiver filed a preliminary report in June 2012 and recommended that the trial court appoint a
    receiver for “all companies operating under the C.D. Henderson Construction Group,” including
    relators. The receiver’s report was not served on relators, and they did not appear at the hearing
    held on the recommendations. Nonetheless, on October 10, 2012, the trial court signed an order
    appointing a receiver for relators. In April 2013, the receiver filed a motion to expand his
    powers, seeking exclusive control over the business affairs and assets of all of the receivership
    entities, including relators. The trial court granted this motion on May 2, 2013.
    Relators complain that the trial court’s order is void as to them because they were not
    served with process or otherwise notified of the receivership proceedings. “Personal jurisdiction
    is composed of two elements: (1) the defendant must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the
    court; and (2) if the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff must
    validly invoke that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant.” Kawasaki Steel
    Corp. v. Middleton, 
    699 S.W.2d 199
    , 200 (Tex. 1985). Real parties in interest do not dispute that
    they failed to name relators as defendants in the case, serve them with process, and notify them
    of the hearings on the receivership. Therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction over relators,
    and it was error to appoint a receiver for relators and expand the powers of that receiver. See
    Benefit Planners, L.L.P. v. RenCare, Ltd., 
    81 S.W.3d 855
    , 861-62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
    2002, pet. denied).
    Real parties in interest argue that relators submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction
    because C.D. Henderson, Inc. argued against the appointment of a receiver over relators and
    because an attorney for relators agreed to the form of a November 2011 order denying C.D.
    –2–
    Henderson, Inc.’s motion to disqualify the receiver. We conclude that neither of these facts is
    sufficient to subject relators to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Similarly, we do not find that
    relators waived their right to mandamus by not challenging the order appointing the receiver
    before the trial court orally granted the receiver’s motion for expanded powers.
    Finally, real parties in interest argue that relators could have appealed the appointment of
    the receiver. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012).
    However, Texas law has long held that mandamus will issue where the trial court’s order is void
    and that it is unnecessary for a relator to pursue other available remedies. See Buttery v. Betts,
    422. S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1967); Amateur Athletic Found. v. Hoffman, 
    893 S.W.2d 602
    , 603
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding).
    Accordingly, we conditionally grant relators’ petition for writ of mandamus. The writ
    will issue only if the trial judge fails to vacate, as to relators, his October 10, 2012 “Order
    Appointing Receiver for Additional Assets Owned or Controlled by Defendant C.D. Henderson,
    Inc.” and his May 2, 2013 “Order Expanding Receiver’s Powers.”
    /Jim Moseley/
    JIM MOSELEY
    JUSTICE
    130593F.P05
    –3–