eLaws | Code of Federal Regulations | United States Code |
 All Courts
 State Courts
 Court of Appeals of Texas
 2011-12

Nancy Yvonne Iiams v. Federal National Mortgage Association A/K/A Fannie Mae ( 2011 )


Menu:
 
  •                                  NO. 07-11-0037-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL D
DECEMBER 22, 2011
NANCY Y. IIAMS,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A
FANNIE MAE,
Appellee
_____________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 4 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY;
NO. 10-1185-CC4; HONORABLE JOHN MCMASTER, PRESIDING
Memorandum Opinion
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Nancy Y. Iiams appeals pro se a trial court judgment of forcible detainer ordering
Iiams to vacate the premises at 3813 Links Lane, Round Rock, Texas, in favor of the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). She contends that the trial court
denied her due process in failing to explain to her that Rule of Evidence 902 would be
used at trial to authenticate copies of the Substitute Trustee’s Deed as a business
record to show that Fannie Mae purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. She
further contends that original documents must be used.        We affirm for the following
reasons.
First, Iiams failed to raise her due process allegation at the hearing when the
business records were introduced into evidence.          Thus, the contention was not
preserved for review. Neely v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline,
    302 S.W.3d 331
    , 339
n.6 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (the failure to raise a due process
claim to the trial court waives it).
Second, Iiams cited no legal authority supporting her contention that the trial
court had a duty to explain the Rules of Evidence to her or that only original documents
could have been admitted at the hearing. By failing to do so, she inadequately briefed
her complaints and, therefore, waived them. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h) (stating that the
brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record); ERI Consulting Engineers, Inc. v.
Swinnea,
    318 S.W.3d 867
    , 880 (Tex. 2010).
Third, a pro se litigant is held to the same rules as a licensed attorney. Mansfield
State Bank v. Cohn,
    572 S.W.2d 181
    , 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Alexander Shren-Yee Cheng
v. Zhaoya Wang,
    315 S.W.3d 668
    , 672 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010, no pet.) (a pro se
litigant not understanding the technicalities of the rules of evidence does not constitute
grounds for reversal); Baughman v. Baughman,
    65 S.W.3d 309
    , 314 (Tex. App.–Waco
2001, pet. denied) (stating that the rules of evidence contain no provision for being
relaxed because one party is not represented by an attorney). Thus, Iiams was bound
by the rules irrespective of whether anyone explained them to her.
2
Fourth, Iiams does not argue that the requirements contained in Texas Rule of
Evidence 902(10) (describing the manner of authenticating business records by
affidavit) were not met. Nor does she allege that the records in question failed to come
within an exception to the hearsay rule such as that provided in Texas Rules of
Evidence 803(6) and (7).     She also fails to contend that the evidence warranting
issuance of the writ of possession was insufficient despite application of the
aforementioned rules of evidence or otherwise contend that those rules were
inapplicable.
Accordingly, we overrule the contentions she does assert and affirm the
judgment.
Per Curiam
3