Arthur Vega Individually and D/B/A Dolco Packaging v. Compass Bank ( 2014 )


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  •                               Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-13-00383-CV
    Arthur VEGA Individually and d/b/a Dolco Packaging,
    Appellants
    v.
    Compass
    COMPASS BANK,
    Appellee
    From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2012-CI-07719
    Honorable Laura Salinas, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
    Sitting:          Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
    Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
    Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: March 12, 2014
    AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED
    This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellee, Compass Bank.
    On appeal, appellants, Arthur Vega individually and doing business as Dolco Packaging, challenge
    the summary judgment on liability and on the amount of attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs
    awarded to Compass. We affirm the summary judgment on liability, but reverse the trial court’s
    award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings.
    04-13-00383-CV
    BACKGROUND
    In the lawsuit, Compass alleged a check in the amount of $114,280.07 made payable to
    Dolco Packaging (hereinafter, “the check”) was deposited into a Compass Bank account titled to
    Dolco Packaging. James Ballweg, Jr. and Vega were signers on the account. According to
    Compass, over the next few weeks the proceeds were transferred out of the Dolco account. The
    check was later returned by Harris Bank as forged, and as a result, the Dolco account became
    overdrawn in excess of $100,000. Compass sued Ballweg individually and doing business as
    Dolco Packaging, and Arthur Vega individually and doing business as Dolco Packaging
    (collectively, “the defendants”). Compass then filed a traditional motion for summary judgment
    against all defendants. The trial court rendered a partial summary judgment in favor of Compass
    against Ballweg and severed the remaining claims. The trial court later rendered a final summary
    judgment against Vega individually and doing business as Dolco Packaging for $70,878.03 in
    damages; $8,279.22 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs; and statutory post-judgment interest.
    Vega and Dolco Packaging (hereinafter, “Vega”) now appeal. 1
    SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY
    In its motion for summary judgment, Compass asserted the defendants took possession of
    and negotiated the check, and were provided credit in their bank account for the amount of the
    check. Compass alleged the defendants then transferred the funds to other bank accounts and/or
    allegedly absconded with the proceeds. Compass contends it is entitled to charge back or obtain a
    refund from defendants in the amount of the check. Therefore, Compass argues under both the
    terms of a deposit agreement entered into with the defendants and under the provisions of the
    Texas Business and Commerce Code, Vega should be liable to Compass for damages resulting
    1
    Ballweg has not appealed the summary judgment against him.
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    04-13-00383-CV
    from the defendants’ improper actions. Because Compass based its entitlement to summary
    judgment on two grounds—breach of contract and provisions of the Business and Commerce
    Code—and because the trial court did not state the grounds on which it rendered judgment in favor
    of Compass, we will affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious.
    Carr v. Brasher, 
    776 S.W.2d 567
    , 569 (Tex. 1989). We first address Compass’s breach of contract
    claim.
    The elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the existence of a valid contract between
    Compass and Vega; (2) Compass performed or tendered performance; (3) Vega breached the
    contract; and (4) Compass was damaged as a result of the breach. See Southwell v. Univ. of the
    Incarnate Word, 
    974 S.W.2d 351
    , 354-55 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (listing
    elements).
    As evidence of the existence of a contract between itself and Vega, Compass attached to
    its motion for summary judgment a copy of the Dolco Packaging “Non-Personal Deposit Account
    Signature Card,” which is signed by both Vega and Ballweg.              The card states that “[t]he
    undersigned agree(s) to the terms and conditions of the Non-Consumer Account Agreement and
    acknowledge(s) receipt of a copy of the Agreement and a current interest and service charge
    schedule or disclosure.” Compass also attached a copy of the Agreement.
    As evidence that it tendered performance by providing provisional credit on the check,
    Compass relied on the following summary judgment evidence. Compass attached the affidavit of
    its employee, Cynthia Capron, who stated the check was deposited into defendants’ bank account,
    Harris Bank later sent a forged endorsement claim, and the defendants used the funds deposited
    into the account. Attached to Capron’s affidavit were several exhibits, including: (1) a copy of the
    check, (2) the signature card and Agreement, and (3) Dolco Packaging bank statements showing
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    04-13-00383-CV
    the deposit of the check. Compass also relied on the “Deposits and Collections” section of the
    Agreement, which provides as follows:
    Any item that we cash or accept for deposit may be subject to later verification and
    final payment. We may deduct funds from your account if . . . [an item] is returned
    to us unpaid, or if it was improperly paid, even if you have already used the funds.
    ...
    Credit for any item we accept for deposit to your account . . . is provisional and
    may be revoked if the item is not finally paid, for any reason, in cash or its
    equivalent.
    As evidence of Vega’s breach and that it was damaged by the breach, Compass relied on
    other exhibits to Capron’s affidavit, such as: (1) Dolco Packaging bank statements showing various
    withdrawals from the account and an overdrawn ending balance (as of February 29, 2012) in the
    amount of -100,878.03, and (2) Harris Bank’s refund request. Compass also relied on a section of
    the Agreement entitled “Insufficient Available Balance and Overdrafts” that states, in part,
    [i]n the event you fail to pay the amount of any overdraft and all associated service
    charges and we refer your overdrawn account to an attorney for collection, you
    agree to pay all reasonable expenses, including without limitation, attorney’s fees
    and court costs, incurred by us as a result of your account being overdrawn.
    In his response to Compass’s motion for summary judgment, Vega did not dispute the
    existence of a contract, that Compass tendered performance by giving provisional credit on the
    check, that the Dolco Packaging account later became overdrawn, or that the overdraft was not
    repaid. Instead, Vega relied on various provisions of the Texas Business and Commerce Code for
    his argument that he is not liable for any damages because he did not endorse the check, did not
    receive any proceeds represented by the check, and did not convert the check.
    We do not address Vega’s arguments under the Business and Commerce Code because we
    conclude Compass established its breach of contract claim as a matter of law. Under the
    Agreement, Compass was entitled to provide only provisional credit for a deposit and Compass
    was entitled to seek repayment of any overdraft and associated charges from any account owner.
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    04-13-00383-CV
    It is undisputed that Vega was a signer on the Dolco Packaging account and, as such, subject to
    the terms of the Agreement. Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly rendered summary
    judgment in favor of Compass on liability under Compass’s breach of contract claim.
    ATTORNEY’S FEES
    Vega devotes almost the entirety of his brief on appeal to the trial court’s award of
    attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs to Compass in the amount of $8,279.22. On appeal, Vega
    argues the affidavit on which Compass relied, that of Compass attorney William P. Huttenbach, is
    insufficient to support the amount of the award. Vega also challenges the reasonableness of the
    award.
    In his affidavit, Huttenbach stated he charges $315.00 per hour and:
    I, or another attorney or paralegal with my firm, researched the facts and law
    involved in the matter, reviewed and analyzed various documents, drafted various
    documents, motions and pleadings involving this dispute. I, or another attorney or
    paralegal, have drafted a demand letter, original petition, written discovery to both
    Defendants, and prepared this Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants
    and supporting exhibits and affidavits. I have drafted settlement documents,
    motions to compel and had many communications with Defendants and my client.
    Huttenbach concluded that Compass “has incurred or expects to incur in excess of
    [$8,279.22] in reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees, costs and expenses in this matter.” On
    appeal, Vega complains the affidavit is insufficient to support the award because it does not itemize
    a breakdown between attorney’s fees and costs/expenses; there is nothing in the record
    documenting the award; and Compass is not entitled to expenses in addition to court costs.
    An attorney’s affidavit can sufficiently establish reasonable attorney’s fees on a motion for
    summary judgment. American 10–Minute Oil Change, Inc. v. Metropolitan Nat’l Bank-Farmer’s
    Branch, 
    783 S.W.2d 598
    , 602 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ); Querner Truck Lines, Inc. v.
    Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 
    747 S.W.2d 464
    , 468 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ). However,
    the nonmovant may create a fact issue by filing an affidavit contesting the reasonableness of the
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    04-13-00383-CV
    movant’s attorney’s fees. Gen. Specialties, Inc. v. Charter Nat’l Bank-Houston, 
    687 S.W.2d 772
    ,
    774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
    Vega, who is himself an attorney, filed his affidavit in which he stated:
    [Huttenbach] submitted no evidence regarding when he was licensed; how many
    years he has engaged in this type of litigation; how many cases he has tried as first
    chair; and whether he has any certifications to justify such an hourly rate. . . . I
    object to such fees as not being reasonable and necessary. . . . I object to an award
    of any expenses and costs since there is no evidence to support such an award.
    We conclude Vega’s affidavit was sufficient to raise a fact issue on both the amount and
    the reasonableness of the award. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees,
    expenses, and costs to Compass on this record.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of
    Compass Bank on liability under Compass’s breach of contract claim. However, we reverse the
    trial court’s award of attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs to Compass in the amount of $8,279.22
    and we remand for further proceedings on the amount, if any, to be awarded Compass for
    attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs.
    Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
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