Randall David Robinson v. State ( 2013 )

Opinion issued November 14, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-01083-CR
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RANDALL DAVID ROBINSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 232nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1354577
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After appellant, Randall David Robinson, with an agreed punishment
recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the offense of possession of a
controlled substance weighing less than one gram, 1 the trial court deferred
1
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(b) (Vernon 2010).
adjudication of his guilt and placed him on community supervision for four years.
In one issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial
motion to suppress evidence.
We affirm.
Background
At the pretrial hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, Houston Police
Department (“HPD”) Officer L. Vaughn testified that on July 17, 2012, he was
conducting surveillance of a Whataburger restaurant parking lot when he saw what
he believed to be a narcotics transaction. Vaughn saw the passenger of appellant’s
car exit and enter the front passenger seat of another car. After “about a minute,”
the passenger exited from the second car and entered into the front passenger seat
of appellant’s car. Vaughn considered this to be suspicious activity, and, as a
result, requested assistance from other police officers.
HPD Officer S. Chaffin was part of the same tactical unit working in a “high
crime” area of Houston, which required that Chaffin and Vaughn dress in plain
clothes and drive unmarked cars. On the police radio, Chaffin heard Vaughn’s
report of suspicious activity, and when he saw Vaughn’s vehicle following
appellant, he “fell in behind” them. Chaffin and Vaughn followed appellant for a
brief period of time before both saw him committing traffic violations.
Specifically, the officers saw appellant change lanes without signaling and cross a
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stop light intersection in front of another car. Vaughn reported the traffic
violations so an officer in a marked police car could conduct the traffic stop.
Chaffin and Vaughn continued to follow appellant until the officer in the marked
police car caught up with and stopped appellant’s car.
HPD Officer K. Cockrill testified that while on patrol in his marked police
car, he heard Officer Vaughn’s initial call over the radio about a possible narcotics
transaction and his subsequent call regarding traffic violations. Cockrill pulled
over appellant’s car and approached the driver side of the car. Shortly after that,
Officer Chaffin approached the driver’s side of the car and Vaughn approached the
passenger side. After Cockrill asked appellant for his identification, which he was
unable to provide, Cockrill asked him to step out of the car. After appellant exited
his car, Cockrill asked him “if he had anything illegal on him, anything illegal in
the vehicle, narcotics, handguns, knife, hand grenades anything like that.” 2 In
response to Cockrill’s question, appellant stated that he had a “pipe” in his pocket.
Cockrill retrieved a glass pipe and asked if he had anything else on him that was
illegal. Appellant admitted that “he had meth in the other pocket.” After removing
a baggie from appellant’s pocket, Cockrill arrested him for possession of
methamphetamine.
2
Officer Chaffin heard Officer Cockrill questioning appellant, and he explained that
these were “standard questions” and “common” for this type of stop.
3
Appellant testified that he and his friend, Cameron Cruz, were eating lunch
at a taqueria when Cruz asked appellant to drive him over to the Whataburger
restaurant so he could “talk to someone.” Appellant agreed and waited in the car
as Cruz met with someone in the Whataburger parking lot. Appellant did not know
the purpose of their meeting until a day or two later when Cruz told him that it was
to purchase narcotics. After Cruz re-entered appellant’s car, they drove away and
were pulled over by Officer Cockrill. When Cockrill approached him, appellant
asked why he had been stopped. Cockrill told him that he had “changed lanes a
couple times without signaling” and then told him to exit the car and put his hands
on top of the car. Once he got out of the car, Cockrill began to “thorough[ly]
search” him by putting his hands in his pockets. Appellant denied that he
volunteered information to the officers regarding the methamphetamine. Cockrill
found the glass pipe in his left pocket and a small baggie of methamphetamine in
his right pocket.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, his statements
and actions, and the testimony of the three police officers involved in the arrest.
After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion with respect to appellant’s
statements in response to questions, but denied it as to the methamphetamine.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App.
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2013). We review the trial court’s factual findings for abuse of discretion and
review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. Almost total
deference should be given to a trial court’s determination of historical facts,
especially those based on an evaluation of witness credibility or demeanor.
Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). At a suppression
hearing, the trial court is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the
witnesses’ credibility and may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the
witnesses’ testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Where, as here,
a trial judge does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We will defer to the trial court’s fact findings and not
disturb the findings on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion in making
a finding not supported by the record. Cantu v. State, 817 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991).
Motion to Suppress
In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress with respect to the methamphetamine because it
was the product of an improper custodial interrogation during which he was not
advised of his legal rights, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct.
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1602, 1612 (1966). Appellant asserts that “the methamphetamine would not have
been found and no conviction would have resulted if he had received Miranda
warnings” and he felt he had “no choice” but to respond to Cockrill’s inquiry about
illegal substances because the question was “inseparably woven into Cockrill’s
absolutely legitimate inquiry regarding officer safety.” 3 The State asserts in
response that the search was consensual, it was incident to appellant’s arrest for
traffic violations, and, even if appellant’s statements were made without Miranda
warnings, the evidence obtained need not be suppressed.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 9 of the Texas Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures by government officials.4 Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007); Atkins v. State, 882 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
3
We note that appellant’s own testimony at the hearing on his motion to suppress
that Officer Cockrill did not ask him any questions but immediately began
searching him contradicts his argument on appeal that it was his answer to
Cockrill’s improper compound question about possession of anything illegal that
“immediately resulted in his arrest.”
4
Appellant does not specifically state whether he believes that his federal or state
constitutional rights were violated. When an appellant does not separately brief
state and federal constitutional claims, we assume that he claims no greater
protection under the state constitution than that provided by the federal
constitution. See Reed v. State, 308 S.W.3d 417, 419 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2010, no pet.); Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Therefore, we will analyze appellant’s claims under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, following guidelines set by
the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. See State
v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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1994, pet. ref’d). Absent a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)). One of these exceptions is a “search incident to
arrest.” See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (1969).
“Search of the person becomes lawful [without a warrant] when grounds for arrest
and accusation have been discovered. . . .” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 232, 94 S. Ct. 467, 475 (1973). Consent to search is another exception to the
constitutional requirement of a warrant and probable cause. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043–44 (1973); Carmouche v.
State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Officer Cockrill testified that appellant consented to the search. He opined
that appellant “[was not] a problem to deal with. He was quite polite actually.”
This was contradicted by appellant’s testimony that Cockrill did not ask him any
questions and he would not have been “dumb enough” to volunteer that he had a
pipe and methamphetamine. The trial court is the sole and exclusive judge of the
credibility of the witnesses. Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281. Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the trial court could have
reasonably found that appellant consented to the search.
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The Texas Transportation Code provides that a person commits a traffic
violation if the person does not signal when intending to turn or change lanes.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.104(a) (Vernon 2011). If a police officer observes
a person committing a traffic violation, the officer is authorized to arrest the person
without a warrant. Id. at § 543.001 (Vernon 2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005); Garcia v. State, 218 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Probable cause for an arrest exists if the officer
has a reasonable belief, based on the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
personal knowledge or of which the officer has gained trustworthy information, the
defendant committed an offense. See State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999); Garcia, 218 S.W.3d at 759-60 (“An arrest for a minor traffic
violation is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”) (citing
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1550, 1557
(2001); State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Incident to
such an arrest, an officer may lawfully search the suspect’s person. Davis v.
United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011) (“a police officer who
makes a lawful arrest may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee’s person”);
State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Appellant does not contest that Officer Cockrill had probable cause to make
the traffic stop of his car, and he stipulated that there were sufficient observations
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by the police officers to make a pretext stop. In fact, appellant concedes that “the
Police already had an adequate basis for stopping [a]ppellant’s vehicle, either with
or without any observed traffic violation.” Appellant asserts, however, that there
was not probable cause to “thoroughly search” him and he was arrested “for his
truthful response to the subject question.” The traffic violation that appellant
committed was an arrestable offense. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 545.104(a),
543.001. In denying appellant’s motion to suppress, the trial court impliedly found
that the officers’ testimony was credible and Cockrill had probable cause to believe
appellant had committed a traffic offense. Both Officers Vaughn and Chaffin
testified that they saw appellant commit several traffic violations by changing lanes
without signaling. The record therefore supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Cockrill had probable cause to stop appellant. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d
85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). With probable cause to stop appellant’s car and
arrest him for traffic violations, Cockrill could lawfully search appellant. Cockrill
testified that he detained appellant with the intent was to arrest him for traffic
violations and his search of appellant was incident to that arrest.5 Viewing the
5
Appellant argues that the State’s “search incident to arrest” arguments are
negated because appellant was not ultimately arrested for the turn-signal
violation or any other traffic offense. However, an officer’s subjective
reasons for a detention or arrest are not considered, and it is irrelevant if the
officer stops or arrests a suspect for another reason. See Garcia v. State, 827
S.W.2d 937, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538,
543 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
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evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the trial court could
have reasonably concluded that Cockrill searched appellant incident to the arrest.
Appellant argues that the evidence obtained should be excluded because it
was the result of a custodial interrogation without him being advised of his
Miranda rights. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88, 83 S. Ct.
407, 417 (1963); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 2005).
A defendant’s statements made during a custodial interrogation must be suppressed
if the defendant was not informed of his legal rights. See Williams v. State, 270
S.W.3d 112, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Whereas statements taken in violation
of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result
of those statements need not be suppressed. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
452, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2368 (1974); Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). The rule articulated in Wong Sun requires suppressing the fruits of a
defendant’s statement only when the statement was obtained through actual
coercion. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448–449, 94 S. Ct. at 2365–67. Appellant makes no
such argument, and the record does not reflect, any suggestion that Cockrill
coerced appellant. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying
appellant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
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Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Brown.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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