Robert David Arguijo v. State ( 2010 )

NO. 07-09-0297-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
NOVEMBER 10, 2010
ROBERT DAVID ARGUIJO, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF CASTRO COUNTY;
NO. B3145-0708; HONORABLE EDWARD SELF, JUDGE
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On August 28, 2009, Appellant, Robert David Arguijo, was adjudicated guilty of
the offense of aggravated assault 1 and sentenced to ten years confinement and a fine
of $5,000. In a single issue, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
denying him the opportunity to hire counsel of his choice. We affirm.
1
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2010).
Background
On February 12, 2008, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of
aggravated assault. Pursuant to a plea bargain, he was granted five years deferred
adjudication community supervision.
On December 31, 2008, the State filed an Amended Motion to Proceed to
Adjudication alleging the following violations of the terms and conditions of his
community supervision: (1) failed to report to the Community Supervision Officer, (2)
failed to pay restitution, fees, and costs, and (3) failed to complete community service
hours. On April 2, 2009, following a hearing on the State's amended motion, the trial
court entered an order continuing Appellant on deferred adjudication community
supervision and modifying the terms thereof to include, among other conditions,
Appellant's commitment to the Lubbock County Court Residential Treatment Center.
On July 22, 2009, the State filed a subsequent Motion to Proceed to Adjudication
alleging Appellant failed to complete the court-ordered residential treatment center
program. On August 6, Appellant filed an affidavit of financial status which indicated he
had no income and requested court-appointed counsel. The same day, the trial court
appointed Kregg Hukill to represent Appellant and set a hearing on the State's Motion to
Proceed to Adjudication for August 28.
Prior to the commencement of the hearing on August 28, Appellant's counsel
announced he was ready to proceed but indicated that Appellant wanted more time to
hire an attorney of his choosing. Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:
2
DEFENDANT: Your honor, I would like to ask for more time so I
could hire my own lawyer.
COURT: You asked the Court to appoint a lawyer for you on
August 6, 2009. You submitted a financial affidavit
indicating you had no income. That's why Mr. Hukill
was appointed for you. So why do you think you can
afford to hire your own lawyer now?
DEFENDANT: My mother is going to help me.
COURT: Why didn't she help before?
DEFENDANT: I had no contact with her at the time. I didn't know if
she was going to be able to.
COURT: How much time is it going to take you to get a lawyer,
then?
DEFENDANT: I think about---I'm not sure, your Honor.
COURT: Not sure?
DEFENDANT: No, sir.
COURT: I will deny your motion for continuance, then. We'll
proceed.
Appellant signed a stipulation of evidence admitting that all of the facts and
allegations in the State's motion to adjudicate were true and correct and, thereafter,
entered a plea of true. The trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty and sentenced him to
ten years confinement and assessed a $5,000 fine, court costs, restitution and
attorney's fees--previously assessed but unpaid. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying a request for a continuance
so that he could retain counsel of his choosing rather than proceed with the attorney
who had been appointed to represent him.
3
Standard of Review
Appellant's request to the trial court for more time to retain different counsel and
his appellate complaint involving the denial of that request is a challenge to the denial of
a motion for a continuance. 2 See Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 722-24
(Tex.App.--Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 999, 127 S. Ct. 502, 166
L. Ed. 2d 376 (2006). The denial of a motion for continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and our review of the denial of such a motion is limited to
whether the trial court abused that discretion. Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 699
(Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 468 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825, 118 S. Ct. 86, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1997).
To establish an abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the defendant
was actually prejudiced by the denial of his motion. Janeka, 937 S.W.2d at 468. A bare
assertion of prejudice will not suffice. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 764
(Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Rather, "a defendant must demonstrate both that the trial court
erred in denying the motion and that the lack of a continuance harmed him." Gonzales
v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). Examples of specific prejudice
include unfair surprise, an inability to effectively cross-examine witnesses, and the
inability to elicit crucial testimony from potential witnesses. Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at
468.
2
The Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[a] criminal action may be continued on the written
motion . . . of the defendant, upon sufficient cause shown." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 29.03
(Vernon 2006).
4
Motion for Continuance
While the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 10 of the Texas Constitution provide an accused in a criminal prosecution with
the right to counsel of his or her own choosing, U.S. Const. amend VI; Tex. Const. art. I,
§ 10, 3 "[t]he choice of counsel of one's choice is not absolute, and may under some
circumstances be forced to bow to 'the general interest in the prompt and efficient
administration of justice.'" Rosales v. State, 841 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 949, 114 S. Ct. 393, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993)).
A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are protected when he has effective
assistance from either retained or appointed counsel; Trammel v. State, 287 S.W.3d
336, 343 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (collected cases cited therein), and, once
the trial court appoints an attorney to represent the defendant, there must be some
principled reason to justify the replacement of appointed counsel. Buntion v. Harmon,
827 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (orig. proceeding). See Thomas, 550
S.W.2d at 68. 4 A defendant does not have the right to the appointed counsel of his
choice and the accused's right to select his own counsel cannot be insisted upon or
manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the
3
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the same right to the assistance of
counsel, including the right to the appointment of counsel in the case of an indigent defendant, in state
criminal proceedings. Thomas v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) (citing Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972)).
4
An accused bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to a change of counsel. King v. State, 511
S.W.2d 32, 34 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974).
5
fair administration of justice. Ex parte Davis, 818 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991);
Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 786 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976). Thus, an accused may not
wait until the day of trial to demand different counsel or request counsel be dismissed
so that he may retain other counsel because such a delay interferes with the timely
administration of justice. Robles v. State, 577 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel
Op.] 1979) (collected cases cited therein).
The State filed its motion to proceed on July 22, 2009. Fifteen days later,
Appellant requested that the trial court appoint counsel because he was indigent. The
same day, the trial court appointed counsel and scheduled a revocation hearing for
August 28, twenty-two days later. During the interim, Appellant did not seek a
continuance or new representation. Rather, on the day of the hearing, Appellant
requested a continuance to hire a new attorney for no other reason than his mother had
agreed to pay the cost. 5 His mother did not attend the hearing to verify that she would
be subsidizing new representation, Appellant did not know who his new counsel would
be and his request for more time was open-ended, i.e., he could not tell the trial court
how long it would take to find a new attorney. Further, prior to making the request, his
court-appointed attorney had announced he was ready to proceed and, after the trial
court denied Appellant's request, ably represented Appellant throughout the remainder
of the hearing. Appellant makes no showing that the lack of a continuance harmed him.
Based upon this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by denying
Appellant's motion for a continuance. Accordingly, Appellant's sole issue is overruled.
5
Appellant did not assert, and the record does not reflect, any bad faith, insincerity, or disloyalty towards
Appellant by his attorney.
6
Conclusion
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.
7