in Re Megan Lee Dozier, Relator ( 2010 )

NO. 07-10-0344-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL D
SEPTEMBER 30, 2010
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In re: MEGAN LEE DOZIER
Relator
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Opinion on Original Proceeding for Writ of Mandamus
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Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Megan Lee Dozier (Dozier) petitions the court for a writ of mandamus directing
the Honorable William H. Heatley to vacate his order ”granting the Motion to Transfer to
Childress County.” We deny the petition.
This dispute involved a proceeding to affect the parent-child relationship once
pending in Cottle County. The district judge who presided over that matter, i.e. William
H. Heatley, signed the order transferring the cause from Cottle County to Childress
County on May 11, 2010. In response, the district judge of Childress County accepted
the transfer via order signed on May 18, 2010. Thereafter, the Childress County district
clerk assigned cause number 9913 to the proceeding on June 7, 2010. It was not until
August 30, 2010, that Dozier petitioned us to direct the Cottle County district judge to
vacate its transfer order. This delay rendered problematic the granting of her request.
While an order to transfer is interlocutory as far as the litigants are concerned, it
is final viz the transferring court. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.
2000) (orig. proceeding); Bigham v. Dempster, 901 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. 1995); Seay
v. Valderas, 643 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. 1982). More importantly, once the case has
been placed on the transferee court’s docket, the transferor court’s jurisdiction over the
matter ends. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §155.005(b) (Vernon 2008). Simply put, it can no
longer issue orders regarding the matter.
Given that the Childress County district court formally accepted the transfer on
May 18, 2010, and the district clerk of that same county assigned the matter a cause
number on June 7, 2010, it can be said that the proceeding was placed on the
transferee court’s docket no later than June 7, 2010. This, in turn, means that whatever
jurisdiction the Cottle County district court had over its order transferring venue lapsed
on June 7, 2010, per §155.005(b) and Bigham v. Dempster. So, because it cannot
rescind a transfer order once its jurisdiction ends, Seay v. Valderas, supra, logic
dictates that we cannot order it to do that which it has no jurisdiction to do.
The petition is denied.
Per Curiam
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