Daniel Perez v. State ( 2010 )


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  •                                    NO. 07-10-0135-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL B
    JULY 22, 2010
    DONALD EARL COLLINS,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _____________________________
    FROM THE 249TH DISTRICT COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY;
    NO. F42536; HONORABLE D. WAYNE BRIDEWELL, PRESIDING
    Opinion
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
    We have before us a rather novel question posed by Donald Earl Collins. After
    the State succeeded in having his community supervision or probation revoked, he
    asked the trial court to grant him credit on his ten-year prison sentence equal to the time
    he sat in prison while serving a different sentence. The trial court granted him some
    relief but not all that he sought. We affirm the judgment.
    Background
    The circumstances before us involve two distinct driving while intoxicated
    offenses for which appellant was prosecuted simultaneously.         One resulted in his
    conviction and imprisonment (Conviction A). The other resulted in his conviction and
    probation (Conviction B). The two sentences were then ordered to run concurrently. As
    a condition of appellant’s probation, he was required to particate in a substance abuse
    program. While serving his prison sentence for Conviction A, the State sent appellant to
    the program in question. He refused to participate in it. Instead, he, as opposed to the
    State, moved to have his probation revoked. Nothing transpired with regard to his
    motion, though. Several months later, the State filed its own motion, which was heard
    by the trial court. That resulted in the revocation of appellant’s probation and sentence
    to prison for Conviction B. Before sentencing, though, appellant asked the court to
    credit him with time spent serving Conviction A. The trial court refused that as well as
    his request for credit for the period beginning from the time he moved to revoke his own
    probation. The trial court did grant him credit, though, from the time the State filed its
    motion.
    Jail Time Credit
    Simply put, appellant wants his Conviction B sentence to be credited for time
    spent serving his Conviction A sentence. At most, the period contemplated should
    begin either at the time he began serving his Conviction A sentence or at the time he
    moved to revoke his probation. Because both issues before us are premised on that
    contention, we consider them together.
    2
    It is true that a defendant normally is entitled to credit for the time he spends
    confined while awaiting the adjudication of a motion to revoke. Ex parte Bates, 
    978 S.W.2d 575
    , 577-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Yet, seldom, if ever, is it the defendant
    that seeks to have his probation terminated. The desire to end probation usually is that
    of the State. But, whether it is the State or the defendant that moves for revocation is
    unimportant to our resolution of this appeal. This is so because a condition precedent
    to the validity of either argument is non-existent, that condition being compliance with
    art. 42.03 §2(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
    Through art. 42.03 §2(a), the legislature directed that in all criminal cases, “the
    judge of the court in which the defendant is convicted shall give the defendant credit on
    the defendant’s sentence for the time that the defendant has spent . . . in jail for the
    case, other than confinement served as a condition of community supervision, from the
    time of his arrest and confinement until his sentence by the trial court . . . .” TEX. CODE
    CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03 §2(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (emphasis added). As can
    be seen, the plain wording of the provision mandates that the defendant receive credit
    for the time spent jailed before his conviction. But, of import is the phrase “for the case”
    appearing in the statute. From its location in the edict, the credit at issue relates not just
    to any time the defendant spent incarcerated before conviction. Rather, it is the time
    one is incarcerated for the case in which he is ultimately tried and convicted. See
    Martinez v. State, No. 13-04-0085-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6000 at *8 (Tex. App.–
    Corpus Christi July 28, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (stating that the
    trial court must award credit for time served in the same offense and not time spent
    serving a sentence in an independent cause).
    3
    According to the record before us, appellant was not jailed for the crime
    underlying Conviction B prior to the time the trial court revoked his probation. Indeed,
    his plea bargain excluded that since he was granted probation; that is, he was not
    supposed to go to jail for having committed that offense. Instead, his imprisonment
    arose from the sentence levied in response to Conviction A.                     Consequently, the
    circumstances at issue do not fit those contemplated by art. 42.03 §2(a)(1).                     And,
    because of that, it matters not who filed the motion to revoke.1
    Appellant’s issues are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Brian Quinn
    Chief Justice
    Publish.
    1
    As for those complaints founded upon due process, they were not preserved since they were not
    made below. See Gonzalez v. State, 
    301 S.W.3d 393
    , 400-01 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2009, no pet.)
    (requiring an appellant to preserve his due process complaints for appeal by asserting them at trial).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-09-00364-CR

Filed Date: 7/22/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015