State of Texas v. Chris Allen McLain ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                                   NO. 07-09-00234-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL A
    APRIL 6, 2010
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT
    v.
    CHRIS ALLEN MCLAIN, APPELLEE
    FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;
    NO. B18002-0904; HONORABLE EDWARD LEE SELF, JUDGE
    Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
    OPINION
    The State of Texas appeals the granting of a motion to suppress by the trial
    court.1 Appellee, Chris Allen McLain, was arrested and indicted for possession with
    intent to deliver a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams
    or more but less than 200 grams.2 We affirm.
    1
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (Vernon 2007).
    2
    See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2009)
    Factual and Procedural Background
    On February 27, 2009, a Plainview police officer presented an affidavit
    requesting a search warrant to search a business and residence at 3607 North
    Columbia in Plainview, Texas.     The affidavit further alleged that the location to be
    searched was controlled by appellee.     A search was conducted and officers found
    several items of contraband, among which was over 100 grams of methamphetamine.
    A Hale County Grand Jury subsequently indicted appellee on a charge of
    possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or more
    but less than 200 grams.     Appellee’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the
    contraband seized as a result of the search authorized by the warrant. The trial court
    held a hearing on appellee’s motion to suppress on June 29, 2009. At the conclusion of
    the hearing, the trial court requested briefs from both parties setting forth their
    arguments. After receiving the briefs, the trial court granted the motion to suppress on
    July 14, 2009. At the request of the State, the trial court filed findings of fact and
    conclusions of law on July 15, 2009.
    The State has brought forth two issues on appeal. First, the State contends that
    the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to suppress. Second, the
    State alleges that the good faith exception contained in article 38.23 of the Texas Code
    of Criminal Procedure3 applies. Disagreeing with the State, we will affirm the judgment
    of the trial court.
    3
    Further reference to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure will be by reference
    to “article __” or “art. __.”
    2
    Standard of Review
    The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the
    appellee’s motion to suppress the evidence seized when the search warrant was
    served. We normally review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress by using a
    bifurcated standard of review, wherein we give almost total deference to the historical
    facts found by the trial court and review de novo the trial court’s application of the law.
    Amador v. State, 
    221 S.W.3d 666
    , 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). However, when the trial
    court is determining probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant there
    are no credibility determinations, rather the trial court is constrained to the four corners
    of the affidavit.   Hankins v. State, 
    132 S.W.3d 380
    , 388 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).
    Accordingly, when we review the magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant, we apply a
    highly deferential standard.       Swearingen v. State, 
    143 S.W.3d 808
    , 810-11
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).      We apply this deferential standard because we have a
    constitutional preference for searches to be conducted pursuant to a warrant as
    opposed to warrantless searches. 
    Id. at 810.
    (citing Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 234-
    37, 
    76 L. Ed. 2d 527
    , 
    103 S. Ct. 2317
    (1983)).           As long as the magistrate had a
    substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, we will uphold the
    magistrate’s probable cause determination. 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
    .
    For purposes of our review, we will find probable cause to exist when the affidavit
    shows facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge to warrant a person of
    caution to believe that 1) a specific offense has been committed, 2) the property to be
    searched or items to be seized constitute evidence of the offense or evidence that a
    3
    particular person committed the offense, and 3) the property or items are located at or
    on the person, place, or thing to be searched. Art. 18.01(c); Hughes v. State, 
    843 S.W.2d 591
    , 593 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Finally, we are instructed not to analyze the
    affidavit in a hyper-technical manner. 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
    . Rather, when we review
    the magistrate’s determination, we should interpret the affidavit in a commonsensical
    and realistic manner, recognizing that the magistrate may draw reasonable inferences.
    Rodriguez v. State, 
    232 S.W.3d 55
    , 61 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).
    Analysis
    According to the findings of fact issued by the trial court, the court found that the
    affidavit lacked any specificity regarding when the matters referenced within its four
    corners occurred. The only mention of time within the four corners of the affidavit is the
    following statement: “In the past 72 hours, a confidential informant advised the Affiant
    that Chris was seen in possession of a large amount of methamphetamine at his
    residence and business.” The State urges that we view this statement as implying that
    the observation of the methamphetamine occurred within the 72 hours before the
    execution of the affidavit. However, such an implication is not supported by the plain
    text of the affidavit. We agree with the trial court that, given a common sense reading,
    the affidavit’s reference to the “past 72 hours” speaks to when the affiant spoke to the
    confidential informant, not when the confidential informant acquired the information.
    All we can determine from the four corners of the affidavit is when the affiant
    spoke to the confidential informant. As the only time reference given in the affidavit is
    the one described above, the affidavit fails to provide probable cause for it fails to meet
    4
    the requirements of article 18.01(c). See art. 18.01(c). The affidavit fails to give the
    magistrate any idea of when any of the activity which allegedly supports the issuance of
    a warrant occurred. See Davis v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 149
    , 155 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).
    The failure to describe when the events referred to took place is fatal to the efficacy of
    the affidavit. Schmidt v. State, 
    659 S.W.2d 420
    , 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). Because
    the affidavit fails to meet the requirements of article 18.01(c), there can be no probable
    cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 
    Id. Accordingly, the
    trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in granting appellee’s motion to suppress. We, therefore, overrule
    the State’s first issue.
    Article 38.23(b)
    We will next address the State’s second contention. The State alleges, because
    appellee’s motion to suppress was based on claims that the search in question violated
    the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the
    Texas Constitution and did not specifically request exclusion of the evidence pursuant
    to article 38.23(a), that the good faith exception of article 38.23(b) applies to allow the
    State to use the evidence.
    First, the position of the State ignores the plain language of article 38.23(b),
    which states:
    It is an exception to the provisions of Subsection (a) of this Article that the
    evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective
    good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based
    on probable cause.
    art. 38.23(b).
    5
    When we construe a statute, we look at the plain meaning of the words used in
    the statute unless the language is ambiguous or its plain meaning leads to absurd
    results.   Swearingen v. State, No. AP-76,073, 2010 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 9, at *8
    (Tex.Crim.App. February 10, 2010). Looking at the plain meaning of the statute, it is
    clear, that in order for the exception that the State urges to apply, there must first be
    probable cause. See Carroll v. State, 
    911 S.W.2d 210
    , 223 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995, no
    pet.) (citing Curry v. State, 
    808 S.W.2d 481
    , 482 (Tex.Crim.App 1991)). Inasmuch as
    we have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
    affidavit in support of the search warrant did not provide probable cause, the exception
    of article 38.23(b) does not apply. Therefore, we overrule the State’s second issue.
    Conclusion
    Having overruled the State’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Mackey K. Hancock
    Justice
    Publish.
    Pirtle, J., concurring.
    6