Armando Barrera v. State ( 2010 )

NO. 07-09-0264-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
MARCH 5, 2010
______________________________
ARMANDO BARRERA, JR.,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_______________________________
FROM THE 110TH DISTRICT COURT OF DICKENS COUNTY;
NO. 2367; HON. WILLIAM P. SMITH, PRESIDING
______________________________
Memorandum Opinion
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Armando Barrera, Jr. (appellant) appeals his conviction for driving while
intoxicated (DWI). Through two issues, he contends that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm for the reasons
discussed below.
Background
Around 10:00 a.m., the morning of September 27, 2007, appellant was found
alone, unconscious, and behind the steering wheel of his vehicle. The vehicle was
stopped on a country road, running, and “in gear.” Its doors were locked, and appellant
was in a semi-reclining position. A traveler who encountered appellant yelled, banged
on the car door, and honked his horn in effort to awaken him. Yet, appellant remained
asleep. Eventually, law enforcement and emergency medical personnel succeeded in
gaining his attention.
According to at least one witness, appellant “was very disoriented.” It also
appeared as if “he could not control his motor skills” as illustrated during his attempt to
unlock the car door. Appellant would try to do so but instead “continued to fall backward
in the seat.” So too were his “eyes roll[ing]” and his “hands shak[ing].” And, once the
door was open and appellant removed from the car, those present “had to help him from
the vehicle onto the stretcher” since he could not perform that task on his own.
Appellant testified that before falling asleep on the road he was “completely
burned out.” So too did he disclose that 1) he had been injecting himself with
methamphetamine, 2) had done so at least nine times during the three days before he
was found unconscious in his car, 3) had accidentally disposed of the remainder of the
drug in his toilet the night before, 4) grew extremely tired, 5) was unable to sleep at his
house, and 6) decided to drive his car out to a country road so he could get some
uninterrupted rest.
The methamphetamine alluded to by appellant had not left his blood. Indeed,
testing disclosed an “extremely high” quantity of the drug within his blood according to a
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Texas Department of Public Safety forensic scientist. This same witness also explained
for the jury the effects methamphetamine had on the human body. She said that it not
only causes one to feel euphoric but also “extreme fatigue [or] sleepiness” as its
stimulating effects wear off. “[A]t some point in time you’re just going to be wiped out,”
and “that’s due to the drug,” she continued.
Standard of Review
As previously mentioned, appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated.
His complaints on appeal focus upon the sufficiency of the evidence illustrating that he
was actually operating the vehicle while intoxicated.1 In assessing the accuracy of
those complaints, we apply the standards of review enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188,
191-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), and Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). In other words, we view the evidence appearing of record through the
window framed by those cases and element of the crime at issue. Since the element in
question here involves appellant’s operation of a vehicle (again, he was found
unconscious in a non-moving car), it seems relevant to determine of what operating a
vehicle consists. Pertinent authority reveals that such conduct occurs when
circumstances demonstrate that the accused took action to affect the functioning of his
vehicle in a manner that would enable its use. Barton v. State, 882 S.W.2d 456, 459-60
(Tex. App.–Dallas 1994, no pet.); see also Freeman v. State, 69 S.W.3d 374, 376 (Tex.
App.–Dallas 2002, no pet.) (wherein the court examined the totality of the
circumstances to determine if appellant exerted personal effort in a manner that shows
1
One commits the crime of DWI if he "is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public
place." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §49.04(a) (Vernon 2003).
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intentional use of the vehicle for the intended purpose). Finally, we note that a person is
intoxicated when he loses the normal use of his mental or physical faculties because of
the introduction of alcohol, drugs or a controlled substance (or a combination thereof)
into his body. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(A) (Vernon 2003).
Analysis
No one disputes that appellant was taking methamphetamine for three days
before being found unconscious in his car on the road. No one disputes that once he
disposed of the remainder of the drug he became very tired or that, while experiencing
that condition, he decided to drive his car to a secluded country road to get some sleep.
Nor is it disputed that appellant was found behind the steering wheel of a running
vehicle. To those circumstances we add that evidence describing the effect
methamphetamine has on the human body once its stimulation begins to wane,
appellant’s inability to be easily awakened, his inability to walk on his own to the
stretcher or operate a door lock, and his leaving the car “in gear.” Together, that
constitutes some evidence from which a factfinder can rationally infer, beyond
reasonable doubt, not only that appellant lacked the normal use of his mental and
physical faculties as he drove to the spot where he stopped his car but also that his
condition resulted from the introduction of methamphetamine (a controlled substance)
into his body. Moreover, there is nothing manifestly unjust in so concluding given the
state of the evidence. It may well be as appellant suggested; he was not operating the
vehicle when he was found unconscious. Yet, that is not something we need decide;
there is more than ample evidence to show that he had lost the normal use of his
physical and mental skills due to his prior ingestion of methamphetamine as he drove to
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the location where others eventually found him. See Hearne v. State, 80 S.W.3d 677,
680 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (evidence sufficient to support
conviction for driving while intoxicated where defendant was found in driver’s seat of
truck, truck registered to defendant, the truck was parked in a moving lane of traffic, and
no other people were around the scene); Pope v. State, 802 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex.
App.–Austin 1991, no pet.) (evidence showing a defendant found asleep in a truck on a
remote road, with the engine running and the lights on, sufficient to support conviction
for driving while intoxicated).
Therefore, we overrule appellant’s issues challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence and affirm the judgment.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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