State v. Matthew Sawyer ( 2013 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-12-00621-CR
The STATE of Texas,
Appellant
v.
Matthew SAWYER,
Appellee
From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. 12-0069-CR
Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 17, 2013
DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION
Matthew Sawyer was charged with the offense of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle
and entered a plea-bargain agreement with the State. The trial court, however, found Sawyer not
guilty and signed a judgment purporting to acquit Sawyer. The State appeals the trial court’s
decision, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by failing to accept or reject the
plea-bargain agreement before making its finding on the plea. However, as the State recognizes,
this court can proceed to the merits of this appeal only if it has jurisdiction under Article 44.01 of
04-12-00621-CR
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Because we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction,
we do not reach the merits of the State’s appeal.
BACKGROUND
Sawyer was indicted for the offense of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle after he
took his mother’s car without permission. Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, the State
recommended a sentence for time already served in jail in exchange for Sawyer’s plea of guilty.
During a hearing on the matter, the trial court inquired about the motivation for and wisdom of
prosecuting the case since Sawyer’s mother had withdrawn her complaint. The court then
expressed its opinion that the District Attorney’s Office was wasting valuable resources
“prosecuting a case like this where a kid takes his mom’s car [until] it runs out of gas.”
Subsequently, the court was informed about the existence of a plea agreement and its terms, and
it accepted Sawyer’s plea of guilty. Almost immediately thereafter, and without further
discussion, the trial court found Sawyer not guilty and adjourned the hearing.
STATE’S RIGHT TO APPEAL
As a preliminary issue, we must first determine whether the State has the right to appeal
in this case. The State is not permitted to appeal a defendant’s acquittal regardless of how
erroneous the judgment may be. State v. Blackshere, 344 S.W.3d 400, 406 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011); State v. Stanley, 201 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). An acquittal occurs when
the trial court’s decision reaches the merits of the case. U.S. v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90–91 (1978);
Stanley, 201 S.W.3d at 760. In State v. Stanley, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the
argument that the order in that case was an acquittal because “nowhere does the order recite that
the appellees have been found not guilty, that the State’s evidence did not meet the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the State’s proof as to any specific factual element
necessary to conviction was lacking.” 201 S.W.3d at 760; see also Blackshere, 344 S.W.3d at
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04-12-00621-CR
406 (explaining that an acquittal is “based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the
court that the evidence is insufficient to convict”).
Under Article 44.01(a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, however, the State is
permitted to appeal the dismissal of an indictment. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
44.01(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012). The State suggests the trial court’s order in the instant case was
truly a dismissal of the indictment and, thus, this appeal is permitted under Article 44.01(a)(1).
Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained the statute’s broad intent to permit the State to
appeal an order concerning an indictment “whenever the order effectively terminates the
prosecution in favor of the defendant” so long as jeopardy has not attached. State v. Moreno,
807 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Consequently, “[t]he mere label
attached either to the defendant’s motion or to the trial court’s order ruling on same cannot
determine its appealability.” State v. Morgan, 160 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting
Moreno, 807 S.W.2d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The question presented in this case is whether the trial court’s judgment finding Sawyer
not guilty was an acquittal or a dismissal of the indictment disguised as an acquittal. For nearly
half of the hearing, the trial court questioned the prosecution about the wisdom of prosecuting
this case and many times expressed its opinion that the prosecution of the case was a waste of
resources. After concluding its criticism, the trial court admonished Sawyer as is required by
Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13
(West Supp. 2012). Subsequently, the State admitted an exhibit documenting Sawyer’s waiver
of a jury trial and stipulation of guilt. The trial court confirmed Sawyer’s understanding that the
document meant he was admitting guilt without requiring the State to present further evidence.
Thereafter, the trial court accepted Sawyer’s waiver and stipulation. The parties then discussed
the plea-bargain agreement with the trial court, and the court accepted Sawyer’s guilty plea.
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04-12-00621-CR
After accepting Sawyer’s guilty plea, however, the trial court proceeded to find Sawyer
not guilty. In fact, the trial court’s judgment states: “Having heard the evidence submitted, the
Court FINDS Defendant NOT GUILTY of the charged offense.” Despite the trial court’s
seeming disapproval of the State’s decision to prosecute this case and the speculation that could
be made regarding the trial court’s reason for finding Sawyer not guilty, the court’s judgment
constitutes an acquittal because the judgment reflects that the trial court’s not-guilty finding was
based on the evidence submitted. Stanley, 201 S.W.3d at 760. We are bound by the express
language used in the trial court’s judgment, not a party’s speculation about the trial court’s
motives. The State is prohibited from appealing an acquittal and, as a result, this court lacks
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the State’s appeal. Blackshere, 344 S.W.3d at 406.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court’s judgment constituted an acquittal. Therefore, this
appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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