Cheryl M. Patterson and Aundrell Patterson v. American General Life Insurance Company ( 2013 )

Opinion issued April 30, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-11-00528-CV
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CHERYL M. PATTERSON AND AUNDRELL PATTERSON, Appellants
V.
AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 11th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2010-02556
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case arises from an interpleader action filed by American General Life
Insurance Company concerning a life insurance policy it issued for Lonnie J.
Patterson, Jr. After Lonnie, Jr. died, appellants Cheryl M. Patterson, Aundrell
Patterson and Lonnie J. Patterson, Sr. each asserted a claim to the policy proceeds.
The trial court found American General to be an innocent stakeholder subject to
rival claims with respect to the policy proceeds and granted it interpleader relief.
The trial court subsequently granted American General’s motion to dismiss Cheryl
and Aundrell’s counter-claims with prejudice. Cheryl and Aundrell challenge the
trial court’s dismissal of their counter-claims and its grant of interpleader relief to
American General.
We affirm.
Background
The operative facts of this case are largely undisputed. On May 3, 2007,
American General issued a life insurance policy for Lonnie J. Patterson, Jr. The
policy initially named Lonnie, Jr.’s father, Lonnie J. Patterson, Sr., the primary
beneficiary and his mother, Cheryl M. Patterson, the contingent beneficiary.
American General subsequently received a change of beneficiary for the policy,
naming Lonnie, Jr.’s mother, Cheryl, and, his sister, Aundrell Patterson, as primary
co-beneficiaries. American General acknowledged and confirmed this change in a
November 2007 letter to Lonnie, Jr.
Lonnie, Jr. passed away on October 8, 2009, and American General
acknowledged that it was obligated to pay the insurance proceeds upon proof of
Lonnie, Jr.’s death. Both Cheryl and Aundrell filed a proof of claim within the
month, each requesting payment of fifty percent of the death benefits payable
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under the policy. After learning of the change in beneficiary, Lonnie, Sr. also sent
three letters to American General challenging the validity of that change and
alleging that he was the policy’s owner/ primary beneficiary. Lonnie, Sr. argued,
inter alia, that Aundrell fraudulently changed the beneficiary designation and/or
that Lonnie, Jr. lacked the mental capacity to make the change. Lonnie, Sr. also
informed American General that he would seek legal counsel if this matter was not
resolved in his favor.
In light of Lonnie, Sr.’s letters challenging the validity of that change,
American General pleaded that it was unable to determine which party was entitled
to the policy proceeds and on January 14, 2010, filed a petition in interpleader
against Lonnie, Sr., Cheryl, and Aundrell, that claimed it to be an innocent
stakeholder subject to rival claims to the policy proceeds. American General,
confirmed Lonnie, Sr. as the policy’s originally named primary beneficiary, but
acknowledged receipt of the November 2007 change the beneficiary request.
Lonnie, Sr., Cheryl, and Aundrell all subsequently filed answers, cross-
claims against one another, and counter-claims against American General. In their
jointly filed first amended counter-claim against American General, Cheryl and
Aundrell asserted multiple causes of actions, including breach of contract, unfair
insurance practices, as well as violations of chapter 542 of the Insurance Code
(e.g., delay in payment, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
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misrepresentation of material facts). All of Cheryl’s and Aundrell’s counter-claims
against American General were based upon American General’s decision to file the
interpleader rather than distribute the policy proceeds to them.
After considering American General’s motion for deposit of funds into
registry and approval of interpleader’s attorneys’ fees, the trial court granted
American General interpleader relief on August 2, 2010. In its order, the trial court
expressly found that American General was subject to bona fide competing and
adverse claims to the policy proceeds, was unable to determine to whom the
proceeds belonged, and that the interpleader action was proper because the
company was subjected to double or multiple liabilities for the policy proceeds.
The trial court granted American General’s interpleader and awarded its $2,500 in
attorneys’ fees.
On March 7, 2011, the trial court granted American General’s motion for
summary judgment seeking dismissal of Lonnie, Sr. and appellants’ counter-
claims. The trial court ordered that Lonnie, Sr., Cheryl, and Aundrell each take
nothing on their claims against American General, and dismissed all of the claims
against American General with prejudice. The trial court also awarded American
General an additional $25,000 in attorneys’ fees.
The following month, on April 4, 2011, the trial court granted Cheryl’s and
Aundrell’s motion for summary judgment against Lonnie, Sr. and awarded Cheryl
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and Aundrell all of the policy proceeds, minus the attorneys’ fees that it had
previously awarded to American General.
After Cheryl and Aundrell dismissed their remaining cross-claims against
Lonnie, Sr. with prejudice, the trial court issued its “final judgment” on April 12,
2011, which incorporated all of its prior interlocutory orders.
Discussion
Appellants to raise two general issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred (or
abused its discretion) when it granted American General’s interpleader based upon
insufficient evidence, and (2) the trial court erred when it granted American
General’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellants’ counter-claims
with prejudice.
Interpleader
Appellants contend that the trial court erred (or abused its discretion) when it
granted American General’s interpleader based upon insufficient evidence.
Specifically, that as the party claiming to be an innocent stakeholder, American
General, had the burden of proof to show its entitlement to interpleader relief.
Such a showing required, appellants argue, proof that Lonnie, Sr.’s claim was a
“bona fide” rival claim (which it could do only if it investigated the claim first) and
that it had a “reasonable doubt” as to who to pay. Appellants contend that
American General presented no evidence at the hearing on its request for
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interpleader relief, only arguments of counsel. American General, in response,
contends that “[t]he Interpleader Order is supported by ample evidence from the
record,” including the three letters from Lonnie, Sr.
Rule 43 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant who
receives multiple claims to property in its possession to join all claimants in one
lawsuit and deposit the disputed property into the registry of the court. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 43; see also Petro Source Partners, Ltd. v. 3–B Rattlesnake Ref. (1990),
Ltd., 905 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, writ denied). The purpose
of interpleader is to allow an innocent stakeholder facing rival claims to let the
courts decide who is entitled to the fund and thus avoid the peril of acting as judge
and jury itself and relieve itself of the vexation and expense of multiple litigation
and the risk of multiple liability. Petro Source Partners, 905 S.W.2d at 375. An
interpleading party is entitled to relief after establishing that the party: (1) is either
subject to, or has reasonable grounds to anticipate, rival claims to the same fund or
property; (2) has not unreasonably delayed filing his action for interpleader; and
(3) has unconditionally tendered the fund or property into the registry of the court.
Id.
Although the parties agree that a trial court’s grant of interpleader relief is
generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, see Bryant v. United Shortline Inc.
Assurance Servs., N. A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. 1998), appellants contend that
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the trial court’s grant of interpleader relief in the present case is subject to de novo
review because it was presented in the context of a motion for summary judgment.
The record, however establishes that the trial court granted American General
interpleader relief on August 2, 2010, after considering American General’s
motion for deposit of funds into registry and approval of interpleader’s attorneys’
fees. American General’s only motion for summary judgment in this case, seeking
dismissal of Lonnie, Sr. and appellants’ counter-claims, was filed nearly six
months later. The trial court granted American General’s motion for summary
judgment eight months after it issued its interlocutory order granting interpleader
relief. As the trial court’s grant of interpleader relief was not presented in the
context of a motion for summary judgment, our review of the trial court’s grant of
interpleader relief will be for an abuse of discretion. See Bryant, 972 S.W.2d at 31.
In doing so, we must resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of a
stakeholder’s right to interplead. See Bryant, 972 S.W.2d at 31; see also Petro
Source Partners, 905 S.W.2d at 375 (citing Citizens National Bank of Emporia v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc., 372 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1963,
writ ref’d n.r.e.)). The party complaining of an abuse of discretion has the burden
to present a record showing the abuse. See Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co.,
Inc., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987).
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Although there was a hearing on American General’s motion for
interpleader relief on June 14, 2010—which, given American General’s burden of
proof and request for attorneys’ fees, should have been an evidentiary hearing—no
reporter’s record has been filed. Without a transcript, we cannot know for certain
what evidence—if any—was presented to the trial court at this hearing. Thus,
there is no record evidence from which we can determine that the trial court abused
its discretion in ruling that the interpleader action was appropriate. See Danner v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 496 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1973, no
writ) (“Granting a party’s right to interplead is within the sound discretion of the
trial court.”). Accordingly, given the record before us, we hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it granted American General’s motion for
interpleader relief. See Bryant, 972 S.W.2d at 31 (stating that appellate courts
must affirm trial court’s interpleader order absent showing of abuse of discretion).
Motion for Summary Judgment
Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it granted American
General’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed their counter-claims
against American General with prejudice.
After American General filed the underling interpleader action, appellants
filed counter-claims against American General alleging breach of contract, unfair
insurance practices, numerous violations of chapters 541 and 542 of the Insurance
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Code, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation of
material facts. Several months after the trial court found that American General’s
interpleader was proper, American General filed for summary judgment on
appellants’ counter-claims, arguing that it was entitled to have these claims
automatically discharged by way of interpleader, citing to Clayton v. Mony Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 284 S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.), Petro
Source Partners, 905 S.W.2d at 378 and Cable Commc’ns Network, Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 838 S.W.2d 947, 949–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
no writ). American General further argued that even if that were not the case, it
was nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on these claims because, inter alia,
they disproved at least one element of each claim, and/or appellants’ allegations
did not constitute a cause of action as a matter of law.
Appellants contend that because American General’s interpleader tender of
the policy proceeds did not result in the automatic dismissal of their independent,
pre-interpleader claims, which can only be resolved on summary judgment or after
a trial on the merits, American General was not entitled to summary judgment on
their counter-claims. See Clayton, 284 S.W.3d at 405 (stating that interpleader
tender does not serve to discharge all liability claims that arose prior to
interpleader, such claims must be resolved on their merits). Appellants further
argue that American General failed to meet its burden of proof.
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Here, appellants’ counter-claims were resolved on the merits by way of
American General’s motion for summary judgment. Although appellants argue
that American General failed to disprove at least one element of each of their
causes of action, they do not attempt to address their various counter-claims
separately, cite to any case law setting forth the elements of any of their counter-
claims, or identify which elements American General has allegedly failed to
disprove.
We hold that this issue has been inadequately briefed on appeal, and we
overrule it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and
concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities
and to the record.”); Stephens v. Dolcefino, 126 S.W.3d 120, 129–30 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (holding challenges waived by lack of
adequate briefing).
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jim Sharp
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.
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