Miracle, Ryan Scott v. State ( 2012 )


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  • AFFIRM; Opinion Filed November 5, 2012.
    In The
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    No. 05-i 1-00978-CR
    No. 05-1 1-00979-CR
    No. 05-1 1-00981-CR
    RYAN SCOTT MIRAC[E, Appellant
    ‘J.
    TIlE STATE OF TEXAS, Appeilee
    On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court
    Rockw all County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause Nos. 2-11-85, 2-11-86, and 2-11-88
    OPINION
    Before Justices O’Neill, FitzGerald, and Lang-Miers
    Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers
    Appellant Ryan Scott Miracle, one of several accomplices, was charged with three counts
    of aggravated robbery. Appellant entered an open plea of guilty in all three cases and was sentenced
    by the trial court to concurrent sentences of eight years in prison in each case. In one issue on appeal
    appellant argues that his pleas were involuntary. We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him and
    affirm.
    Appellant argues that his guilty pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily because
    (1) the indictments allege the use of a “BB gun” and “BB Shotgun,” which are not deadly weapons;
    and (2) he only furnished the vehicle used in the robberies and “did not himself use or exhibit any
    weapon.” Stated differently, appellant argues that his pleas to the charges of aggravated robbery
    were not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he “did not use or exhibit any weapon at all
    [and] the weapon used by others was not a firearm or deadly.” In a related argument, appellant also
    complains that the trial court’s admonishment “failed to correctly state the law” because without the
    deadly weapon findings appellant could have been found guilty of the lesser included offense of
    robbery and “straight probation would have become a punishment option.”
    To the extent that appellant is complaining about a substantive defect in the indictment, he
    has waived this complaint by not raising it before his guilty plea. See Tux. CODE CRIM, PRoc. ANN.
    art. 1.14(b) (West 2005) (“If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form
    or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits
    commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may
    not raise the objection on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding.”); Jack v. State, 
    871 S.W.2d 741
    , 743 (Tex. Crim. App.               1994) (“[A] nonnegotiated guilty plea waives all
    nonjurisdictional defects occurring prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”).
    And to the extent that appellant is complaining about the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support the deadly weapon findings, we conclude that appellant’s judicial confessions are sufficient
    to support the findings. The indictments alleged that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon
    during commission of the aggravated robberies. Appellant pleaded guilty and judicially confessed
    to committing “each and every allegation” contained in the indictments. Appellant’s judicial
    confessions, alone, are sufficient to support the deadly weapon findings contained in the written
    judgments. See Dinnery v. State, 
    592 S.W.2d 343
    , 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh’g) (“It
    is well settled that a judicial confession,   standing alone,   is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon
    a guilty plea and to satisfy the requirements of Article 1.15.” (internal citations omitted)); see also
    Alexander v. State, 
    868 S.W.2d 356
    , 361 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no pet.) (“If a defendant pleads
    —2—
    guilty to an indictment that includes an allegation that lie used a dead! weapon, the trial court may
    make a deadly weapon finding.”).
    Finally, with respect to appellant’s argument that his pleas were involuntary, we note that
    appellant did not complain to the trial court about the voluntariness of his guilty pleas either befbre
    or after his sentencing. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, a party must first complain
    to the trial court and obtain a ruling in order to preserve most complaints for appellate review. See
    Tix. R. API. P. 33.1   .   The court of criminal appeals and this Court have held that the rule 33. 1
    requirement of preservation of error applies to complaints about the voluntariness of a guilty plea.
    See Mendez v. State, 13$ S,W.3d 334, 339,350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Aldrich v. State, 
    53 S.W.3d 460
    . 468-69 (Tex. App.-—Dallas 2001), aj/’d, 
    104 S.W.3d 890
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We
    conclude that appellant has not preserved his complaint about the voluntariness of his guilty pleas
    for appellate review, But even if appellant had preserved this issue for appellate review, we would
    resolve it against him. There is no evidence in the record that appellant’s guilty pleas were not made
    knowingly and voluntarily. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the trial court admonished
    appellant as to the range of punishment for the first-degree felony of aggravated robbery, and that
    appellant fully understood the proceedings, including the trial court’s admonishments and the effects
    of his guilty pleas.
    CONCLUSION
    We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    Do Not Publish
    TEx. R. App. P.47
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    JUDGMENT
    RYAN SCOTT MIRACLE, Appellant                          Appeal from the 439th Judicial District
    Court of Rockwafl County, Texas.
    No. 05-i 1-00978-CR             V.                     (Tr.Ct.No. 2-1 1-85).
    Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers,
    THE STATE OF TEXAS. Appellee                           Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald
    participatmg.
    Based   Ofl   the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMEI).
    Judgment   entered November 5, 2012.
    1
    E LIABETH LANG-MI            S
    / JUSICE
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    JUDGMENT
    RYAN SCOTT MIRACLE. Appellant                      Appeal from the 439th Judicial District
    Court of Rockwall County, Texas.
    No. 05- 11-00979-CR          V.                    (Tr.Ct.No. 2-1 1-86).
    Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers,
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                       Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered November 5, 2012.
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    kfZA13ETH LANGM1E
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    ’1
    JUSTTCE
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    JUDGMENT
    RYAN SCOTT MIRACLE, Appellant                          Appeal from the 43 9th Judicial District
    Court of Rockwal I County, Texas.
    No. 05-Il -009$ I-CR          V.                       (Tr.Ct.No. 2-1 1-88).
    Opinion delivered by .Justice Lang—Miers.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                           Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s   opinion   of this date, the judgment   of   the trial Court   IS   AFFIRN’IED.
    Judgment entered November 5, 2012.
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    ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
    JUS’IICL