James Earl Reese v. State ( 2013 )

Opinion issued January 17, 2013.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-11-00360-CR
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JAMES EARL REESE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 228th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1141875
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Earl Reese pleaded guilty to the third-degree felony offense of driving
while intoxicated in March 2008. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 & 49.09(b)
(West 2011). At that time, the trial court suspended Reese’s sentence and placed
him under community supervision for five years. The State subsequently moved to
revoke Reese’s community supervision, alleging that Reese had violated its
conditions. The trial court granted the motion, revoked Reese’s community
supervision, and assessed his punishment at two years’ confinement. On appeal,
Reese contends that the trial court erred in (1) finding that Reese violated the terms
of his community supervision and (2) revoking his community supervision based
on his inability to pay, thereby violating his constitutional rights. He further
contends that the written judgment revoking his community supervision fails to
reflect the judgment announced in the hearing and recites findings on allegations
not raised in the hearing. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in revoking Reese’s community supervision, but agree that the written
judgment does not reflect the judgment announced in the hearing. We therefore
modify the judgment of the trial court and affirm the judgment as modified.
Background
In January 2011, the State moved to revoke Reese’s community supervision
alleging that he violated the conditions of his supervision by (1) failing to obtain
suitable employment; (2) failing to pay supervision fees, a fine and court costs, and
laboratory processing fees; (3) failing to obtain an in-home alcohol monitoring
device; (4) committing an offense on July 22, 2010 in Chambers County; (5)
giving a false and fictitious name to a peace officer on January 6, 2011; (6)
traveling outside Harris County without authorization; and (7) operating a motor
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vehicle without a required breath-analyzing device. Reese pleaded not true to the
allegations. During a hearing on the motion, the State struck some of these
allegations and proceeded on the first three: Reese’s failure to obtain suitable
employment, pay the required fees, and purchase the in-home alcohol monitoring
device. After the hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion. The judgment
revoking community supervision provided that Reese pleaded true to the
allegations and waived his right to appeal. It further provided that the trial court
found true all seven original allegations of the State, including those that the State
had abandoned before the hearing.
Before June 2010, Reese was a contract employee, working on and off as a
pipe-fitter, with short periods of unemployment between jobs. In June 2010, Reese
reported that he was unemployed. According to Harris County Community
Supervision policy, probationers must apply to four jobs each weekday to show
sufficient efforts to obtain employment. Reese testified that he was aware of the
policy. In July 2010, Reese met this requirement. The next two months, however,
Reese reported no attempts to obtain employment. Reese told the supervision
officer that he was not looking for a job because of transportation problems related
to his community supervision. Reese reported applying to a few jobs in October
and three jobs in November. Reese testified that he applied only to jobs related to
his trade, although he knew any job would satisfy his community supervision
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requirements.
The community supervision officer testified that she informed Reese that he
was not complying with the conditions of his probation. She testified that Reese
did not seem to care about his noncompliance and was nonchalant during their
meetings. Reese was required to pay a monthly community supervision fee of $60,
but had not made this payment in several months. He was behind by more than
$1,300 in December 2010. The State also produced evidence that Reese did not
purchase the required in-home alcohol monitoring device. Reese testified that he
could not afford to pay the fees or purchase the device.
Discussion
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s order revoking community supervision under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). The trial court abuses its discretion in issuing an order to revoke if the
State fails to meet its burden of proof. Greathouse v. State, 33 S.W.3d 455, 458
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet ref’d). We examine the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s order. Id. The trial judge is the sole trier of
the facts and determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
to their testimony. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980);
Amado v. State, 983 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet.
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ref’d).
In a community supervision revocation hearing, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and conditions
of community supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993); Smith v. State, 790 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990,
writ ref’d). This standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence
creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a condition of his
community supervision. Jenkins v. State, 740 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983); Akbar v. State, 190 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,
no pet.). When several violations are found by the trial court, we will affirm the
order revoking community supervision if the State proved any one violation by a
preponderance of the evidence. Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 870–71 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980); Akbar, 190 S.W.3d at 123.
Failure to Diligently Seek Employment
Reese contends that his violations of the conditions raised in the hearing—
Reese’s failure to secure and maintain employment, pay the required fees, and
purchase the in-home alcohol monitoring device—resulted from his inability to
pay. Therefore, he argues, revocation based on these conditions violates the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution under Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 2072 (1983).
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Maintaining suitable employment is an explicit condition of Reese’s
community supervision, and thus, a violation of the condition is an independent
ground for revocation. See e.g., Smith, 790 S.W.2d at 367–68 (analyzing as
separate the defendant’s failure to pay restitution due to inability to pay and failure
to secure employment). The defendant’s employment status and ability to obtain
employment are also factors to consider in determining the defendant’s ability to
pay. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672, 103 S.Ct. at 2072. We therefore first examine
whether sufficient evidence supports a finding that Reese failed to secure and
maintain employment.
To prevail on a motion to revoke based on lack of employment, the State
must show that a defendant failed to exercise diligence and good faith in seeking
employment. See Dureso v. State, 988 S.W.2d 448, 450–51 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). If it does, then the trial court’s decision to revoke
community supervision is sufficiently supported, and we need not address the other
grounds, which Reese correctly observes, depend in part on his ability to pay. See
Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 870–71 (holding that the violation of one condition is
sufficient to support revocation). Short periods of unemployment, during which the
defendant demonstrates some effort to obtain a job, will not support a finding that
the defendant failed to secure and maintain employment. See e.g., Dureso, 988
S.W.2d at 450 (finding abuse of discretion in revoking community supervision
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when defendant had been unemployed for only one month, during which time
defendant applied for jobs); Rehwalt v. State, 489 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973) (finding abuse of discretion in revoking community supervision when
State moved to revoke seven days after his employment terminated). Compliance
with this condition does not turn on a defendant’s ability to pay; rather, the
question is whether the defendant made efforts to find work.
The record reveals that Reese had a longer period of unemployment than the
State demonstrated in Rehwalt and Dureso. Reese was unemployed for an
extended period—six months—before the State moved to revoke his community
supervision. See Rehwalt, 489 S.W.2d at 885; Dureso, 988 S.W.2d at 450. Reese
diligently sought employment during the first month he was unemployed, but after
that month, he made no effort to seek employment for the second and third months,
explaining that his community supervision made it too difficult. Over the fourth
and fifth months he applied for only a few jobs. Reese was aware that the Harris
County Supervision policy required him to complete four job applications per
weekday to show reasonable efforts to obtain employment. This policy was not a
condition of Reese’s community supervision. See DeGay v. State, 741 S.W.2d 445,
450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (explaining clear distinction between rules imposed by
a probation officer and the conditions of probation). Still, Reese’s failure to show
reasonable efforts to comply with this policy is evidence that Reese did not
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diligently attempt to obtain employment. Reese was aware that any job would have
satisfied the conditions of his community supervision. Yet, he limited his search to
jobs he preferred, where he could use his skills as a pipe-fitter. Reese noted that his
lack of transportation hampered his job search efforts, but the trial court could have
concluded that, given Reese’s difference in behavior between the first month, when
he sent many applications, and the subsequent months, when he completed few, if
any, applications, Reese had simply stopped looking for work.
From this evidence, the trial court reasonably could have found that Reese
did not exercise diligence in seeking employment. See Dureso, 988 S.W.2d at 450.
Viewing the record in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we hold that the
trial court’s finding that the defendant had not secured and maintained suitable
employment was within its discretion. See Greathouse, 33 S.W.3d at 458. Because
proof of any one alleged violation is sufficient to support an order revoking
probation, we need not review whether sufficient evidence exists to support the
other violations raised in the hearing or whether revocation on those grounds
violated Reese’s constitutional rights. See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 870–71; Akbar,
190 S.W.3d at 123.
Reformation of the Judgment
Reese complains that the judgment revoking community supervision does
not reflect the judgment announced in the hearing, and it erroneously recites
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findings regarding violations neither raised nor supported by evidence in the
hearing. When the record reflects a clerical variance between a judgment
announced in open court and the judgment eventually signed by the trial judge, the
appellate court can modify the judgment to correct the mistake. TEX. R. APP. P.
§ 43.2(b); Mazloum v. State, 772 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see
Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
Both parties agree that the written judgment is in error in that it provides that
Reese pleaded “true” to the allegations and waived his right to an appeal. The
record reflects that Reese pleaded “not true” to the State’s allegations. The trial
court judge informed Reese at the end of the hearing, “You have the right to
appeal.” We therefore modify the trial court judgment to reflect that Reese pleaded
not true to the State’s allegations and retained his right to appeal.
Additionally, the State proceeded in the hearing alleging only that Reese
failed to obtain suitable employment, failed to pay the required fees, and failed to
obtain an in-home alcohol monitoring device. It introduced no evidence to support
the findings that Reese (1) committed an offense on July 22, 2010 in Chambers
County; (2) gave a false and fictitious name to a peace officer on January 6, 2011;
(3) traveled outside Harris County without authorization; and (4) operated a motor
vehicle without a required alcohol monitoring device. The trial court erred in
reciting these findings in the judgment. We therefore modify the judgment to
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remove these findings.
Conclusion
Based on the record, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that the defendant violated the conditions of his community
supervision by failing to use diligent efforts to secure suitable employment. We
further hold that the record supports a modification of the trial court’s judgment to
reflect that Reese pleaded not true and retained the right to appeal, and to remove
the unsupported findings. We therefore modify the trial court judgment, and affirm
the judgment of the trial court as modified.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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