Roce M. Lopez v. Texas Workforce Commission and La Madeline of Texas Inc. ( 2012 )

Opinion issued September 27, 2012.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-10-00849-CV
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ROCE LOPEZ, Appellant
V.
TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION AND LA MADELEINE OF TEXAS,
INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 151st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2009-61346
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Roce Lopez appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor the Texas
Workforce Commission and La Madeleine of Texas, Inc. Lopez’s claim for
unemployment benefits was denied by TWC. She appealed the decision to the
district court. TWC and La Madeleine filed a joint motion for summary judgment,
and the trial court granted it. In her sole issue, Lopez contends that the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment was improper. We conclude that the trial court
correctly determined the legal question before it: whether TWC’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
Background
Lopez left her employment with La Madeleine on January 17, 2009. A few
weeks later, she made a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. A TWC
claims examiner initially determined that Lopez qualified for benefits. La
Madeleine appealed the decision to a TWC appeal tribunal.
The appeal tribunal reversed the initial decision, concluding Lopez was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under section 207.045 of the
Texas Unemployment Compensation Act. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.045(a)
(West 2006). Under that section, a former employee is not entitled to
unemployment benefits if she left the job voluntarily, unless there was “good
cause” for leaving. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.045(a) (West 2006). TWC
defines good cause as follows: “Good cause connected with the work for leaving,
as that term is used in the law of unemployment insurance, means such cause,
related to the work, as would cause a person who was genuinely interested in
retaining work to nevertheless leave the job.” TEX. WORKFORCE COMM’N APP. &
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POL’Y MANUAL, VL 210.00 Good Cause (Oct. 1, 1996), available at
http://www.twc.state.tx.us/ui/appl/vl.pdf. An exception to this rule applies if the
employee shows that her working conditions are “intolerable.” See id. VL 515.05
Working Conditions: General (“Dissatisfaction with working conditions is
generally not considered to be good cause connected with the work for quitting
unless the claimant can show that the conditions were intolerable.”). Additionally,
under TWC precedent, an employee who voluntarily leaves her employment
because of dissatisfaction with working conditions without “affording the
employer any opportunity to resolve the situation” has not quit for good cause. See
id.
The appeal tribunal issued findings of facts and conclusions of law with its
decision. It found that Lopez was dissatisfied with her working conditions and felt
that Tara Keffer, the general manager of the restaurant and Lopez’s direct
supervisor, was treating her unfairly. According to Lopez, Keffer was working her
too hard, working her too long, denying her breaks, and shouting at her. Lopez
informed Ty Fichtner, La Madeleine’s director of operations, that Keffer was
mistreating her. Fichtner investigated Lopez’s complaint and determined that
Lopez was not being mistreated.
The appeal tribunal also found that Lopez did not report the alleged
mistreatment through La Madeleine’s normal chain of command. In addition,
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Lopez did not use an employee hotline to report Keffer’s alleged mistreatment.
Based on Lopez’s failure to report her alleged mistreatment to La Madeleine
through the proper channels, the tribunal concluded that Lopez had not shown that
her working conditions were intolerable. See TEX. WORKFORCE COMM’N APP. &
POL’Y MANUAL, VL 515.05 Working Conditions: General. The appeal tribunal
concluded that Lopez did not give La Madeleine the opportunity to resolve the
situation. Therefore, under TWC precedent, Lopez was disqualified from
receiving benefits. See id.
Lopez appealed the decision of the appeal tribunal to the TWC
commissioners. The commissioners determined that the appeal tribunal decision
was correct. They adopted the appeal tribunal’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law and affirmed that decision. Lopez filed a motion for rehearing, and the
commissioners denied it.
Lopez appealed the decision to district court. La Madeleine and TWC
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that TWC’s decision was supported
by substantial evidence. The summary judgment was supported, in part, by
affidavits from Keffer and Fichtner. In her affidavit, Keffer denied harassing or
abusing Lopez. She also stated that Lopez was given the same work load as other
employees. In his affidavit, Fichtner averred that, about a month and a half before
Lopez quit, she complained of Keffer’s treatment. Fichtner looked into the matter
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and determined that Lopez was not being worked excessively or otherwise being
treated unfairly. He stated that because of reduced business at the location where
Lopez worked, only one service assistant was assigned to each shift. La Madeleine
also submitted evidence that, despite the purportedly intolerable work
environment, Lopez did not contact any other management or human resources
personnel to complain. Lopez also did not call the corporate employee hotline,
which she had used in reporting her prior supervisor’s conduct.
In response, Lopez submitted her own affidavit, in which she presented a
different version of events. Lopez worked as a service assistant for La Madeleine
for approximately eighteen months until she had to move out of state in December
2007. After she returned to Texas, she was rehired by La Madeleine in April 2008.
Lopez complained of her immediate supervisor’s behavior. She reported that he
shoved her with a broomstick, making contact with her buttocks. As a result of the
incident, La Madeleine terminated the supervisor’s employment.
The replacement supervisor, Lopez alleges, continually teased her about the
prior incident and frequently touched her buttocks. Lopez contends that she
reported the behavior to Keffer, the manager of the restaurant, but that Keffer did
nothing. As a result, Lopez called a La Madeleine employee hotline and later had
an attorney write a letter to Keffer and to La Madeleine’s corporate office in
Dallas. The replacement supervisor’s employment was later terminated.
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Lopez contends that Keffer, who became Lopez’s direct supervisor, began to
show hostility and to retaliate against her. For instance, Keffer called Lopez
stupid, accused her of being a thief, and subjected her to random searches. Keffer
also reduced Lopez’s hours. When Lopez filed a complaint, Keffer increased her
hours, but deprived her of breaks. Keffer also allegedly required Lopez to scrub
the restroom floors with a toothbrush and clean the toilets using bleach. Lopez
contends that such janitorial tasks were not part of her job description. Lopez
submitted a letter of resignation giving two weeks’ notice on January 5, 2009.
Lopez claims that by doing so, she hoped that “the company w[ould] step in.”
Lopez left her employment on January 17, 2009.
The trial court decided the legal question of whether TWC’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence against Lopez and granted summary judgment.
Lopez filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled. Lopez appealed.
Standard of Review
A. Summary Judgment Review
We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim,
315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if
reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant
unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v.
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Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable
inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker,
249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008).
B. Substantial Evidence Review
The trial court’s review of a TWC decision is by “trial de novo based on the
substantial evidence rule.” TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 212.202(a) (West 2006);
Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986), cited in Tex. Workforce
Comm’n v. City of Houston, 274 S.W.3d 263, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2008, no pet.). A TWC decision concerning the payment of benefits carries a
presumption of validity, and the party seeking to set it aside has the burden to show
it was not supported by substantial evidence. City of Houston, 274 S.W.3d at 266
(citing Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831). Whether TWC’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence is a question of law. Id.; Blanchard v. Brazos Forest Prods.,
L.P., 353 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied).
Under the substantial evidence rule, the issue before the court is “whether
the evidence introduced before the trial court shows facts in existence at the time
of the [agency’s] decision that reasonably support the decision.” Collingsworth
Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1998), quoted in Blanchard,
353 S.W.3d at 572. The issue is not whether TWC made the correct decision.
Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 572. If the evidence is such that reasonable minds could
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have reached the same conclusion, the agency’s decision must be upheld. City of
Houston, 274 S.W.3d at 267; Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 572. In other words, “[i]f
substantial evidence would support either affirmative or negative findings, we must
uphold the agency decision and resolve any conflicts in favor of the agency
decision.” Farris v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 27 S.W.3d 307, 312 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Auto Convoy v. Railroad Comm’n, 507
S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. 1974)). “We may not set aside an agency decision merely
because testimony was conflicting or disputed or because it did not compel the
agency’s decision.” Scally v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 351 S.W.3d 434,
441 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. filed) (citing Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civil
Serv. Comm’n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984)). It is the
agency’s function to resolve conflicts in evidence, and “it is the aim of the
substantial evidence rule to protect that function.” Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956.
“Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 572 (citing City of Houston v. Tippy,
991 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)). Thus, a
decision supported by substantial evidence will be upheld, even if the evidence
preponderates against the decision. City of Houston, 274 S.W.3d at 267;
Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 572.
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Trial courts may grant summary judgments in cases tried under the
substantial evidence rule. Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 573. “Indeed, appeals under
substantial evidence review are uniquely suited to summary judgment because the
only issue before the court is a question of law.” Id. (quoting Arrellano v. Tex.
Emp’t Comm’n, 810 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ
denied)). We review the trial court’s summary judgment by comparing the TWC
decision with the evidence presented to the trial court and the governing law. Id.
The issue we must decide is whether the summary judgment evidence established
as a matter of law that substantial evidence existed to support the TWC decision.
Id.
Discussion
In this appeal, Lopez contends that she had good cause for leaving her
employment because her working conditions were “intolerable.” See TEX.
WORKFORCE COMM’N APP. & POL’Y MANUAL, VL 515.05 Working Conditions:
General. She argues that TWC’s determination that she did not have good cause
for quitting was not supported by substantial evidence because TWC “failed to
consider th[e] facts as a whole, rather it attached more importance to the hearsay
affidavit and/or testimony of the Employer’s representatives.” This, however,
confuses the issue the trial court was required to address. The question before this
court is not whether TWC correctly resolved conflicting evidence, but whether the
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trial court properly found as a matter of law that TWC’s determination was
supported by substantial evidence.
TWC and La Madeleine submitted Keffer’s and Fichtner’s affidavits in
support of their motion for summary judgment. Keffer stated she did not mistreat
Lopez and Lopez was given the same amount of work as other employees.
Fichtner stated that, when Lopez complained to him, he looked into the matter and
determined that Lopez was not being mistreated or unfairly given heavier
workloads. In addition, Fichtner also averred that Lopez did not contact any other
management or human resources personnel or utilize the employee hotline to
report that hse was being mistreated. Lopez responded with her own affidavit,
testifying that Keffer became hostile because Lopez had complained about her
prior supervisors. Lopez detailed specific instances of alleged mistreatment,
including being given heavier workloads than other employees, being denied
breaks, and being verbally abused.
Additionally, TWC’s prior decision was included as summary judgment
evidence. TWC determined that, following TWC precedent, Lopez did not have
good cause for quitting for two reasons. In the findings of fact and conclusions of
law issued by the appeals tribunal and adopted by the commissioners, TWC
specifically found that Lopez did not report her complaints of mistreatment
through La Madeleine’s normal chain of command. Nor did she report her
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complaints using the employee hotline. Therefore, TWC determined that Lopez
had not met her burden of showing her working conditions were intolerable. TWC
also determined that Lopez’s failure to report her mistreatment deprived La
Madeleine the opportunity to resolve her complaints about the working conditions.
Because the working conditions were not intolerable and because Lopez did not
give La Madeleine the chance to address the issue, Lopez did not have good cause
for quitting.
Although it was presented with conflicting evidence, the trial court correctly
determined that TWC’s decision was not unreasonable. Keffer’s and Fichtner’s
affidavits provide a reasonable basis to determine that Lopez’s working conditions
were not intolerable and, therefore, she quit without good cause. See City of
Houston, 274 S.W.3d at 267 (inquiry is whether reasonable minds could have
reached the same decision as the agency decision under review). Fichtner’s
affidavit also provides a reasonable basis to determine that Lopez did not give La
Madeleine the opportunity to address the situation and, therefore, Lopez quit
without good cause. We do not decide whether Lopez raised a fact issue
concerning whether she quit for good cause; rather, like the trial court, we decide
only whether substantial evidence supported TWC’s determination that she did not
have good cause for quitting. Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 572. On this record, we
conclude that the summary judgment evidence demonstrated that substantial
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evidence did support TWC’s determination. See Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988
S.W.2d at 708 (stating that issue on review is whether evidence introduced before
trial court showed facts in existence at time of TWC’s decision that reasonably
support that decision). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly granted
summary judgment.
We overrule Lopez’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
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