in the Matter of R. G. ( 2012 )

Opinion issued August 30, 2012.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-11-00748-CV
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IN THE MATTER OF R.G.
On Appeal from the 315th Judicial District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 86,647
OPINION
Relator, R.G., challenges the juvenile court’s order vacating its previous
order granting him habeas corpus relief and a new trial on the court’s adjudication
of his delinquency. In his sole issue, relator contends that the juvenile court erred
in vacating its order granting him habeas corpus relief on the ground that it did not
have jurisdiction to grant the relief. Relator also contends that the juvenile court
“lacked plenary power” to set aside its order granting him habeas corpus relief
We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus.
Background
On March 20, 1995, a jury found that relator, who was fourteen years old at
the time, engaged in delinquent conduct,1 namely, committing the offense of
murder,2 and assessed his punishment at confinement for forty years. The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudication of delinquency. In re R.G.,
No. 14-95-00584-CV, 1997 WL 379151 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July
10, 1997, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
On August 4, 2009, relator filed, in the juvenile court, an application for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
during his adjudication. On January 28, 2011, after a hearing, the juvenile court
found that relator’s adjudication was “based on the admission of inadmissible
testimony, improper questions, argument outside the record, and ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Accordingly, it granted relator habeas corpus relief and a
new trial.
1
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03 (Vernon Supp. 2011).
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 2011).
2
Six months later, on June 28, 2011, relator filed a motion to dismiss the case
against him for lack of jurisdiction. He asserted that the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to retry him after he had become 17 years of age. The State responded,
arguing that the juvenile court retained continuing jurisdiction over relator to retry
his adjudication of guilt. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the juvenile
court concluded that it had “no jurisdiction to re-try [the] case,” further stating that
“it appears this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider [relator’s] habeas corpus or
grant a new trial.” The juvenile court then vacated its order granting relator habeas
relief and a new trial, and it reinstated relator’s adjudication of delinquency.
Appellate Jurisdiction
At the outset, we note that the State argues that this Court does not have
jurisdiction to hear this “appeal” because it not authorized by the Texas Family
Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2011). Section
56.01(c)(1) provides that an appeal may be taken “by or on behalf of a child” from
an order entered under:
(A) Section 54.03 with regard to delinquent conduct or conduct
indicating a need for supervision;
(B) Section 54.04 disposing of the case;
(C) Section 54.05 respecting modification of a previous juvenile
court disposition; or
(D) Chapter 55 by a juvenile court committing a child to a facility
or the mentally ill or mentally retarded . . . .
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Id. Moreover, an appeal may be taken “by a person from an order entered under
Section 54.11(i)(2) transferring the person to the custody of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice.” Id. § 56.01(c)(2). The State argues that because this
“appeal” does not fall into any of the above categories, this Court must dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, section 56.01 also provides that it “does
not limit a child’s right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. § 56.01(o).
The State correctly notes that in criminal cases, “no appeal can be had from
a refusal to issue or grant a writ of habeas corpus even after a hearing.” See Ex
Parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). However, “[w]hen a
hearing is held on the merits of an applicant’s claim and the court subsequently
rules on the merits of that claim, the losing party may appeal.” Id. Regardless, in
its order vacating its grant of habeas corpus relief, the juvenile court did not
purport to deny relator’s relief on the merits. Rather, relator is now in the position
of arguing that the juvenile court erred in issuing the order vacating its order
granting habeas corpus relief because it had jurisdiction to grant him the relief and
the order vacating the granting of relief is void because the juvenile court issued it
after its plenary power had expired. Mandamus relief is appropriate when a trial
court issues an order after its plenary power has expired because that order is void.
In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 68–69 (Tex. 2008) (orig.
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proceeding); In re Office of the Attorney Gen. of Tex., 264 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008) (orig. proceeding).
Relator requests that, if this Court concludes that it does not have appellate
jurisdiction, we construe his appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus. The
Texas Supreme Court recently held that an interlocutory appeal should not have
been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but instead should have been considered as
a petition for a writ of mandamus as requested by the petitioner. CMH Homes v.
Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 453–54 (Tex. 2011). The court explained that “Texas
policy . . . ‘disfavors disposing of appeals based upon harmless procedural
defects.’” Id. at 453 (quoting Higgins v. Randall County Sheriff’s Office, 257
S.W.3d 687, 688 (Tex. 2008)); see also In re J.P.L., 359 S.W.3d 695, 703 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. filed) (construing appeal from nonfinal order
granting petition to enforce child custody as request for writ of mandamus).
Accordingly, we construe relator’s briefing as a petition for writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, which is available only when (1) a
trial court clearly abuses its discretion and (2) there is no adequate remedy by
appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). A
trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker v.
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Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992). With respect to a trial court’s
determination of legal principles, “a trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining
what the law is or applying the law to facts.” In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135
(quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840).
Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction
In his sole issue, relator argues that the juvenile court erred in vacating its
order granting him habeas corpus relief because it did have jurisdiction to grant
him the relief and it vacated the order granting him relief after its plenary power
had expired.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that
we review de novo. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007).
Here, the juvenile court, the 315th Judicial District Court of Harris County,
is a “family district court.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 24.601, 24.623 (Vernon
2004). “A family district court has the jurisdiction and power provided for district
courts by the constitution and laws of this state.” Id. § 24.601(a). “Its jurisdiction
is concurrent with that of other district courts in the county in which it is located.”
Id. The Texas Constitution confers to the district courts “exclusive, appellate, and
original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases
where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this
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Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.”
TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 8. And district court judges “shall have the power to issue
writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.” Id.
The Family Code provides that “[i]n each county, the county’s juvenile
board shall designate one or more district, criminal district, domestic relations,
juvenile, or county courts or county courts at law as the juvenile court.” TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 51.04(b) (Vernon 2008). The 315th Judicial District Court has been
designated as a juvenile court. See Harris County District Judges Rules of
Administration R. 9.1.3 (listing 315th Judicial District Court as one of three courts
constituting Harris County’s “juvenile division” as established “by statutory
preferences and board policy”). The Juvenile Justice Code covers the proceedings
“in all cases involving the delinquent conduct . . . engaged in by a person who was
a child within the meaning of this title at the time the person engaged in the
conduct.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.04(a). “[T]he juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over proceedings under” the Juvenile Justice Code. Id.
The State argues that relator failed to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of
the juvenile court as a “district court” because he filed his application for a writ of
habeas corpus “under the same petition number as the murder petition and directed
it to the same court,” which, the State asserts, made the petition effectively an out-
of-time motion for new trial. The State further asserts that relator invoked the
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juvenile court’s “limited jurisdiction solely as a juvenile court,” which lacked the
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the writ. In support of this proposition, the
State, as did the juvenile court in vacating its order, relies on In re N.J.A., 997
S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1999). In In re N.J.A., a juvenile defendant turned eighteen
years of age during the pendency of a petition to transfer the case to criminal
district court, which was denied. Id. at 554–55. The Texas Supreme Court held
that the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to adjudicate the defendant’s guilt.
Id. at 556–57. The court reasoned that “[l]ogically, once a juvenile becomes
eighteen, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction does not include the authority to
adjudicate the juvenile.” Id. at 555. It held that once a juvenile defendant turns
eighteen, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is limited to waiving its exclusive
jurisdiction and transferring the case to district court, providing certain criteria are
met. Id. at 557 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 54.02(j) (Vernon Supp. 2011)).3
3
We note that during R.G.’s incarceration, the Texas Legislature provided an
exception to the holding of In re N.J.A. See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 51.0412
(Vernon Supp. 2011); see also In re V.A., 140 S.W.3d 858, 859 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth, no pet.). Section 51.0412 provides that a juvenile court retains jurisdiction
over a person, “without regard to the age of the person,” if the original petition
was filed before the person turned 18 years of age, the proceeding is not complete
before the person turned 18 years of age, and the juvenile court enters a finding
that the prosecuting attorney exercised due diligence in an attempt to complete the
proceedings before the person turned 18 years of age. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
51.0412. However, section 51.0412 does not apply “to conduct that occur[red] on
or after the effective date,” which was September 1, 2001. See Act of Sept. 1,
2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1297, § 72, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3142, 3175.
8
Although relator filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus under the
same cause number as that used in the previous juvenile proceedings, he styled it
as an “Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” alleging that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel at his trial. In his application, relator argued that the
juvenile court had jurisdiction, pursuant to the Texas Constitution, to consider a
writ of habeas corpus. The State, and the juvenile court, treated relator’s pleading
as an application for a writ of habeas corpus during every stage of the proceedings.
The court referred to it as an application for a writ of habeas corpus in its order
granting relief and in its order vacating relief, noting that relator filed his
application “pursuant to Article 5, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution.” Thus,
despite filing his application under the same cause number as that used in the
previous juvenile proceedings, relator actually filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, and he invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
as a district court, to consider such writs. See TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 8; In re Hall,
286 S.W.3d 925, 926–27 (Tex. 2009) (recognizing civil district court, which was
also juvenile court, had jurisdiction to hear writ of habeas corpus); Ex Parte Valle,
104 S.W.3d 888, 889–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that civil, not criminal,
district courts should entertain writs of habeas corpus, and noting that “several
courts of appeals have entertained appeals when writs of habeas corpus were
issued by district courts on the application of juveniles accused of delinquent
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conduct”). Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to
entertain relator’s application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to its
constitutional jurisdiction as a district court.
Plenary Power
Relator next argues that the juvenile court lacked the power to vacate its
order granting him habeas corpus relief because a trial court has plenary power to
grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform a judgment “within thirty
days after the judgment is signed.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). Relator further
argues that because the juvenile court’s order vacating its grant of habeas corpus
relief was entered more than thirty days after the original order, it acted outside of
its plenary power to modify the original order.
The State argues that relator’s application is in effect an out-of-time motion
for new trial. See In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2008).
In Baylor, a trial court vacated a previous order granting a motion for new trial two
months after it had granted the new trial, reinstating the original jury verdict. Id. at
228–29. The Texas Supreme Court explained that once a new trial is timely
granted, “the case stands on the trial court’s docket ‘the same as though no trial
had been had.’” Id. at 230–31 (citing Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160
S.W.3d 550, 563 (Tex. 2005)). The court noted that federal courts and
commentators have observed that there is “no sound reason why the court may not
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reconsider its ruling [granting] a new trial” at any time. Id. at 232 (citing 6A
James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 59.13[1], at 59–227 (2d ed.
1996)). Ultimately, the court concluded that a trial court should “have the power
to set aside a new trial order ‘any time before a final judgment is entered.’” Id. at
231 (quoting Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993)).
The State argues that we should apply the above rule to the instant case
because the Texas Family Code provides that, except as otherwise provided, “the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure govern proceedings under” the Juvenile Justice
Code and courts have stated that juvenile proceedings are “civil in nature.” See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.17(a) (Vernon Supp. 2011); Ex Parte Valle, 104
S.W.3d at 890. However, relator’s application, styled as a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, initiated an entirely new proceeding; it cannot be treated as a
motion for new trial in the underlying juvenile adjudication proceeding, which was
disposed of by a final judgment entered long ago.
As the State itself notes, an application for a writ of habeas corpus
constitutes a “separate proceeding collaterally attacking” the original judgment.
See, e.g., Ex Parte Rieck, 144 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(recognizing that habeas proceedings are considered to be “separate from the
criminal prosecution”); Rose v. State, 198 S.W.3d 271, 272 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2006, pet. ref’d) (“A habeas corpus proceeding, unlike a criminal trial, is
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an independent proceeding that makes inquiry into the validity of the conviction
. . . .”). “An application for habeas corpus is not like a motion for new trial in the
sense that a habeas proceeding is not part of the underlying criminal prosecution
against the applicant.” Ex Parte Cummins, 169 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2005, no pet.); see also Ex Parte Galvan-Herrera, No. 13-11-00380-CR,
2012 WL 1484097, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 26, 2012, pet. struck)
(mem. op.) (holding that application for writ of habeas corpus was not governed by
rules applicable to motion for new trial because those rules “govern[] only direct
challenges to a defendant’s conviction or punishment filed within thirty days”).
Thus, the granting of an application for a writ of habeas corpus where one is
collaterally attacking a judgment is fundamentally different from the granting of a
motion for new trial, where one is directly and timely attacking a judgment. In In
re Baylor, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that the granting of a timely filed
new-trial motion may be reconsidered by the trial court at any time because a trial
court has “not only the authority but the responsibility to review any pre-trial order
upon proper motion.” 280 S.W.3d at 231 (citing Downer v. Aquamarine
Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985)). The granting of habeas corpus
relief, in a separate and distinct proceeding from the original proceeding, and from
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which the State is entitled to appeal in certain circumstances,4 cannot be
characterized as a “pre-trial” order.
Here, the juvenile court entered its order granting relator habeas corpus
relief on January 28, 2011, and the State did not appeal from or otherwise
complain about that order. And, as stated above, the juvenile court had jurisdiction
to grant relator’s application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to its
constitutional jurisdiction as a district court. Accordingly, we hold that the
juvenile court abused its discretion and exceeded its plenary power when it vacated
its order granting relator habeas corpus relief more than six months after granting
the relief. Thus, its order vacating relief is void. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d)
(providing that trial court has plenary power to vacate or modify its judgment
within thirty days after it is signed); In re State ex rel. Sistrunk, 142 S.W.3d 497,
503 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (noting that trial court
generally retains plenary jurisdiction over case for thirty days after sentencing).
We sustain relator’s sole issue.
4
See, e.g., State v. Nkwocha, 31 S.W.3d 817, 818 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no
pet.) (noting that State could appeal grant of habeas corpus relief, ordering new
trial, on grounds of newly-discovered evidence); State v. Kanapa, 778 S.W.2d
592, 593 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (noting that State can
appeal from habeas corpus proceeding when it would otherwise have right to
appeal under Code of Criminal Procedure).
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Conclusion
We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and reverse the juvenile
court’s order vacating its order granting habeas corpus relief, and we reinstate the
juvenile court’s order granting relator a new trial. The writ will issue only if the
trial court fails to comply.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Huddle.
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