Ralph O. Douglas ( 2012 )

Opinion issued March 1, 2012

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-10-00482-CV

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Ralph O. Douglas, Appellant

On Appeal from the 412th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 57344

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Ralph O. Douglas appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing his case without prejudice for failure to comply with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  We affirm. 

Background

Douglas filed suit against two employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional Division, alleging that they retaliated against him in assigning his work duties and restricting his access to the law library.  Neither defendant was served with the petition, and neither appeared in the trial court or in this Court on appeal.  The trial court dismissed Douglas’s case for failure to comply with the provisions of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14.  Although the order of dismissal does not provide a reason for the trial court’s action, the trial court’s notes on the docket sheet indicate that the case was dismissed because Douglas provided no evidence that he complied with the grievance process.  On appeal, Douglas contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his case.

Standards of Review

We review the dismissal of an inmate’s Chapter 14 case under an abuse of discretion standard.  Jackson v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Moreland v. Johnson, 95 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).  An abuse of discretion can be found when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.  Jackson, 178 S.W.3d at 275.  However, when a trial court dismisses a claim without a hearing, the issue on appeal is whether the claim had no arguable basis in law.  Moreland, 95 S.W.3d at 394.  A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” or is based on “wholly incredible or irrational factual allegations.”  Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing Minix v. Gonzales, 162 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).  Because there is no indication in the record that the trial court held a hearing in this case, we review de novo the legal question of whether the trial court properly concluded that the claim had no arguable basis in law.  Moreland, 95 S.W.3d at 394.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Inmate complaints about the actions of TDCJ employees are subject to the grievance procedure.  See Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297, 308 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.008 (West 2004) (Inmate Grievance System); 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 283.3 (West 2011) (Inmate Grievance Plan); Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Orientation Handbook 53 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/ Offender_Orientation_Handbook_English.pdf (stating that complaints about actions of TDCJ employees and reprisals for exercising “Access to Courts” rights are subject to grievance procedures). An inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in state court.  Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.008(d). In addition, if his state-court claim is subject to the grievance system, the inmate must file with the court “(1) an affidavit or unsworn declaration stating the date that the grievance was filed and the date the written decision described by Section 501.008(d), Government Code, was received by the inmate; and (2) a copy of the written decision from the grievance system.”  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.005(a) (West 2002).  Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is grounds for dismissal under Chapter 14 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  See Leachman, 261 S.W.3d at 309.

Analysis

          Douglas’s petition alleged that in 2007 he had a disagreement with TDCJ employee Valerie Henton about his assigned job duties.  Douglas alleged that after the disagreement, Henton and another employee retaliated against him by changing his job duties and limiting his access to the law library.  Douglas’s complaint was subject to the grievance system, but nothing in the record indicates that he exhausted—or even initiated—the grievance process. 

Douglas argues that because he filed a request to pay filing fees, relying upon Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 14.006, he was not required to show that he had exhausted his administrative remedies.  Section 14.006 provides that a court may order an inmate who has filed a lawsuit to pay fees and costs, and it provides a method for determining both the amount owed and the monthly payments required to satisfy the inmate’s obligation. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.006 (West 2002).  Douglas’s contention that his filing of a document requesting to pay fees as provided in § 14.006 exempts him from the requirement to exhaust his administrative remedies is simply an incorrect statement of the law.

Because Douglas failed to show that he exhausted his administrative remedies, his claim could not be filed in state court.  See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.008(d); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.005.  Thus, we conclude that Douglas’s case had no arguable basis in law, see Moreland, 95 S.W.3d at 394, and we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Douglas’s case for failure to comply with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  We overrule Douglas’s issues.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                      Michael Massengale

                                                                      Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Huddle.