in Re the Estate of Francisco Julio Lerma Sanchez ( 2012 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-11-00332-CV
IN RE THE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO JULIO LERMA SANCHEZ, Deceased
From the County Court At Law No. 1, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2009PB4000055L1
Honorable Alvino (Ben) Morales, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Sitting: Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 18, 2012
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Carmen Viera-Peňa de Lerma (“Carmen”) filed a petition to establish an informal
marriage with the late Francisco Julio Lerma-Sanchez (“Francisco”), whose estate is pending in
probate court. Claudio Lerma Torres, Adrian Lerma Martinez, Julio Francisco Lerma Torres,
Victor Manuel Lerma Torres, Maria De Los Angeles Lerma, and Clementina Lerma De
Arzagoitia, Francisco’s children (hereinafter “the children”), filed no-evidence and traditional
motions for summary judgment, asserting there was no informal marriage between Carmen and
Francisco. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment and Carmen appeals.
Carmen also complains on appeal that the trial court erred in canceling and expunging the
notices of lis pendens.
04-11-00332-CV
BACKGROUND
Francisco died in April 2009, and the administration of his estate was filed in County
Court at Law No. 1 in Laredo, Texas. Carmen filed a petition to establish an informal marriage
to Francisco. Carmen’s response to the motions for summary judgment included her affidavits, 1
in which Carmen stated she and Francisco lived together for approximately thirteen years and
had two children together. She stated they began living together in Laredo, Texas in December
1995, at which time she claims they agreed to be married. In her second affidavit, she also stated
she and Francisco reiterated their agreement to be married several times while they lived in
Texas. She attested they continued to live in Laredo until mid-1996, at which time they left
Laredo and moved to Mexico. Carmen stated she and Francisco returned to Laredo in December
2007 and lived there until 2009. Carmen also stated in her second affidavit she and Francisco
represented to people in Texas, on numerous occasions, that they were married. She stated these
representations were made to hotel employees where they lived and to restaurant personnel
where they dined.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When filing a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant must specifically
challenge the evidentiary support for an element of a claim or defense. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i)
cmt. (1997). The movant is entitled to summary judgment if it can prove, as a matter of law, that
the opponent failed to produce legally sufficient evidence to support its theory of liability or
defense after adequate time for discovery. Id. Once the movant files a no-evidence motion for
summary judgment, the respondent has the burden to produce summary judgment evidence
raising a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element. Id.; Ford Motor Co. v.
1
We do not address Carmen’s other summary judgment evidence or the objections to that evidence because
Carmen’s affidavits are sufficient to raise a fact issue on her claim that she and Francisco were married.
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Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). However, the non-movant is not required to
marshal its proof; he need only present some evidence of probative value raising a fact issue
about which reasonable minds could differ. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) cmt. (1997); Johnson v.
Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002). We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-movant and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. King
Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).
A traditional motion for summary judgment requires the movant to establish there is no
genuine issue of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a(c); Little v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004); KPMG Peat
Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Houston Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). The movant
has the burden to conclusively disprove one element of the challenged cause of action or to
conclusively prove all of the elements of an affirmative defense. Little, 148 S.W.3d at 381;
Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 645-46 (Tex. 2000). “‘When reviewing a
motion for summary judgment, the court takes the nonmovant’s evidence as true, indulges every
reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolves all doubts in favor of the
nonmovant.’” Little, 148 S.W.3d at 381(quoting M.D. Anderson Hosp. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d
22, 23 (Tex. 2000).
SHAM AFFIDAVIT OBJECTION
The children assert the trial court erred in overruling their objection that Carmen’s
affidavits were “sham” affidavits. An allegation that an affidavit is a sham generally occurs
when a party files an affidavit to avoid a summary judgment and the affidavit testimony is in
direct and total contradiction with the affiant’s deposition testimony. Farroux v. Denny’s Rest.,
Inc., 962 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). A sham affidavit
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must be disregarded by the court. Cantu v. Peacher, 53 S.W.3d 5, 10-11 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied). In Cantu, this court concluded that when determining whether an
affidavit is a sham, the court must examine the nature and extent of the differences in the facts
asserted in the deposition and the affidavit. Id. at 10. “If the differences fall into the category of
variations on a theme, consistent in the major allegations but with some variances of detail, this
is grounds for impeachment, and not a vitiation of the later filed document. If, on the other hand,
the subsequent affidavit clearly contradicts the witness’s earlier testimony involving the suit’s
material points, without explanation, the affidavit must be disregarded and will not defeat the
motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 10-11.
The children claim Carmen’s July 2010 affidavit, filed in relation to the administration of
Francisco’s estate and in which she stated Francisco’s “residence and domicile was in the
Republic of Mexico,” was in direct contradiction of her later testimony regarding the time she
and Francisco cohabitated in Laredo. We disagree. First, the statements in the July 2010
affidavit do not reference a specific time period that Francisco’s residence and domicile was in
Mexico. Furthermore, when asked during her deposition about the July 2010 affidavit, Carmen
explained that Francisco’s domicile and residence was in both Laredo and in Mexico.
Additionally, having a domicile and residence in Mexico does not necessarily preclude Francisco
living in Laredo during the time periods Carmen claims she and Francisco cohabitated in Texas.
The children also contend Carmen’s affidavits filed in response to the summary judgment
motions conflict with her testimony at a hearing in probate court. They claim Carmen testified
she was not living in the United States until 2011 due to her immigration status. However,
Carmen testified she used a border crossing card to enter Texas up until she received a student
visa in 2011. Carmen stated that she was not allowed by law to live in the United States until
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January 2011. Carmen was asked “you wouldn’t have broken the law by coming here before
then, correct” and she responded “no, I wouldn’t have broken the law because there is…so many
enemies.” These statements are not a direct contradiction of her testimony that she lived in
Laredo with Francisco. We conclude the affidavits filed in response to the summary judgment
motions are not sham affidavits, and the trial court did not err in overruling the children’s
objections.
ELEMENTS OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
“Common law marriages have been recognized in Texas since 1847.” 2 Russell v. Russell,
865 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1993) (citing Tarpley v. Poage’s Adm’r, 2 Tex. 139, 149 (1847)). A
common law marriage has three requirements: (1) the parties agreed to be married; (2) the parties
lived together as husband and wife in Texas after they agreed to be married; and (3) the parties
represented to others that they were married. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2) (West 2006);
Russell, 865 S.W.2d at 932; Palacios v. Robbins, No. 04-02-00338-CV, 2003 WL 21502371, *3
(Tex. App.—San Antonio July 2, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.). All three elements must exist at
the same time. Palacios, 2003 WL 21502371, at *3.
To establish an agreement to be married, “the evidence must show the parties intended to
have a present, immediate, and permanent marital relationship and that they did in fact agree to
be husband and wife.” Eris v. Phares, 39 S.W.3d 708, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2001, pet. denied). The agreement to be married may be established by direct or circumstantial
evidence. Russell, 865 S.W.2d at 933. The testimony of one of the parties to the marriage
constitutes direct evidence the parties agreed to be married. See Eris, 39 S.W.3d at 714; In re
2
“Informal marriage” is the statutory term used to describe what is colloquially known as a common law marriage.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2006).
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Estate of Giessel, 734 S.W.2d 27, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The conduct of the parties and evidence of cohabitation and representations to others may
constitute circumstantial evidence of an agreement depending upon the facts of the case. See
Russell, 865 S.W.2d at 933; Eris, 39 S.W.3d at 714. Cohabitation need not be continuous. See
Bolash v. Heid, 733 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (holding evidence
sufficient to establish cohabitation where husband worked in Nigeria but lived with wife each
time he returned to Texas). As with all of the elements of common law marriage, cohabitation is
determined on a case-by-case basis. See Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d 164, 166
(Tex. 1981).
The statutory requirement of “represent[ing] to others” is synonymous with the judicial
requirement of “holding out to the public.” Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2) (West
2006) with Claveria, 615 S.W.2d at 166. “‘Holding out’ may be established by the conduct and
actions of the parties.” Eris, 39 S.W.3d at 715. “Spoken words are not necessary to establish
representation as husband and wife.” Id. Written references to the marriage or to a party as
“spouse” are evidence of “holding out.” See Claveria, 615 S.W.2d at 167 (holding recorded deed
in which parties represented they were married was evidence of common law marriage); Persons
v. Persons, 666 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(holding reference to one party as “spouse” in credit application was evidence of holding out).
ANALYSIS
The children contend Carmen’s testimony regarding whether she and Francisco had an
agreement to be married is conclusory and as such is insufficient to raise a fact issue. “A
conclusory statement is one that does not provide the underlying facts to support the conclusion.”
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Trejo v. Laredo Nat. Bank, 185 S.W.3d 43, 50 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.)(quoting
Haynes v. City of Beaumont, 35 S.W.3d 166, 178 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
In Carmen’s second affidavit, she stated “[w]e expressly agreed to be married in
December of 1995, when we began living together, and thereafter expressly reiterated our
agreement several times to each other when we were living in Texas.” This testimony is a
statement of fact and not a mere conclusion that requires further explanation or detail. Id.
Additionally, Carmen testified during her deposition that she and Francisco agreed to be married
while staying at the Family Garden Hotel in Laredo because “[i]t was a new life that we were
beginning.” This testimony provides additional evidence regarding the agreement to be married.
Carmen’s affidavit and deposition testimony is sufficient to raise a fact issue on whether she and
Francisco agreed to be married. See Collora, 574 S.W.2d at 70 (“Ollie’s testimony that she and
Joe had “agreed to a marriage” was direct testimony of an agreement to be married and was
enough to raise the issue of agreement”); see also Giessel, 734 S.W.2d at 32 (testimony of one
party that they had agreed to be married “in God’s eyes” was direct evidence of agreement to be
married).
The children also contend Carmen’s testimony regarding cohabitation is conclusory and
does not raise a fact issue. Carmen stated she lived with Francisco in Laredo, Texas for
“approximately six months from the end of 1995 to mid-1996” and again from December 2007
to February 2009. This testimony is not conclusory; rather, it is a statement of fact. See Trejo,
185 S.W.3d at 50.
The children also argue the six-month period in 1995 and the fifteen-month period from
December 2007 to February 2009 was not a continuous period of cohabitation as required by the
statute. However, cohabitation need not be continuous. See Bolash, 733 S.W.2d at 699. In
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Bolash, the defendant was employed in Nigeria and would on occasions spend time in this
country. Id. According to plaintiff’s testimony, she and the defendant agreed to be husband and
wife one night when the defendant was visiting. Id. The defendant left San Antonio the
following day, but according to the plaintiff’s testimony, he returned to San Antonio several
times during the next four years and stayed with plaintiff on each occasion. Id. She testified
they traveled together on occasion to New York, Atlanta, Las Vegas and Europe. Id. The court
determined that, although defendant testified he had returned to this country several times when
he did not see plaintiff, and although the plaintiff admitted she did not know where defendant
worked in Nigeria and did not know how to get in touch with him there, her testimony that they
were together each time he came to this country was sufficient to support the finding they lived
together as husband and wife to the extent possible under the circumstances. Id. Thus, even if
there were gaps of time when Carmen and Francisco did not live together in Laredo does not
negate the cohabitation element. Carmen’s testimony is sufficient to raise a fact issue on
cohabitation.
The children also contend Carmen’s 2010 affidavit placed Francisco’s “residence and
domicile” in Mexico, which would make cohabitation in Texas a “factual impossibility.”
However, as discussed above, Carmen clarified in her deposition that Francisco’s residence and
domicile was in both Mexico and Laredo. The children argue there is ample evidence to
disprove that Carmen and Francisco cohabited in Texas. However, we must disregard this
evidence because in an appeal of a summary judgment the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to Carmen and all contrary evidence and inferences must be disregarded. King
Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 751.
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Finally, the children argue Carmen’s testimony related to the holding out element is
conclusory and does not raise a fact issue. In her second affidavit, Carmen stated she and
Francisco represented to Francisco’s employees as well as to hotel and restaurant personnel in
Texas they were married. These are statements of fact and are not conclusions. See Trejo, 185
S.W.3d at 50.
The children rely on Nichols v. Lightle, 153 S.W.3d 563, 570-71 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2004, pet. denied) to support their argument that Carmen’s testimony is insufficient to raise a
fact issue. However, their reliance is misplaced. In Nichols, the only evidence regarding the
holding out element was the statement “we held out to others that we were husband and wife.”
Id. The court held this statement was conclusory because it merely paraphrased the statute’s
language and contained no specific factual basis for the statement. Id. Accordingly, the
statement was not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact. Id. However, Carmen’s testimony
provides more information than simply paraphrasing the statute and is sufficient to raise a fact
issue. Although the children point to evidence that contradicts Carmen’s testimony, for
summary judgment purposes this evidence must be disregarded. King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d
at 751.
LIS PENDENS
The administrator of the estate filed an application to sell a commercial warehouse owned
by Francisco. Carmen filed an objection, asserting, among other things, that the property was
presumptively community property because Francisco was her common law husband and she
had a fee simple interest in the property. The trial court entered an order authorizing the sale,
and Carmen filed a notice of lis pendens and an amended notice of lis pendens.
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The estate administrator filed a motion to cancel the notices and to waive bond pursuant
to section 12.008 of the Texas Property Code. The administrator asserted Carmen failed to
comply with the statutory requirement that the notice of lis pendens be served on each party to
the action. The administrator also pleaded that if the children’s pending motions for summary
judgment were granted, Carmen would not have an interest in the property and the administrator
could proceed with the sale. After granting the motions for summary judgment, the trial court
entered an order canceling the lis pendens and waived the bond requirement.
Before the trial court granted the motion to cancel the lis pendens, Carmen appealed the
trial court’s order granting the children’s motions for summary judgment. After the motion to
cancel the lis pendens was granted, Carmen amended her notice of appeal to include the trial
court’s order canceling the lis pendens. Carmen also filed a second notice of lis pendens. Four
days after the second notice of lis pendens was filed, the trial court sua sponte entered an order
expunging the second notice of lis pendens. Carmen then amended her notice of appeal to
include the trial’s court’s order expunging the second notice.
Carmen asserts the trial court erred in canceling the notice and amended notice of lis
pendens and in expunging the second lis pendens. We only address Carmen’s complaint that the
trial court erred in expunging the second notice of lis pendens because, if the trial court erred in
expunging the second lis pendens, it remains in effect. Thus, any error related to trial court’s
order canceling the first and amended notices is moot.
A lis pendens may be filed during the pendency of an action involving title to real
property, the establishment of an interest in real property, or an enforcement of an encumbrance
against real property. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007 (West 2009). The purpose of a lis
pendens is to put parties interested in a particular tract of land on notice as to the facts and issues
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involved in a suit or action concerning that particular tract. In re Jamail, 156 S.W.3d 104, 108
(Tex. App.—Austin 2004, orig. proceeding.); In re Collins, 172 S.W.3d 287, 292–93 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, orig. proceeding); Garza v. Pope, 949 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1997, no writ). A lis pendens is not an independent claim, Collins v. Tex Mall, L.P., 297
S.W.3d 409, 419 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.), and has no existence separate and apart
from the litigation of which it gives notice. Taliaferro v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). Under Texas law, a lis pendens does not prevent a
sale of the property; it merely places a purchaser on notice that a person other than the title
holder claims an interest in the property. Group Purchases, Inc. v. Lance Inv., Inc., 685 S.W.2d
729, 731 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A lis pendens notice operates during the
pendency of the lawsuit and terminates with the judgment, in the absence of appeal. Berg v.
Wilson, 353 S.W.3d 166, 180 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. denied); see also Hartel v.
Dishman, 135 Tex. 600, 145 S.W.2d 865, 869 (1940); Collins, 297 S.W.3d at 418.
Section 12.0071 of the Texas Property Code provides the statutory authority for
expunging a lis pendens. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.0071 (West Supp. 2011). Section 12.071
provides in part
(a) A party to an action in connection with which a notice of lis pendens has been
filed may:
(1) apply to the court to expunge the notice; and
(2) file evidence, including declarations, with the motion to expunge the
notice.
(b) The court may:
(1) permit evidence on the motion to be received in the form of oral
testimony; and
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(2) make any orders the court considers just to provide for discovery by a
party affected by the motion.
(c) The court shall order the notice of lis pendens expunged if the court
determines that:
(1) the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real
property claim;
(2) the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the
probable validity of the real property claim; or
(3) the person who filed the notice for record did not serve a copy of the
notice on each party entitled to a copy under Section 12.007(d).
(d) Notice of a motion to expunge under Subsection (a) must be served on each
affected party on or before the 20th day before the date of the hearing on the
motion.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.0071 (West Supp. 2011). The record does not reflect that any party
to the underlying action filed a motion to expunge the second lis pendens, nor do the children
argue one was filed. It appears from the record the trial court sua sponte, only four days after the
second lis pendens was filed, ordered the second lis pendens expunged.
Section 12.0071 allows a party to file a motion requesting the trial court expunge a notice
lis pendens, but the statute requires that the motion be served on each affected person on or
before the 20th day before a hearing on the matter. No party filed a motion and Carmen was not
provided twenty days’ notice that the trial court was considering expunging the lis pendens. We
hold the trial court erred in expunging the lis pendens sua sponte and without proper notice to
each affected party.
CONCLUSION
Carmen’s affidavits were not sham affidavits and were sufficient to raise a fact issues on
each element of her claim that she and Francisco had an informal marriage. Accordingly, the
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summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court. Additionally, we
hold the trial court erred in expunging Carmen’s second notice of lis pendens.
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
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