Warren Teel v. State ( 2010 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-09-00150-CR
WARREN TEEL APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
In one issue, Appellant Warren Teel appeals the jury‘s guilty verdict,
asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of
Dr. Barry Norman, a psychologist. We affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. Factual and Procedural History
Teel was charged with committing aggravated robbery with a deadly
weapon after he approached a woman at a gas station on May 9, 2008; asked
her for money; got into her car; and started beating her with a wooden post. He
also bit her while trying to take her keys. He took her purse and left.
On July 22, 2008, Dr. Barry Norman conducted a court-ordered
competency examination. Dr. Norman diagnosed Teel with schizoaffective
disorder with psychosis and mixed substance abuse and opined that Teel was
not competent to stand trial. The trial court ordered Teel confined to a state
hospital until he regained competence. Several months later, a doctor at North
Texas State Hospital filed with the court a report stating that Teel was competent
to stand trial. The trial court entered a judgment of mental competency, and
Teel‘s attorney filed a notice of intent to raise the insanity defense.
Before trial, the State objected to Teel‘s proposed admission of Dr.
Norman‘s testimony on the basis of relevance, and Teel made a proffer of Dr.
Norman‘s testimony. Dr. Norman opined that, as of his examination of Teel on
July 22, 2008, Teel was suffering from schizoaffective disorder and was
responding to auditory hallucinations, was not oriented as to time and place, and
did not know where he was or what was going on. At the end of his examination,
he concluded Teel was not competent to stand trial.
2
On cross-examination by the State, Dr. Norman explained the difference
between a competency examination and a sanity examination, 2 and he stated
that he did not perform a sanity examination in this case. He testified that all of
his opinions pertained to Teel‘s status as of July 22, 2008—not May 9, 2008—
and that he did not have an opinion as to Teel‘s sanity as of May 9, 2008. The
trial court sustained the State‘s objection and excluded Dr. Norman‘s testimony.
Teel pleaded not guilty to the charge and true to the habitual offender
paragraph. The jury found Teel guilty, and the trial court assessed fifty years‘
confinement as punishment. This appeal followed.
III. Analysis
In his sole issue, Teel complains that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding Dr. Norman‘s testimony because it was relevant, was probative, and
would have assisted the jury in determining an ultimate issue of fact, i.e., whether
Teel was insane. Specifically, he argues that Dr. Norman‘s testimony would
have ―provided a ‗small nudge‘ in proving or disproving a fact of consequence to
the trial‖ and that by excluding Dr. Norman‘s testimony, the trial court violated
Teel‘s due process right to present his defense.
2
Dr. Norman testified that a competency examination involves determining
whether a defendant has the ability to speak and interact with his attorney, to
attend courtroom proceedings, and to understand what is going on in a
courtroom. In contrast, a sanity examination has to do with whether a defendant
was suffering from a debilitating illness at the time of the alleged offense such
that he could not understand that his conduct was wrong.
3
A. Standard of Review
We may not disturb a trial court‘s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of
discretion. Winegarner v. State, 235 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In
other words, as long as the trial court‘s decision was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement and was correct under any theory of law applicable to
the case, it must be upheld. Id. (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372,
391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh‘g)). This is so because ―trial courts . . .
are usually in the best position to make the call on whether certain evidence
should be admitted or excluded.‖ Id. (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
―Relevant evidence‖ means ―evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖ Tex. R.
Evid. 401. ―[E]xpert testimony that does not directly rebut the culpable mental
state usually may be excluded at the guilt stage.‖ Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d
368, 381–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (―In sum, the trial judge was not required to
admit any expert testimony concerning appellant‘s mental illness during the guilt
stage because it did not directly rebut his culpable mens rea.‖); see also Ruffin v.
State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (―Such [expert] evidence may
also be excluded if it does not truly negate the required mens rea.‖). The test for
determining insanity is whether, at the time of the conduct charged, as a result of
4
mental disease or defect, the defendant did not know his conduct was wrong.
Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592. In this context, ―wrong‖ means ―illegal.‖ Id.
B. Analysis
Teel refers us to Fisher-Riza v. State, No. 01-08-00264-CR, 2009 WL
4358622 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 3, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication), arguing that his due process rights were violated
when he was prohibited from presenting Dr. Norman‘s testimony.
We note first that Fisher-Riza is inapposite, as the court addressed expert
testimony about past mental illness and held that testimony about a defendant‘s
mental health five years prior to the instant offense was not too remote. Id. at
*6–7 (holding that evidence about appellant‘s past mental health problems was
relevant to her sanity defense). Here, Dr. Norman did not testify about Teel‘s
past mental health during the proffer,3 and he specifically testified that he was
unaware of Teel‘s mental health status on the date of the incident at issue.4
Further, he stated that he did not conduct a sanity examination at the time he
evaluated Teel‘s competency to stand trial and that he had no opinion about
3
In his competency evaluation report, which the trial court took judicial
notice of, Dr. Norman summarized what Teel told him about his prior mental
health issues—inpatient and outpatient mental health treatment while
incarcerated, as well as numerous visits to John Peter Smith hospital. The same
information was admitted during the trial through Teel‘s testimony and Teel‘s
mother‘s testimony.
4
Dr. Norman testified that during the competency evaluation, Teel told him
that he did not know what happened or why he was in jail. When asked whether
Teel displayed a decent sense of what is right and what is wrong, Dr. Norman
replied, ―I‘m not sure that we engaged in that conversation.‖
5
Teel‘s state of mind—sanity or mens rea—on the date Teel committed the instant
offense. Rather, he testified about Teel‘s lack of mental competence to stand
trial over a month after the commission of the offense. Cf. id. Under the
circumstances here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding Dr. Norman‘s testimony during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.5 See
Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 381–82; Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 596. We overrule Teel‘s
sole issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Teel‘s sole issue, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and GABRIEL, J.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: November 24, 2010
5
The trial court granted Teel a running objection to the exclusion of Dr.
Norman‘s testimony and offered to treat it as a proffer of testimony regarding any
punishment issues during the punishment phase if the jury found Teel guilty,
which Teel accepted.
6