Ralph O. Douglas v. American Title Company ( 2011 )

Opinion issued October 13, 2011.

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-07-00358-CV

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Ralph O. Douglas, Appellant

V.

American Title Co., Appellee

On Appeal from the 133rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2004-01400

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Proceeding pro se, inmate Ralph O. Douglas, appeals the dismissal of his breach of contract suit against American Title Company (“ATC”).[1]  Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Douglas’s suit, we affirm.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 14.001–.014 (West 2002).

Background

In May 1999, Douglas contracted with ATC to perform title services for several Harris County properties. See Douglas v. Amer. Title Co., 196 S.W.3d 876, 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)  (citing Douglas v. Amer. Title Co., No. 01-04-00265-CV, 2005 WL 568290, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 10, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.)).  Douglas was shortly thereafter indicted for real-estate fraud,[2] and ATC, at the request of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, halted all transactions and real estate closings involved in Douglas’s fraud.  See id.  Douglas subsequently (2003) sued ATC for breach-of-contract related to a property located at 4703 Sauer.  See id. at 878.  ATC was granted a summary judgment from which Douglas pursued a restricted appeal that was dismissed by this Court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Douglas, 2005 WL 568290, at *3.

In January 2004, Douglas filed a second suit against ATC alleging that ATC had failed to produce mortgage records for 4703 Sauer and three other properties.[3]  ATC moved to declare Douglas a vexatious litigant and sought security pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  Id.  The trial court granted the motion and, when Douglas failed to post the required security, dismissed the case.  Douglas appealed and this Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court’s declaration of Douglas as a vexatious litigant was an abuse of discretion.  See Douglas, 196 S.W.3d at 883. 

On remand, in response to ATC’s special exceptions, Douglas amended his petition and the special exceptions were denied.  ATC then moved to dismiss Douglas’ suit pursuant to Chapter 14’s statutory scheme authorizing dismissal of pro se inmate claims found to be frivolous or malicious.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2).  Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted ATC’s motion to dismiss and this appeal followed.

Discussion

In two issues, Douglas contends that the trial court’s grant of ATC’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Chapter 14 was an abuse of discretion because (1) his claims were neither malicious nor frivolous, and (2) the court’s denial of ATC’s special exceptions “demonstrated that [Douglas] had a viable cause of action, that was not frivolous or malicious, [and that Douglas’s suit was not] based on an indisputable [sic] meritless legal theory” or “irrational or wholly incredible” factual allegations. 

First, we must acknowledge the trial court’s broad discretion to dismiss a suit pursuant to Chapter 14 if the court concludes it to be frivolous or malicious.  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2); Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).  In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the trial court may consider whether (1) the claim’s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts.  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(b).

Although dismissals under Chapter 14 are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, whether a claim has an   arguable   basis   in law   is a legal question that we review de novo.  Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 266; Sawyer v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 983 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).  A claim is without an arguable basis in law only if based on (1) wholly incredible or irrational factual allegations, or (2) an indisputably meritless legal theory.  See Nabelek v. Dist. Attorney of Harris Cnty, 290 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

In his amended petition, Douglas contends that ATC had a “legal duty to produce [his] mortgage records pursuant to the Texas Insurance Code and U.S.C.A. Title 12, Banks and Banking.” Douglas clarifies the legal basis for his claim in a subsequent pleading.  Specifically, he contends that his right to sue for the release of the mortgage records derives from article 9.34 of the Texas Insurance Code.

Neither article 9.34, repealed in 2005, nor its successor, section 2704.001, requires a title company to maintain its records for copying and production.  See Tex. Ins. Code art. 9.34 (West 2003), repealed by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1274, § 26(b)(4), eff. Apr. 1, 2005; Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 2704.001 (West 2010).  Although both statutes require title companies to take certain steps prior to issuing a title insurance policy in Texas, neither statute creates a private cause of action for a title company’s failure to comply with those provisions.  See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Becker, 930 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (refusing to imply private cause of action for violations of former article 9.34); see generally Texas Dep’t of Ins. v. Reconveyance Servs., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2010) (recognizing that under Texas Title Insurance Act, Texas title insurance industry is “completely regulate[d]” by Texas Department of Insurance).  Accordingly, Douglas’s claims, based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, have no arguable basis in law and the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Chapter 14 was proper.  See Spurlock v. Johnson, 94 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (stating that dismissal proper pursuant to Chapter 14 because no private cause of action under Texas Penal Code).

Douglas’s contention that the Court’s dismissal is an abuse of discretion because it “was contrary to the court’s order denying [ATC’s] motion for special exceptions,” is inapposite because one—the court’s order denying special exceptions with respect to Douglas’s amended original petition—does not preclude the other—dismissal as frivolous or malicious pursuant to Chapter 14. Indeed, a point of error as to an abuse of discretion fails because the trial court has inherent authority to reconsider any interlocutory order at any time before final judgment.  See Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); H.S.M. Acquisitions, Inc. v. West, 917 S.W.2d 872, 876–77 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                   Jim Sharp

                                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Sharp and Brown.

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[1]           See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 14.001–.014 (West 2002) (hereinafter, “Chapter 14”).

[2]           In 2000, a jury convicted Douglas of theft of property in the aggregate amount of between $1,000 and $200,000 and, due to enhancement for a prior theft, sentenced him to life in prison and to a $10,000 fine.  The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on August 29, 2002.  See Douglas v. State, No. 14-00-01226-CR, 2002 WL 1988163 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 29, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).

[3]           Douglas’s original petition is not included in the clerk’s record.