Derick Dion Rector v. State ( 2010 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-09-166-CR
DERICK DION RECTOR APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 78TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Appellant Derick Dion Rector of injury to a child and
assessed his punishment at twelve years’ confinement. In a single issue, Rector
argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s implied
rejection of his parental justification defense. We will affirm.
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sometime in the mid-afternoon on December 22, 2008, LaQuita Y.
instructed Rector, her boyfriend, to whip her seven-year-old son, Q.Y., because
he had wet his bed again. After Q.Y. removed his clothes and laid on a bed at
LaQuita’s and Rector’s direction, Rector whipped Q.Y. with a leather belt at least
eight times. LaQuita also whipped Q.Y.—at least seven times—for ―talking back‖
to her.
Officer Adam Maloney responded to a check-welfare-of-a-child call at
LaQuita’s home later that same day. LaQuita told Officer Maloney that Q.Y. had
been whipped with a leather belt, and Officer Maloney observed that Q.Y.’s hand
was swollen to about twice the size of his other hand. A CPS worker
subsequently arrived and examined Q.Y. In addition to a swollen hand, Q.Y. had
multiple red marks and discoloration or bruises on his arm, multiple abrasions
and bruises on his leg, an open cut on his ribcage, and a cut on the back of his
knee. Both Rector and LaQuita were arrested.2 The State indicted Rector for
2
LaQuita was arrested that same day. Rector was arrested sometime
later. LaQuita pleaded guilty to injury to a child and was serving five years’
community supervision at the time of Rector’s trial.
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injury to a child.3 At trial, the trial court instructed the jury on Rector’s penal code
section 9.61 parental justification defense.4
III. EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY
In his sole issue, Rector argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to
support the jury’s implied rejection of his parental justification defense because
he did not beat Q.Y. but merely disciplined him, no witness testified that he was
exclusively responsible for Q.Y.’s injuries, and Q.Y.’s injuries were merely
temporary.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party.
Steadman v. State, 280 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Watson v.
State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We then ask whether the
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The indictment alleged in relevant part that on or about December 22,
2008, Rector ―did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to
[Q.Y.], a child fourteen years of age or younger, by striking said [Q.Y.] with a belt
across his arms, hands, body and/or legs.‖
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The trial court instructed:
Therefore, if you find that the defendant, Derick Dion Rector,
did intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to [Q.Y.], a child
fourteen years of age or younger, by striking said [Q.Y.] with a belt
across his arms, hands, body and/or legs, but you further find that
the defendant was acting in loco parentis to [Q.Y.], and the force
was used when and to the degree the defendant reasonably
believed the force was necessary to discipline [Q.Y.], you will then
find the defendant not guilty.
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evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so
weak that the factfinder’s determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or
whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the
conviction that the factfinder’s determination is manifestly unjust. Steadman, 280
S.W.3d at 246; Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414–15, 417. To reverse under the
second ground, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that
the great weight and preponderance of all the evidence, although legally
sufficient, contradicts the verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417. In reviewing a
challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s rejection of
a defense to prosecution, we use the same standards used in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, looking at the sufficiency of
the evidence to support both the verdict as well as the rejection of the defense.
Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Ortiz v. State, No.
05-08-00490-CR, 2009 WL 1664940, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 16, 2009,
pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
Unless we conclude that it is necessary to correct manifest injustice, we
must give due deference to the factfinder’s determinations, ―particularly those
determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence.‖ Johnson
v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see Steadman, 280 S.W.3d at
246. Evidence is always factually sufficient when it preponderates in favor of the
conviction. Steadman, 280 S.W.3d at 247; see Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.
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B. Injury to a Child and Parental Justification Defense
A person commits the offense of injury to a child if he intentionally or
knowingly causes the child bodily injury. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(3)
(Vernon Supp. 2010). ―Child‖ means a person fourteen years of age or younger.
Id. § 22.04(c)(1). ―Bodily injury‖ means physical pain, illness, or any impairment
of physical condition. Id. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2010). Injury to a child is
considered a result-oriented crime; that is, the accused acts with intent if it is his
conscious objective or desire to cause the result. Assiter v. State, 58 S.W.3d
743, 748 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.). Intent may be inferred from the
acts and the words of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Id.
The parental justification defense provides that the use of force, but not
deadly force, against a child younger than eighteen years is justified if the actor is
the child’s parent or stepparent or is acting in loco parentis to the child and ―when
and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to
discipline the child or to safeguard or promote his welfare.‖ Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 9.61 (Vernon 2003). ―In loco parentis‖ includes anyone who has express
or implied consent of the parent.5 Id. § 9.61(b). The use of force under section
9.61 is not justified simply because of a parent’s subjective belief that the force is
necessary; rather, the use of force is justified only if a reasonable person would
have believed the force was necessary to discipline the child or to safeguard or
5
It is undisputed that Rector was acting in loco parentis.
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promote the child’s welfare. Quattrocchi v. State, 173 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Assiter, 58 S.W.3d at 748). The
―reasonable belief‖ standard is thus an objective standard. Id.; see Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (stating that a reasonable belief means a belief that
would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the
actor).
Because reasonable discipline is a justification, the State is not required to
affirmatively produce evidence which refutes the claim; rather, the State has the
burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 9.02 (Vernon 2003); Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913–14 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991) (reasoning that State does not have burden of production but rather
burden of persuasion in disproving defense); Goulart v. State, 26 S.W.3d 5, 10
(Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref’d); see also Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 593–94. A
verdict of guilty is an implicit rejection of a defendant’s defensive argument.
Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594.
C. Evidence Factually Sufficient
Officer Maloney testified that when he observed Q.Y. on December 22,
2008, Q.Y. was holding his hand up against his torso, his hand was swollen to
twice the size of his other hand,6 and he had multiple red marks and discoloration
or bruises on his arm, multiple abrasions and bruises on his leg, an open cut on
6
Officer Maloney agreed that Q.Y.’s right hand was ―significantly smaller‖
than his left hand.
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his ribcage, and a cut on the back of his knee. When Officer Maloney ―ever so
lightly‖ touched Q.Y.’s swollen hand, Q.Y. pulled his hand back and winced as if
the contact had hurt him.
Q.Y. testified that Rector hit him with a belt when he was lying on the bed
and that it hurt him. K.W., LaQuita’s half-sister, testified that Rector whipped
Q.Y. with a belt, that Q.Y. screamed and yelled when he was struck, that the
whipping took a ―long‖ time, and that Q.Y. just laid in bed and did not want to eat
dinner that night or watch television.
Scott Myers, an emergency room physician, testified that Q.Y.’s injuries
would have caused a child younger than fourteen years old pain. In regard to a
photograph of Q.Y.’s swollen hand, Myers testified
You can see that there’s a significant amount of swelling in the hand
there, and then you can see the contrast between the color right
there. So this is - - this is bruising or this is - - This would probably
be even more consistent with what we call hematoma[,] which is a
little bit more severe form of bruising where there’s more of a
collection of blood under the skin and some swelling there.
LaQuita testified that she instructed Rector to whip Q.Y.; that Rector
whipped Q.Y. with a leather belt at least eight times; that she thought Rector
struck Q.Y.’s left hand, causing it to swell up; that it is possible that Rector struck
Q.Y. with the belt’s buckle; that she knew Q.Y. was hurt by the whipping; that she
did not know if the injuries shown in the photographs entered in evidence
depicting Q.Y.’s injuries were caused by her or Rector; that she did not think it
was reasonable or ―right‖ for Rector to strike Q.Y. with the belt in the manner that
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he did; and, significantly, that striking Q.Y. with the belt was more than what was
reasonably necessary to discipline him. On cross-examination, however,
LaQuita testified that she thought Rector’s actions were an exercise of
reasonable parental discipline.
In light of the above evidence, a rational jury could have concluded that an
ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as Rector would not
believe that the force used by Rector against Q.Y.—using a belt to repeatedly
whip Q.Y.’s body, causing and leaving multiple visible bruises, cuts, and a
significantly swollen hand—was necessary to discipline him or to safeguard or
promote his welfare. See Roberts v. State, No. 10-04-00203-CR, 2005 WL
979002, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 27, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (holding evidence that appellant whipped child with a
belt that had a metal buckle, causing child injuries to his head, neck, back, arm,
buttocks, and legs, factually sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for injury
to a child); Jones v. State, No. 01-06-01078-CR, 2007 WL 4278722, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding evidence that appellant whipped child with belt, causing
child injuries to her arms, back, and thighs, factually sufficient to support
appellant’s conviction for injury to a child). And that Q.Y.’s injuries were
temporary does not mean that they were not ―bodily injuries‖ as defined by penal
code section 1.07(a)(8).
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As for Rector’s causation argument, LaQuita specifically testified that she
thought Rector struck Q.Y.’s left hand, causing it to swell, and that Rector could
have struck Q.Y. with the belt’s buckle. Even in the absence of this evidence, in
light of the record, Rector is not absolved of criminal responsibility for causing
Q.Y. bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.04 (Vernon 2003) (stating that
a person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his
conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the
concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of
the actor clearly insufficient).
Rector argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s
implied rejection of his defense because the facts of this case are distinguishable
from those in Goulart, another case in which the appellant was prosecuted for
whipping a child. 26 S.W.3d at 7. The evidence is not factually insufficient in this
case even if the evidence here of the intensity of the ―discipline‖ was less brutal
than that reviewed in Goulart.
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party,
we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict
and its implied rejection of Rector’s parental justification defense. We overrule
Rector’s sole issue.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Rector’s only issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: September 23, 2010
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