Karyn Gene Scott v. State ( 2011 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-10-00425-CR
Karyn Gene SCOTT,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 4747
Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Marialyn P. Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 2, 2011
AFFIRMED
Karyn Gene Scott appeals her conviction for intoxication assault arising out of an
automobile accident. After the trial court denied her motion to suppress, Scott pled guilty. The
trial court then sentenced Scott to six years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice. In one issue on appeal, Scott argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to
suppress the results of a blood test taken after she was arrested for driving while intoxicated. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-10-00425-CR
DISCUSSION
We review a motion to suppress evidence ruling using a bifurcated standard of review.
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We are to give “almost total
deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts that the record supports especially
when the trial court’s fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.”
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). And we afford the same level of
deference to a trial court’s ruling on application of law to fact questions, or mixed questions of
law and fact, if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and
demeanor. Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We review de novo
mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend upon credibility and demeanor. Id.
Section 724.012(b) of the Texas Transportation Code authorizes the involuntary taking of
a blood specimen if three specific requirements are met: (1) there was a life-threatening accident;
(2) the defendant was arrested for an intoxication offense under Chapter 49; and (3) the arresting
officer “reasonably believed” the accident occurred as a result of the offense. TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 724.012(b) (West Supp. 2010); Badgett v. State, 42 S.W.3d 136, 138 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001). Scott takes issue with only the third statutory requirement. According to Scott, the
evidence failed to show the arresting officer could have reasonably believed that the accident
occurred as a result of Scott driving while intoxicated.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Trooper Anthony Ortiz, the arresting officer, testified
that he responded to a call about a major accident. When he arrived at the scene, he saw vehicles
on the roadway as well as law enforcement personnel, an ambulance, and witnesses. At first, he
saw only three vehicles with damage, but was advised by a deputy that a fourth vehicle was
possibly involved. The deputy also advised Trooper Ortiz that Scott may have been involved in
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the accident. When Trooper Ortiz approached Scott, she first indicated she was unsure if she had
been involved. She then described for Trooper Ortiz her version of how the accident occurred.
There were, however, no indications on the roadway that the accident took place as Scott
described. Trooper Ortiz noticed that the front-end damage on the vehicle driven by Scott
matched the rear-end damage on another vehicle involved in the accident. Further, Trooper Ortiz
saw that the front-end of Scott’s vehicle had green paint on it that appeared to be from the other
vehicle. Based on his investigation and observations, Trooper Ortiz concluded a driver in a green
Toyota had been attempting to make a left turn from the inside lane when Scott rear-ended the
Toyota, forcing it into oncoming traffic where it collided with two other vehicles. According to
Trooper Ortiz, there was no weather or road condition that could have caused the accident.
When speaking with Scott, Trooper Ortiz smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage
coming from Scott’s breath. Scott denied having consumed any alcohol but stated she had taken
pain medication. Trooper Ortiz then administered three field sobriety tests on Scott. As to the
horizontal nystagmus gaze (HGN) test, Scott exhibited six out of six possible clues. As to the
walk-and-turn test and the one-leg stand test, Scott exhibited two clues and no clues,
respectively. Scott refused to take a breathalyzer test. Based upon the results of the standardized
field sobriety tests, Trooper Ortiz arrested Scott and took her to a hospital to obtain a blood
sample.
In addition to Trooper Ortiz’s testimony, the State offered into evidence several
exhibits, which included Trooper Ortiz’s affidavit of probable cause for arrest and a statutory
authorization–mandatory blood specimen form. Scott did not object, and the trial court admitted
the exhibits into evidence. In his affidavit, Trooper Ortiz described his investigation of the
accident and interviews with witnesses much as he did in his trial testimony. He further stated
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that his investigation at the scene led him to believe that Scott had been travelling behind the
green Toyota and did not see it attempting to make a left turn. He further concluded Scott had
failed to control her speed and struck the green vehicle, causing it to spin into oncoming traffic.
On the statutory authorization–mandatory blood specimen form, Trooper Ortiz stated that he had
arrested Scott because she was involved in an accident he reasonably believed occurred as a
result of the offense for which she was arrested.
Scott cites Badgett v. State to support her argument that the State failed to “establish any
specific and articulable facts of causation.” See Badgett, 42 S.W.3d at 139. In Badgett, the Court
of Criminal Appeals considered whether sections 724.012(b)(2) and 724.013 of the Texas
Transportation Code “require law enforcement personnel to possess specific evidence that an
intoxicated defendant was at fault in causing an accident before a blood specimen can be taken
involuntarily,” or if “merely an accident involving an intoxicated driver is sufficient.” Id. at 137.
The arresting officer in Badgett testified that he believed the defendant could have been at fault
for the accident because the defendant was intoxicated. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that
the officer’s belief that the accident occurred as a result of the offense must be based on
something more than the mere fact that there was an accident and that the officer arrested the
defendant for an intoxication offense. Id. at 139. “[S]uch a belief must be based upon specific
and articulable facts of causation.” Id. The court further stated that “[a]rticulable belief can result
from any number of factors, including but not limited to, witness interviews, conclusions drawn
from experience in combination with observation of the accident scene, or determinations made
by an accident reconstruction team.” Id.
In this case, unlike in Badgett, Trooper Ortiz did not simply state that he believed Scott
could have been at fault for the accident because she was intoxicated. In both his trial testimony
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and the exhibits, Trooper Ortiz specifically articulated his belief that Scott’s commission of the
offense of driving while intoxicated was the cause of the accident. According to Trooper Ortiz,
his investigation, which included speaking with witnesses and making observations at the
accident scene, led him to believe that Scott, while travelling behind a green Toyota, did not see
it attempting to make a turn, failed to control her speed, and struck the green vehicle, causing it
to spin into oncoming traffic. And, as he stated in his affidavit, Trooper Ortiz reasonably
concluded that Scott’s intoxication caused the accident.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Scott’s motion to suppress, and we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Karen Angelini, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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