J.J. Salazar v. State ( 2010 )

OPINION
No. 04-09-00548-CR
J.J. SALAZAR,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 79th Judicial District Court, Jim Wells County, Texas
Trial Court No. 08-04-12371-CR
Honorable Ricardo H. Garcia, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 15, 2010
AFFIRMED
A jury found appellant, J.J. Salazar, guilty of theft over $200,000.00, and assessed
punishment at twenty years’ confinement and a $10,000.00 fine. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
At trial, witnesses testified that appellant was jailed for non-payment of child support; he
got high on cocaine and was involved with drugs; he organized high-stakes poker games with
“bad guys,” he used enforcers, was an “operator,” and was a street savvy hustler; he was
04-09-00548-CR
connected to organized crime; he wanted to be like the character in the movie Heat; and he
celebrated in strip clubs. In a single issue on appeal, appellant asserts he was egregiously
harmed by the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury that evidence of these
extraneous acts could be considered (1) only for the purpose for which they were admitted and
(2) only if the jury believed the acts occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.
A limiting instruction that extraneous acts must be considered only for the purpose for
which they are offered should be given in the guilt-innocence-stage jury charge only if the
defendant requested such an instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted. Hammock v.
State, 46 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). If the jury can only consider evidence for a
particular purpose, “then it must do so from the moment the evidence is admitted.” Id. at 894.
“Allowing the jury to consider evidence for all purposes and then telling them to consider that
same evidence for a limited purpose only is asking the jury to do the impossible.” Id. Therefore,
once the trial court admits evidence without a limiting instruction, it is part of the general
evidence and can be considered for all purposes. Id. at 895. Here, when the evidence was first
admitted appellant did not request an instruction that the extraneous acts must be considered only
for the purpose for which they are offered; therefore, he was not entitled to such a limiting
instruction in the jury charge. As to the instruction that the jury may consider the extraneous acts
only if the jury believed the acts occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, a trial court is not required
to sua sponte offer such an instruction. See Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 251 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007).
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04-09-00548-CR
CONCLUSION
We overrule appellant’s issue on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Publish
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