Anthony Ray Mari v. State ( 2010 )


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  •                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Nos. 04-09-00820-CR & 04-09-00821-CR
    Anthony Ray MARI,
    Appellant
    v.
    The STATE of Texas,
    Appellee
    From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court Nos. 2008-CR-4557W & 2007-CR-8617
    Honorable Mary D. Román, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:        Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
    Sitting:           Karen Angelini, Justice
    Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
    Rebecca Simmons, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: September 1, 2010
    AFFIRMED
    Anthony Ray Mari appeals the trial court’s orders revoking his community supervision,
    arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree, and affirm the judgments of
    the trial court.
    04-09-00820-CR & 04-09-00821-CR
    In two separate cases, Mari pled no contest to assault charges involving family
    members. 1 The trial court suspended his concurrent six-year sentences and placed him on
    community supervision for a period of six years. The State later moved to revoke Mari’s
    community supervision and adjudicate his guilt, alleging that he violated Condition No. 1 of his
    community supervision by committing the offense of unlawful restraint. At the revocation
    hearing, Mari pled “true” to the allegation, admitting that he “did tie the girl up” but then
    explained that he tied up the complaining witness as “an S & M thing. It was a sexual thing.”
    Based on Mari’s plea of true, the trial court revoked his community supervision and imposed the
    original concurrent sentence of six years’ confinement in each case. Mari now complains he was
    denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel allowed him to plead true because the
    restraint was consented to as part of a sexual act, and thus there was no violation of the
    conditions of his community supervision.
    We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel according to the two-step analysis
    articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984). An appellant must show that (1)
    counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have
    been different. 
    Id. at 688-89;
    Hernandez v. State, 
    726 S.W.2d 53
    , 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In
    order to determine whether counsel acted reasonably, we must look at the totality of the
    representation. 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690
    ; Thompson v. State, 
    9 S.W.3d 808
    , 813 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1999). The appellant must rebut the presumption that counsel’s decisions at trial were
    1
    In cause number 2008-CR-4557W, Mari pled no contest to the charge of assault-bodily injury/family and
    punishment was assessed at confinement for a period of six years, probated for six years. In cause number 2007-
    CR-8617, Mari pled no contest to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon/family/second and
    punishment was assessed at confinement for a period of six years, probated for six years, to run concurrent with
    cause number 2008-CR-4557W.
    -2-
    04-09-00820-CR & 04-09-00821-CR
    based on sound trial strategy. 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
    ; 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813
    . We may
    not second-guess trial counsel’s strategy, 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
    , and therefore the appellate
    record must affirmatively demonstrate counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Rylander v. State, 
    101 S.W.3d 107
    , 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813
    .
    Mari contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he allowed Mari to plead true to
    the allegation of unlawful restraint despite Mari’s defense that the restraint was consensual.
    However, the record here is silent as to counsel’s strategy. See Andrews v. State, 
    159 S.W.3d 98
    ,
    103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (record on appeal is usually insufficient to determine if counsel’s
    performance was deficient). The record contains no evidence of whether or when Mari met with
    his attorney, what his attorney told him about the revocation hearing or the pleas he could enter,
    or of Mari’s decision to plead true. Thus, Mari has failed to overcome the presumption that
    counsel employed sound trial strategy, and cannot show that counsel’s representation fell below
    an objective standard of reasonableness. 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89
    . We overrule Mari’s
    sole issue on appeal and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    -3-