Christine Soliz v. State ( 2010 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-09-124-CR
CHRISTINE SOLIZ APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Christine Soliz appeals from the trial court’s order revoking her
deferred adjudication community supervision and adjudicating her guilty of
assault causing bodily injury to a family member with a prior conviction. In her
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 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
sole point, Soliz argues that the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating
her guilty and sentencing her to two years’ imprisonment. We will affirm.
II. P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
Soliz pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the third-degree
felony of assault causing bodily injury to a family member with a prior
conviction. On March 3, 2006, the trial court placed Soliz on five years’
deferred adjudication community supervision and imposed a $500 fine. The
State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication on June 20, 2008, but the trial
court dismissed the petition, reinstated Soliz’s community supervision, and
imposed additional conditions of community supervision. The State filed a
second petition to proceed to adjudication on March 13, 2009, alleging that
Soliz had violated multiple conditions of her community supervision.
Specifically, the State alleged that Soliz had failed to pay required fees
(Paragraph 1), had failed to submit to urine testing (Paragraph 2), had failed to
report to her probation officer (Paragraph 3), had failed to timely notify her
probation officer of an address change (Paragraph 4), had failed to complete
anger-control classes (Paragraph 5), and had failed to attend the Personal
Money Power Program (Paragraph 6).
Soliz pleaded “True” to the violations alleged in Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6
at the adjudication hearing, and she signed a written judicial confession to
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violating Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6, as well as Paragraph 1 of the State’s petition.
The State did not present any evidence or call any witnesses to testify at the
adjudication hearing. Soliz testified and attempted to explain some of her
violations. She said that she did not report to her probation officer one month
and did not attend the Personal Money Power Program because she did not
have transportation. She also said that she could not afford the anger-control
classes. Soliz testified that she is responsible for seven children—six of her
own children and one grandchild—and that she and the children live with her
mother. Soliz explained that she works at a Days Inn and recently purchased
a car for $1,300. She said that the trial court had placed her on community
supervision for the underlying offense because she had slapped her daughter
after her daughter had called her a “bitch.”
The trial court found the allegations in Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of the
State’s petition to be true, adjudicated Soliz guilty, and sentenced her to two
years’ confinement.
III. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of
discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);
Cherry v. State, 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet.
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ref’d). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of
community supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993); Cherry, 215 S.W.3d at 919. The trial court is the sole judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.
Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); see Cherry, 215 S.W.3d at 919. It is well
settled that a plea of true to even one of the State’s allegations is sufficient to
support a revocation of community supervision. See Watts v. State, 645
S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128
(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979).
IV. N O A BUSE OF D ISCRETION
Soliz specifically contends in her sole point that, “[c]onsidering the nature
of the State’s allegations and the facts and circumstances of the offense as
well as those of [Soliz],” the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her
community supervision. Soliz does not dispute that her pleas of true are
sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling; she argues instead that the trial
court “should not have” revoked her community supervision based on her
situation.
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But reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, we hold that Soliz’s pleas of true—as well as her own
testimony—support the trial court’s revocation of her community supervision.
See Watts, 645 S.W.2d at 463; Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128; see also Moore v.
State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (holding proof
of any one violation is sufficient to support revocation order). Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Soliz’s
community supervision and adjudicating her guilty. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d
at 763. We overrule Soliz’s sole point.
V. C ONCLUSION
Having overruled Soliz’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 8, 2010
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