Paramount Rehab & Health/PHCC v. Tamesha Matthews ( 2010 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-10-00194-CV
PARAMOUNT REHAB & HEALTH/PHCC,
Appellant
v.
Tamesha MATTHEWS,
Appellee
From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2009-CI-17280
Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 28, 2010
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Paramount Rehab & Health/PHCC (“Paramount”) seeks relief from the trial court’s order
denying its motion to compel arbitration. Because the trial court erred by denying Paramount’s
motion to compel arbitration, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the cause to the trial
court for entry of an order compelling the parties to arbitration.
BACKGROUND
Paramount, a non-subscriber under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, hired
Tamesha Matthews as a nurse in 2009. During the course of Matthews’s employee orientation
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on June 2, 2009, Paramount provided Matthews with a benefits schedule for its Employee Injury
Benefit Plan, a summary plan description for its Employee Injury Benefit Plan, and a Mutual
Agreement to Arbitrate Claims. The arbitration agreement stated, in part, as follows:
The effective date of this Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims
(“Agreement”) is 04/01/2009. If claimant receives notice of this Agreement prior
to commencing work at [Paramount], Claimant’s commencement of work at
Company shall constitute acceptance of the terms and conditions of this
Agreement. In that situation, the date of Claimant’s commencement of work shall
be the acceptance date. For any other Claimant, Claimant’s continuation of work
at Company after three days have passed from the date Claimant receives notice
of this Agreement shall constitute acceptance of the terms and conditions of this
Agreement. In that situation, the fourth day after receipt of this notice shall be the
acceptance date.
For Claimants who commence or continue employment at [Paramount] as
of their respective acceptance date, Company and Claimant mutually agree to
resolve Covered Claims which occur on or after the effective date according to
the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
***
Company is engaged in “commerce” as that term is defined in Section 1 of
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The FAA governs all aspects of this
Agreement.
***
COVERED CLAIMS SHALL BE EXCLUSIVELY RESOLVED BY
BINDING ARBITRATION.
***
This Agreement is mutual, covering all claims that Company or Claimant
may have which arise from . . . [a]ny injury suffered by Claimant in the Course
and Scope of Claimant’s employment with Company, including but not limited to,
claims for negligence, gross negligence, and all claims for personal injuries,
physical impairment, disfigurement, pain and suffering, mental anguish, wrongful
death, survival actions, loss of consortium and/or services, medical and hospital
expenses, expenses of transportation for medical treatment, expenses of drugs and
medical appliances, emotional distress, exemplary or punitive damages and any
other loss, detriment or claim of whatever kind and character[.]
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Matthews subsequently signed a document entitled “Receipt and Arbitration Acknowledgment,”
which included the following recitals:
RECEIPT OF MATERIALS. By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have
received and read (or had the opportunity to read) the Benefits Schedule,
Summary Plan Description (the “SPD”) for the Employee Injury Benefit Plan, and
Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims, effective 05/01/2004.
ARBITRATION. I acknowledge that this includes a mandatory company policy
requiring that certain claims or disputes (that cannot otherwise be resolved
between the Company and me) must be submitted to an arbitrator, rather than a
judge and jury in court. I understand that by receiving this Mutual Agreement to
Arbitrate Claims and becoming employed (or continuing my employment) with
the Company at any time on or after 05/01/2004, I am accepting and agreeing to
comply with these arbitration requirements. I understand that the Company is
also accepting and agreeing to comply with these arbitration requirements. All
covered claims brought by my spouse, children, parents, estate, successors and
assigns are also subject to this Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims, and any
decision of an arbitrator will be final and binding on such persons and the
Company.
Matthews purportedly sustained physical injuries to her back while in the course and
scope of her employment on June 18, 2009. Matthews sued Paramount for negligence in
October 2009, seeking damages for her injuries. Paramount moved to compel arbitration based
on the written documents signed by Matthews during her employee orientation.
At the hearing on Paramount’s motion to compel arbitration, Pamela Reeves,
Paramount’s Director of Staff Development, testified she conducted Matthews’s orientation
when Matthews joined Paramount. Reeves stated she discussed a document entitled “Mutual
Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” with Matthews and witnessed Matthews sign the “Receipt and
Arbitration Acknowledgment” form. Reeves testified she took the opportunity to examine
Paramount’s files and ascertained that Exhibit 2, which is a copy of Paramount’s “Mutual
Agreement to Arbitrate Claims,” is a true and correct copy of the document she reviewed with
Matthews during Matthews’s employee orientation. Paramount’s Director of Human Resources,
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Deanna Dominguez, also testified at the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. According
to Dominguez, the “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” document was presented to
Matthews during her employee orientation. After the hearing on Paramount’s motion to compel
arbitration, the trial court denied the motion without explanation. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must establish: (1) a valid
arbitration agreement exists; and (2) the claims at issue fall within that agreement’s scope. In re
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2006). “Generally under the FAA, state
law governs whether a litigant agreed to arbitrate, and federal law governs the scope of an
arbitration clause.” In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005). Although
there is a strong presumption favoring arbitration, the presumption arises only after the party
seeking to compel arbitration proves that a valid arbitration agreement exists. J.M. Davidson,
Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003). The trial court’s determination as to the
validity of an arbitration agreement is a legal question subject to de novo review. Id. “If the trial
court finds a valid agreement, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to raise an
affirmative defense to enforcing arbitration.” Id.
On appeal, Matthews claims we must affirm the trial court’s order denying Paramount’s
motion to compel arbitration because Paramount failed to establish that she consented to the
terms of the particular arbitration agreement introduced into evidence at the hearing on the
motion to compel. Paramount’s Director of Staff Development testified at the hearing on the
motion to compel that she personally discussed the arbitration documents with Matthews as part
of Matthews’s orientation. She stated that Exhibit 2, which is a copy of the “Mutual Agreement
to Arbitrate Claims” found in Paramount’s files, is a true and correct copy of the document she
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reviewed with Matthews during her orientation. She further testified Matthews signed the
acknowledgment reciting her acceptance of Paramount’s arbitration requirements in her
presence. It is evident from the record that Matthews was provided with the “Mutual Agreement
to Arbitrate Claims” appearing in the record and that she agreed to comply with its terms by
executing the “Receipt and Arbitration Acknowledgment” document.
Next, Matthews argues the trial court properly denied Paramount’s motion to compel
arbitration because Paramount failed to sign any of the arbitration documents. “Although the
FAA requires an arbitration agreement to be written, it does not expressly require the agreement
to be signed by the parties.” In re Big 8 Food Stores, Ltd., 166 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2005, orig. proceeding); see Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. McKay, 763 S.W.2d 934, 937
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ); Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 64
(5th Cir. 1987). The absence of Paramount’s signature from the arbitration documents is thus
inconsequential. See In re Brown & Root, Inc., No. 05-98-00689-CV, 1998 WL 325692, *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (rejecting employee’s
argument that arbitration agreement was not binding because employer failed to sign the
agreement). Because the record shows the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement, we
must next consider whether Matthews’s claims fall within the arbitration agreement’s scope. See
In re Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 186 S.W.3d at 515.
Matthews sued Paramount for negligence. The parties’ arbitration agreement expressly
covers “all claims for negligence, gross negligence, and all claims for personal injuries.” The
claims covered under the “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” therefore include all claims
that Matthews brought against Paramount.
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CONCLUSION
We conclude a valid arbitration agreement exists and that Matthews’s claims fall within
the scope of the agreement. The trial court clearly erred in denying Paramount’s motion to
compel arbitration. Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying Paramount’s motion to compel
arbitration is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order compelling
the parties to arbitration.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
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