Arnold Carrizales v. State , 397 S.W.3d 251 ( 2013 )

NUMBER 13-12-00406-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
ARNOLD CARRIZALES, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court
of Bee County, Texas.
OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria
Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant Arnold Carrizales challenges his conviction for class B misdemeanor
criminal mischief. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03(a)(1), (b)(2) (West 2011). By two
issues, Carrizales argues the evidence was insufficient to establish (1) that the alleged
offense was committed, i.e., the corpus delicti of the offense, or (2) Carrizales's identity as
the person who committed the offense. We affirm.
I. Background
Carrizales was charged by information with committing criminal mischief for
damaging the vehicle of Ramona Gomez "by throwing screws and nails into the road
causing flat tires." Carrizales pleaded not guilty, and his case was tried to the bench.
At trial, Gomez testified that she and her family live on a private road that connects
to a county road that then connects to state highway 181 outside of Beeville, Texas.
Gomez testified that there was an oil well at the end of their private road and that
eighteen-wheelers often drove past their home on the way to the well. Gomez testified
that, to drive to work in the mornings, both she and her husband travel first on their private
road then turn on the county road, which they then travel on to highway 181. Gomez
testified that Carrizales is her cousin. Carrizales lives on the county road in between the
Gomezes' home and highway 181, and both Gomez and her husband drive by
Carrizales's home every day on their way to and from work.
In the past, Carrizales expressed concern to Gomez over the speed at which she
and her husband drive on the county road. Gomez testified that at some point,
Carrizales had placed logs in the roadway adjacent to his home to force Gomez and her
husband to drive slower. In late 2009 and early 2010, Gomez and her husband began
having flat tires on their vehicles. When they repaired their vehicles, they discovered the
same type of roofing, or sheet metal, screws in the tires on both of their vehicles. Gomez
testified that neither she nor her husband had trouble with screws in their tires before this
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point. Gomez testified that she believed Carrizales threw the screws in the roadway and
filed a complaint with the sheriff's department to that effect. On cross-examination,
Gomez testified that she never saw Carrizales throwing screws in the roadway.
Next, Steve Linam with the Bee County Sheriff's department testified that he
investigated Gomez's complaint. Linam testified that he recovered the screws that had
caused the flat tires on Gomez's vehicle. Linam also testified that an officer who had
gone out in a patrol car to Carrizales's home to investigate returned with flat tires and that
the screws found in the patrol car's tires were the same type of sheet metal screws
Gomez found in her tires. Linam testified that the first time he called Carrizales to
interview him about the complaint, Carrizales denied throwing screws in the road. The
second time he interviewed him, Carrizales became upset and threatened to report Linam
to his supervisor.
On cross-examination, Linam testified that he did not search Carrizales's property
for the type of screws discovered in the tires. Linam also testified that he did not discover
any screws in the roadway near Carrizales's home.
Carrizales then testified on his own behalf. He admitted putting the logs in the
roadway, but denied throwing screws onto the roadway. Carrizales confirmed the oil
well traffic that Gomez mentioned in her testimony.1 On cross-examination by the State,
Carrizales admitted that the logs he placed in the roadway did not slow the Gomezes
down.
After argument by the State and the defense, the trial court found Carrizales guilty
1
The defense also called Jimmy Alaniz, an investigator with the public defender's office, who
testified that there was an operating gas well at the end of the Gomezes' private road.
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of the charged offense. The court sentenced Carrizales to thirty days in county jail,
suspended for one year on the condition that Carrizales pay $166.58 in restitution, have
no contact with Gomez, and commit no other offenses. This appeal followed.2
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In a sufficiency review, courts examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether "any rational fact finder could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This standard requires reviewing courts to
resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment, keeping in mind that the
fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the
weight to give their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Appellate courts do not
reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; they only ensure that the fact finder
reached a rational decision. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009). A fact finder may support its verdict with reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence, and it is up to the fact finder to decide which inference is most reasonable. Id.
at 523. Further, when the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the
fact finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination.
Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Legal sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a
2
The State has not filed an appellate brief in response to Carrizales's contentions. See Siverand v.
State, 89 S.W.3d 216, 219 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) ("The Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure require appellant to either file a brief or state that he no longer desires to prosecute the appeal.
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). However, there is no corresponding rule requiring the State to file a brief in
response to appellant's brief.").
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hypothetically correct jury charge.3 Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). "Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried." Id. As authorized by the information in this case, a
person commits criminal mischief if "without the effective consent of the owner[,] . . . he
intentionally or knowingly damages or destroys the tangible property of the owner" and
"the amount of pecuniary loss is $50 or more but less than $500." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 28.03(a)(1), (b)(2).
It is not necessary that the evidence directly proves the defendant's guilt;
"[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the
actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d 460,
462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A defendant's intent, in particular, may be inferred from his
words, acts, and conduct. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
In other words, intent and knowledge are fact questions and are almost always proven
through evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime. Robles v. State, 664
S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Finally, we note that both the identity of the
accused and the corpus delicti of an offense may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
See Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see also Wheeler v. State,
35 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd); Clark v. State, No.
3
This standard applies to evidence presented in a bench trial as well as to cases tried to a jury.
See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
5
13–10–00496–CR, 2011 WL 3821055, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 25, 2011,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
III. Corpus Delicti
By his first issue, Carrizales argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that
the crime of criminal mischief actually occurred in this case. Carrizales argues that the
State presented no evidence that any person placed screws in the road intentionally to
damage Gomez's tires.
In general, "[t]he corpus delicti of a crime—any crime—simply consists of the fact
that the crime in question has been committed by someone." Fisher v. State, 851
S.W.2d 298, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citations omitted). We have found no case law
regarding corpus delicti in the context of criminal mischief, specifically. Carrizales urges
the Court to consider the corpus delicti jurisprudence developed in arson cases in order to
determine what the State must prove to establish the corpus delicti of criminal mischief.
We agree with Carrizales that the arson corpus deliciti cases are instructive.
In both arson and criminal mischief cases, the State must prove that a person
acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly to destroy or damage property. Compare
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (West 2011), with id. § 28.03(a). Specifically, courts have
held that the corpus delicti of arson is the willful burning of property; proof that the
property merely burned is insufficient. See Wheeler, 35 S.W.3d at 134–35; see also Orr
v. State, 306 S.W.3d 380, 394 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) ("'To establish the
corpus delicti in arson cases[,] it is necessary to show that a fire occurred and that the fire
was designedly set by someone.'" (quoting Mosher v. State, 901 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex.
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App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.), citing Troncosa v. State, 670 S.W.2d 671, 680 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1984, no pet.)). Similarly, in criminal mischief cases, proof that
property has merely been damaged or destroyed is not enough; rather, to establish the
corpus delicti of criminal mischief, the State must show that the destruction or damage
occurred and that the destruction or damage was intentionally or knowingly caused by a
person. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03(a). Here, as posited by Carrizales, that
means the State was required to prove that "the screws ended up in [Gomez's] tires due
to a person's intentional [or knowing] act."
With the foregoing established, we now turn to the evidence in this case.
Carrizales argues that there was no direct evidence that he placed the screws in the
roadway. He points to testimony that no screws were found in the roadway and that no
one saw him place any screws in the roadway. Carrizales argues that the evidence at
trial regarding the screws in the Gomezes' tires was as consistent with accident as it was
with criminality. We disagree.
As asserted by Carrizales, it is true that there was no direct evidence that
Carrizales placed the screws in the road. But there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence that he committed the offense. Carrizales admitted that he had had a conflict
with the Gomezes in the past over the speed at which they drove past his house on the
county road. He even admitted that he had placed logs in the roadway in an attempt to
slow them down, but that the logs had not curbed the Gomezes' speeding. There was
evidence that the Gomezes had never had trouble with screws in their tires until the
dispute arose with Carrizales. Finally, the patrol car that had gone to Carrizales's home
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to take the initial report ended up with flat tires caused by the same type of sheet metal
screws that caused the flat tires in the Gomezes's vehicles. Although there was
testimony that supported an inference that the Gomezes could have picked up screws in
their tires elsewhere—from screws dropped by the oil well vehicles or from elsewhere in
their drives to and from work—it was within the purview of the trial court to resolve this
conflicting evidence, and we presume that the court did so in favor of the verdict. See
Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26.
We conclude that the foregoing circumstantial evidence shows that Carrizales
intentionally placed the screws in the roadway to damage the Gomezes' tires. It was
reasonable for the fact finder to infer from Carrizales's words and actions that he had a
motive to damage the Gomezes' tires. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004) (holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent); see also
Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 487. The evidence of motive combined with the physical
evidence, i.e., that the same type of screws were recovered from both the Gomezes'
vehicles and the patrol car, allowed a rational fact finder in this case to conclude that the
State had established the corpus delicti of criminal mischief. See Wheeler, 35 S.W.3d at
134; see also Clark, 2011 WL 3821055, at *4. In other words, the evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the destruction and damage to the
Gomezes' tires were intentionally caused by Carrizales. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895. We overrule Carrizales's first issue.
IV. Identity
By his second issue, Carrizales argues that the evidence was insufficient to
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establish Carrizales's identity as the person who committed the offense. Carrizales
argues that the evidence established only his motive and opportunity to commit the
offense and that evidence of motive and opportunity alone are, as a matter of law,
insufficient to prove identity. See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 526. Again, we disagree.
The same evidence that circumstantially established the corpus delicti of the
offense also circumstantially established Carrizales's identity. See Earls, 707 S.W.2d at
85. We note that Carrizales appears to concede that the evidence establishes that he
had the motive and opportunity to commit the offense; he was unhappy with the speed at
which the Gomezes were driving on the road outside his home (motive), and he lived near
the Gomezes (opportunity). The evidence of motive and opportunity, while not sufficient
alone, are nonetheless circumstances linking Carrizales to the crime. See Merritt, 368
S.W.3d at 526 (holding that even though motive and opportunity are not sufficient to
prove identity, they are circumstances indicative of guilt); see also Temple v. State, No.
PD–0888–11, 2012 WL 6861531, at *19 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2013) (same). But the
motive and circumstance evidence is not the only evidence of identity in this case. At
trial, Carrizales admitted that he had placed objects in the road on a prior occasion in an
attempt to slow the Gomezes speeding. Also, the patrol car that went to Carrizales's
home to investigate Gomez's complaint returned with a flat tire caused by the same type
of sheet metal screws that caused the Gomezes' flat tires. Both of the foregoing are
strong circumstantial evidence corroborating the motive and opportunity evidence and
circumstantially identifying Carrizales as the perpetrator of the charged offense. See
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see also Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462; Earls, 707 S.W.2d at
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85. In short, we are not persuaded by Carrizales's assertions that the only evidence of
identity was the evidence related to motive and opportunity.
It was within the prerogative of the fact finder in this case to weigh the evidence
before it, and having reviewed the entire record, we cannot conclude that the trial court
acted irrationally in determining beyond a reasonable doubt that Carrizales was the
person who threw the screws in the roadway. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks,
323 S.W.3d at 895; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517. We overrule Carrizales's second issue.
V. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 21st
day of February, 2013.
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