in the Matter of K.M.D. ( 2018 )

Affirmed and Opinion Filed July 3, 2018
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-01284-CV
IN THE MATTER OF K.M.D., a child
On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. JD-17-01047-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Myers, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Bridges
The juvenile court certified KMD, a fourteen-year-old, to be tried as an adult and
transferred criminal proceedings to a criminal district court. On appeal, he argues the juvenile
court’s certification and transfer order was deficient and lacking in specificity to waive its original
jurisdiction. We affirm.
Background
On July 26, 2017, decedent and others were playing basketball in a Dallas city park when
several vehicles drove by. KMD drove the first vehicle, a red Chevrolet four-door Impala. BD
sat in the front passenger seat, and two others sat in the backseats. According to BD, “somebody”
had a “previous beef” with decedent.
The Impala drove by the park again. Although KMD initially drove the car, he switched
seats at some point with BD. KMD fired a weapon twice out of the front passenger side window
striking decedent in the head.1 The car immediately left the scene.
Based on a 9-1-1 call, officers located the Impala within minutes and a chase ensued. By
this time, KMD was again driving and BD was in the front passenger seat. During the chase, BD
exited the car and fled on foot while KMD continued to flee in the car.
Officers caught BD and recovered a .380 semiautomatic weapon from his pants pocket.
KMD eventually ended the car chase, and officers took all four individuals into custody. KMD
denied shooting anyone, but admitted he evaded arrest because he did not have a driver’s license.
Detective Cayce Shelton interviewed several witnesses to the crime. One witness on the
basketball court thought the shots came from the black car following the Impala. However, a
woman on her front porch heard gunshots and saw a person with his arm out the right front
passenger side window of the Impala. Two passengers in the Impala said KMD was the shooter
and the third passenger, KMD’s brother, would not identify KMD as the shooter but said “the shots
came from where he was sitting.” After interviewing the passengers in the Impala, the people in
the car following the Impala, neighbors, and those on the basketball court, Detective Shelton was
confident KMD was the shooter.
KMD was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing the death of an individual by
shooting him with a firearm in violation of section 19.02 of the penal code.
On August 3, 2017, the State filed its Petition for Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court,
asking the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and transfer KMD’s case to adult criminal court.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West 2014). As required by family code section 54.02(d),
1
Decedent was eighteen years old.
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the trial court ordered a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of
KMD, his circumstances, and circumstances of the alleged offense.
After the evaluations were completed, the juvenile court conducted a hearing regarding the
State’s motion to transfer. Two witnesses testified at the hearing: Detective Shelton, the lead
investigator, and Kendrick Smith, a juvenile probation officer. Smith prepared the social
evaluation and investigative report. The juvenile court took judicial notice of the reports without
objection. Smith recommended the juvenile court grant the State’s petition for discretionary
transfer.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court made oral findings on the record. On
October 16, 2017, the court signed its waiver of jurisdiction and order of transfer to a criminal
district court. The order stated the court considered “all the testimony, diagnostic study, social
evaluation, and full investigation” and found “it is contrary to the best interest of the public to
retain jurisdiction.” This interlocutory appeal followed.2
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
To waive its jurisdiction and transfer KMD to adult criminal court, the juvenile court had
to find KMD was alleged to have committed a felony, he was fourteen years old or older at the
time he committed the alleged offense, after a full investigation and a hearing there was probable
cause to believe KMD committed the alleged offense, and the welfare of the community requires
criminal proceedings because of the alleged offense’s seriousness or KMD’s background. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a)(1)–(3).
2
Although juvenile certification cases are on an accelerated 180-day deadline for this Court, this case was delayed by actions outside the
Court’s control. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(h-1) (West Supp. 2017). The notice of appeal was filed on November 6, 2017. Appellant’s
deadline for filing his brief began to run on January 4, 2018. Appellant did not file a brief on the January 24, 2018 deadline. The Court, on its own
action, issued two separate orders ultimately resulting in an abatement of the appeal until the trial court held a hearing to determine whether appellant
desired to continue the appeal. On March 28, 2018, the trial court held a hearing. The trial court filed its findings in this Court on April 13, 2018.
Appellant’s brief was filed on April 27, 2018, and the State’s response brief was filed on May 31, 2018.
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In making the determination required in subsection (a), the juvenile court had to consider,
among other matters: (1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater
weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person; (2) KMD’s sophistication and
maturity; (3) KMD’s record and previous history; and (4) the prospects of adequate protection of
the public and the likelihood of KMD’s rehabilitation by use of procedures, services, and facilities
currently available to the juvenile court. See id. § 54.02(f). These are nonexclusive factors that
serve to facilitate the juvenile court’s balancing of the potential danger to the public posed by the
particular juvenile offender with his amenability to treatment. Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 38
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Hidalgo v. State, 983 S.W.2d 746, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
Family code section 54.02(h) requires that if the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, “it shall state
specifically in the order its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the written order
and findings of the court.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(h); Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 38.
With regard to our review of that order, the court of criminal appeals has instructed us as
follows:
[I]n evaluating a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction,
an appellate court should first review the juvenile court’s specific
findings of fact regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors under
“traditional sufficiency of the evidence review.” But it should then
review the juvenile court’s ultimate waiver decision under an abuse
of discretion standard. That is to say, in deciding whether the
juvenile court erred to conclude that the seriousness of the offense
alleged and/or the background of the juvenile called for criminal
proceedings for the welfare of the community, the appellate court
should simply ask, in light of its own analysis of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the Section 54.02(f) factors and any other
relevant evidence, whether the juvenile court acted without
reference to guiding rules or principles. In other words, was its
transfer decision essentially arbitrary, given the evidence upon
which it was based, or did it represent a reasonably principled
application of the legislative criteria? And, of course, reviewing
courts should bear in mind that not every Section 54.02(f) factor
must weigh in favor of transfer to justify the juvenile court’s
discretionary decision to waive its jurisdiction.
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Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47. Further, a reviewing court should measure sufficiency of the evidence
to support the juvenile court’s stated reasons for transfer by considering the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the facts as they are expressly found by the juvenile court in its certified order.
In re G.B., 524 S.W.3d 906, 914–15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.). The appellate court
should not be made to rummage through the record for facts that the juvenile court might have
found, given the evidence developed at the transfer hearing, but did not include in its written
transfer order. Id. Thus, in conducting a sufficiency review of the evidence to establish the facts
relevant to section 54.02(f) factors and any other relevant historical facts, which are meant to
inform the juvenile court’s discretion whether the seriousness of the offense alleged or the
background of the juvenile warrants transfer for the welfare of the community, the appellate court
must limit its sufficiency review to the facts that the juvenile court expressly relied upon, as
required to be explicitly set out in the juvenile court’s transfer order under Section 54.02(h). Id.However, while the order must show the juvenile court considered the four factors in
section 54.02(h), the court “need make no particular findings of fact with respect to those factors.”
Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 41–42; see also In re D.L.C., No. 06-16-00058-CV, 2017 WL 1055680, at
*6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing that “there may be no
reversible error even when the juvenile court’s order seemingly restates the factors contained in
section 54.02, as long as the enumerated reasons were supported by evidence”). Further, the court
may order a transfer on the strength of any combination of the criteria listed in section 54.02(f).
Hidalgo, 983 S.W.2d at 754 n.16.
Discussion
KMD challenges the trial court’s failure to “show its work” as required by Moon. He
argues the transfer order does not include specific, concrete facts supporting (1) KMD’s “refusal
to remain away from associates who habitually violate the law,” (2) his “actions and conduct as a
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principal or party in the commission of the offense,” (3) his “sophistication and maturity is
excessive for his age,” and (4) his “likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation . . . is remote” and
“contrary to the best interest of the public.” We interpret KMD’s arguments as challenging only
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings.
We begin by analyzing the trial court’s order for its specific findings. The relevant portion
of the order states as follows:
The Court finds that said offense is a felony under the penal
law of the State of Texas. The Court finds that the alleged offense
was against a person; and the Court finds that there is probable cause
to believe that the Respondent committed the offense alleged in the
State’s Petition for Discretionary Transfer.
The Court finds the Respondent is of excessive
sophistication and the Respondent’s level of maturity is excessive to
be tried as an adult and to aid an attorney in his defense. After
considering all the testimony, diagnostic study, social evaluation,
and full investigation, the Court finds it is contrary to the best
interest of the public to retain jurisdiction.
The Court finds for the welfare of the community, the
seriousness of the alleged offense and the background of the
Respondent, that criminal proceedings are required.
Thus, the order indicates the juvenile court concluded the welfare of the community required
criminal proceedings because of both the seriousness of the offense and KMD’s background.
We first consider the seriousness of the offense. In Moon, the court concluded the juvenile
court abused its discretion by waiving jurisdiction when the transfer order found only that “because
of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings”
without any specific findings about the murder except that it was committed against another
person. 451 S.W.3d at 48. The order at issue in the present case does not suffer from the same
fatal flaw. Rather, the court’s order provides “the reasons for this disposition are that: . . . the
Respondent’s conduct was willful and violent; a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, was used during
the course of the offense; [and] death resulted to the victim.” Thus, the court “showed its work”
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and provided specific facts regarding its finding that transfer was appropriate because of the
seriousness of the offense.
Our review of the record likewise indicates the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
trial court’s specific finding regarding the seriousness of the offense. The court heard testimony
that KMD circled the park twice before shooting decedent twice in the head killing him. He then
fled the scene. When officers were in pursuit, he continued to drive away until he finally ended
the chase and was captured. Smith, the probation officer, testified the offense was committed in
“an aggressive, violent, and premeditated manner.” Thus, there is more than a scintilla of evidence
supporting the court’s determination that the circumstances of this particular murder was “willful
and violent.” See Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 48 (distinguishing between generic findings related to the
“category of crime alleged” and findings concerning “the specifics of a particular offense”).
We now consider the juvenile court’s finding that criminal proceedings are required
because of KMD’s background. In its order, the court explained “the reasons for its disposition”
were in part because of KMD’s “refus[al] to remain away from associates in the community who
habitually violate the law; the sophistication of the child is excessive for his age; and his level of
maturity is excessive; . . . and the previous history of the Respondent.”
The court heard and reviewed the following testimony regarding KMD’s background.
KMD’s parents had extensive criminal histories and substance abuse issues. After their parental
rights were terminated, KMD was raised by his paternal grandmother. She described his behavior
as “fair to poor.” He had little regard for her authority and instead was influenced by negative
peers to engage in delinquent behavior. KMD told Smith that some of his peers used drugs, had
criminal histories,3 and were affiliated with gangs. He also admitted he was not responsive to
Grandmother’s supervision.
3
BD, one of the occupants in the car during the shooting, had five referrals to the Dallas County juvenile department.
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KMD’s psychological evaluation indicated a severe level of depression and the profile of
an individual who is unhappy, emotionally labile, and quite angry. He admitted to using guns,
stealing food, and setting fires. He believed he was antisocial and struggled to manage his
behavior. KMD admitted difficulty with anger and explained his outbursts “may” cause him to
“black out” sometimes. He never hurt anyone during these episodes, but recalled hurting his hands
by punching a wall during a “black out” and holding a knife to his throat during another episode.
Although Grandmother denied that KMD physically assaulted her, she admitted he had a
history of violence and aggression in the home. Grandmother tried her best to keep KMD enrolled
in school, but he regularly left campus after she dropped him off. A school resource officer
reported KMD attended school under the influence of marijuana and smoked on campus. KMD
told Smith he began smoking marijuana when he was seven and had used it to some extent ever
since then. He tested positive for marijuana and Xanax the day of the offense.
Smith described KMD as having a level of sophistication higher than those similar to other
fourteen-year-olds. Smith described the offense as “extremely sophisticated in nature” and
“reflective of an individual much older than himself,” who “demonstrates a lack of respect for
authority and a person’s life.” Smith ultimately concluded, in part, the following:
Due to the subject’s pending offense, his current age, his drug
history, and his association with older and negative peers who have
criminal histories, who use drugs, and who have gang affiliations,
rehabilitation of the subject within the Juvenile Justice System is
remote. Due to the aggressive, violent, and deadly-nature of the
pending offense, which resulted in loss of human life, this case
warrants transfer to the Adult Criminal Court.
Thus, there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the court’s determination that KMD’s
background supported transfer to criminal court. See, e.g., In re S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d 235, 241–42
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (juvenile’s admission to criminal activity and
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frequent possession and use of drugs weighed in favor of waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to
criminal district court).
Finally, the trial juvenile court determined the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation was
remote and retaining jurisdiction was contrary to the best interests of the public. KMD admitted
to anger issues, drug use, and associating with negative influences. Because of these issues, Smith
testified KMD’s likelihood of rehabilitation with the services available through the juvenile system
was remote. Thus, there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting transfer to criminal court
because rehabilitation was remote and retaining jurisdiction was contrary to the best interests of
the public.
The juvenile court considered each of the section 54.02(f) factors and stated specific
reasons and findings in support of its decision to waive its jurisdiction and transfer KMD for trial
as an adult. Its findings are supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court of criminal appeals
has advised that “the juvenile court that shows its work should rarely be reversed.” Moon, 451
S.W.3d at 49. “As long as the appellate court can determine that the juvenile court’s judgment
was based upon facts that are supported by the record, it should refrain from interfering with that
judgment absent a scenario in which the facts in the transfer order, based on evidence produced at
the transfer hearing . . . bear no rational relation to the specific reasons the order gives” to justify
transfer. Id. at 46. Given the juvenile court’s board discretion, we hold that this is not the rare
case in which reversal is warranted in spite of the juvenile court’s adherence to the statutory
criteria. In light of the juvenile court’s findings and our review of the record, which supports those
findings, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by waiving jurisdiction and
transferring KMD for trial as an adult. We overrule KMD’s sole issue.
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Conclusion
The juvenile court’s certification and transfer order is affirmed.
/David L. Bridges/
DAVID L. BRIDGES
JUSTICE
171284F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
IN THE MATTER OF K.M.D., a child On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-17-01284-CV Trial Court Cause No. JD-17-01047-X.
Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges.
Justices Myers and Schenck participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered July 3, 2018.
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