Domingo Perez III v. State ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-17-00239CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DOMINGO PEREZ III, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 36th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Domingo Perez III appeals from a judgment convicting him of burglary
of a habitation, a first-degree felony, and sentencing him to forty-five years’ confinement.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). In one
issue, Perez contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The indictment in this case alleges that on May 14, 2009, Perez entered the home
of Odilia Herrera without her effective consent and assaulted her. See id. At trial, the
State called only three witnesses: Herrera, the complainant; Priscilla Torres, who lived
across the street from Herrera; and Erica Gomez, the City of Taft police officer who first
encountered Herrera after her altercation with an intruder.
Herrera testified that on May 14, 2009, she was in her home, had fallen asleep,
and was suddenly awoken by a “searing pain” to her head. She then realized that an
assailant was hitting her head with a metal pot she had left on the kitchen table. Herrera
fended off her attacker by kicking and hitting him. When the police arrived, Herrera was
“in and out” of consciousness and “in shock,” and all she conveyed to the police was that
her attacker was “a tall skinny guy.” Herrera was airlifted to a hospital and received
treatment in the intensive care unit. Two weeks after being released from the hospital,
Herrera met with the police, and she identified Perez out of a photographic line up of six
male individuals.
Torres recalled that Perez lived in the neighborhood and befriended her boyfriend.
During the State’s direct examination of Torres, it asked and she answered:
Q. Going back to May 14th, 2009, can you describe for the jury what if
anything unusual happened that evening?
A. That night I was in the shower. I don’t remember the time but it was
nighttime. My two boys, [John Doe 1] and [John Doe 2], my oldest
was asleep on the couch. [John Doe 2] was sitting below him
watching TV. I heard some banging and I thought it was my boys
fighting but my oldest had been asleep so I yelled from the shower
[John Doe 2], [John Doe 1], what are y’all doing? I didn’t hear
anything else after that but I heard a loud commotion so I got
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dressed, I went outside and I started to comb my hair—that’s the way
I do it is I go outside and I comb my hair—and when I was outside I
heard screaming. I don’t know where it came from because it was
nighttime. I didn’t know who it was until a few minutes later I saw
that the cops were down the street at [Herrera’s] house and the next
morning when I had saw my door frame was cracked and like two or
three days before that I had put a chain on the door just for my little
boy to put it because we lived on a busy street and I asked him, I
said Oh my God—I told my boys—look what happened, there’s a
crack on the door because everything was renovated brand new in
the house and he said Mom it was Flaco. That’s his nickname,
Domingo’s nickname, and he said that he was trying to bang on the
door to go in the house and, you know, I freaked out because he was
six at the time and he knew him by his name and nickname and he
had told me that he tried breaking in the house going in and he
wanted him to open the door but of course my son couldn’t reach to
unlock it and he probably would have because he knew who he was.
So for that chain I just thank God I had put it up a couple days before.
It didn’t let him go in my house otherwise I know he would have done
something to my boys and myself.
Torres clarified that the knocking at her door occurred minutes before she heard the
screaming.
On cross-examination by Perez’s counsel, Torres testified her son who interacted
with Perez on May 14, 2009, was twelve years old at the time of trial. Torres
acknowledged discussing with her son the possibility of testifying in court, and she
emphasized that she never told him what to say. Perez’s counsel and Torres then
discussed:
Q. Was it common for you to see Domingo walking around the
neighborhood?
A. I guess, yes. At that time I heard he was really bad on drugs.
Q. Well, if he was bad on drugs or not, you hadn’t heard that and you
don’t know that for sure, do you?
A. Well, I mean it’s a small town. You know when somebody is on
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something.
Q. Well, it is a small town. In fact, houses are really close together,
correct?
A. Yes.
...
Q. Ma’am, can you tell this jury one hundred percent you know that
Domingo Perez committed this attack?
A. To [Herrera]?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, she told me herself.
Q. For you to be 100 percent sure you would have had to be there as a
witness, correct?
A. Yeah, I would have but I wasn’t.
Q. So you’re relying on what somebody else told you, correct?
A. Yes.
Gomez recounted that on May 14, 2009, she was patrolling Herrera’s
neighborhood when she “could hear the victim’s cries for help” through the rolled-down
windows of her police vehicle. Soon thereafter, Gomez heard the dispatch call and
proceeded to Herrera’s home. Gomez described that Herrera’s “eyes were kind of rolling
back and she was in and out of consciousness.”
The jury convicted Perez of burglary, and it assessed punishment at forty-five
years’ confinement. The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with the jury’s
verdict and its punishment assessment. Perez did not file a motion for new trial. This
appeal followed.
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II. DISCUSSION
In his sole issue, Perez contends that his counsel’s performance was deficient
when she did not object to Torres’s testimony that Perez had tried to break into her house
before allegedly breaking into Herrera’s home and that he used drugs. Perez maintains
that Torres lacked personal knowledge, she injected inadmissible extraneous acts into
evidence, such testimony was overly prejudicial when weighed against its probative
value, and her testimony conveyed hearsay statements. Perez also complains that her
trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to formally request extraneous-offense
evidence from the State before trial.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to
reasonably effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend.
VI; DeLeon v. State, 322 S.W.3d 375, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet.
ref’d). In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984). The court evaluates the counsel’s performance by an objective standard. Ex
parte Lane, 303 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We give great deference to
counsel’s performance and begin with the assumption that counsel’s conduct fell within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Lane,
303 S.W.3d at 707. Counsel’s assistance prejudices the defense when there is a
reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome that, but for
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counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.A. at 668; Lane 303 S.W.3d at 707. This two-pronged test is “the
benchmark for judging . . . whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; see Lane, 303 S.W.3d at 707.
A. Torres’s Testimony
According to Perez, his trial counsel had four legal bases on which to object to
Torres’s testimony recounting her son’s statements to her and that she had heard Perez
“was really bad on drugs.” First, Texas Rule of Evidence 602, which provides that a
witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding
that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. TEX. R. EVID. 602. Second,
Perez contends that Torres’s testimony recounted hearsay statements by her six-year-
old son and unnamed individuals. See generally id. at R. 801(d) (defining hearsay).
Third, Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) generally prohibits the admissibility of evidence
of a crime, wrong, or other act to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Id. R. 404(b)(1).
Fourth, rule 403, which provides that a court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of, among other things, unfair prejudice.
Id. R. 403.
Perez’s complaints regarding Torres’s lack of personal knowledge and on her
relying hearsay statements fail to overcome the presumption of reasonable trial strategy.
See generally Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Appellate
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review of defense counsel’s representation is highly deferential and presumes that
counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable and professional assistance.”).
The question by the State did not overtly call for hearsay testimony. Had Perez’s counsel
objected to Torres’s statement and the objection been sustained, the trial court would
have given the jury a curative instruction. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 889 S.W.2d 615,
617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (providing that in order to properly
exclude evidence or obtain an instruction to disregard a nonresponsive answer, a party
must object to the nonresponsiveness and inadmissibility of the answer) (citing Smith v.
State, 763 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d)). Reasonable trial
strategy may have persuaded Perez’s trial counsel to forgo such an objection and the risk
of highlighting the testimony. Further, Torres’s testimony suggested that her twelve-
year-old son may have been willing to testify. Perez’s trial counsel may have determined
that it was more advantageous to forego objections to Torres’s testimony than risk the
State calling a twelve-year-old. Accordingly, Perez’s first two ineffective assistance of
counsel arguments fail Strickland’s first prong.
As for Perez’s reliance on rule 404(b)(1), there is no clear indication that such an
objection would have been sustained. See Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (providing that to show deficient performance, appellant must show evidence
was inadmissible). Rule 404(b)(2) provides for the admissibility of evidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act for another purpose, such as proving opportunity or intent. TEX. R.
EVID. 404(b)(2). Perez’s trial counsel may have gauged the chances of prevailing at
objecting on extraneous offense grounds as low. See Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. Trial
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counsel may have also deemed the instruction to disregard that likely would have followed
the sustaining of such an objection to be more detrimental than beneficial as with the
hearsay objections. See id.; see also Jackson, 889 S.W.2d at 617. This argument also
fails Strickland’s first prong.
The same weighing of risks and benefits applies to counsel’s failure to object on
rule 403 grounds. The instruction to disregard that would have followed a successful
objection may have, in trial counsel’s judgment, highlighted the statement regarding
Perez’s drug use. See Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833; see also Jackson, 889 S.W.2d at 617.
In this case, Perez’s trial counsel parlayed Torres’s testimony regarding Perez’s alleged
drug use into a discussion questioning her certainty that Perez was the individual who
assaulted Herrera. Therefore, we cannot say that this argument satisfies Strickland’s
first prong.
B. Rule 404(b) Request
Perez further argues that his trial counsel’s assistance was deficient because she
failed to send the State a rule 404(b) request. Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) states, “On
timely request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must provide reasonable
notice before trial that the prosecution intends to introduce such evidence—other than
that arising in the same transaction—in its case-in-chief.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
Perez then references “evidence of [his] prior burglary attempt and drug abuse” in support
of this argument. But, there is no indication that the State knew Torres would make such
statements. A claim of ineffective assistance must be firmly rooted in the record.
Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see also Bone, 77
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S.W.3d at 833 (“Under normal circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be
sufficient to show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical
or strategic decisionmaking as to overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct was
reasonable and professional.”). Under the current state of the record, we cannot
conclude that Perez’s final ineffective assistance of counsel argument satisfies
Strickland’s first prong.
We overrule Perez’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
5th day of July, 2018.
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