in the Matter of J.L.C., a Juvenile ( 2018 )


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  •                                    IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-18-00061-CV
    IN THE MATTER OF J.L.C., A JUVENILE
    From the County Court at Law No. 1
    Johnson County, Texas
    Trial Court No. J05776
    OPINION
    J.L.C. appeals the trial court's Order Modifying Disposition—Determinate
    Sentence committing J.L.C. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for four years with
    a possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We affirm.
    J.L.C.’s appellate attorney filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief in
    support of the motion to withdraw, asserting that the appeal presents no issues of
    arguable merit. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L. Ed. 2d 493
    (1967).
    The procedures set forth in Anders are applicable to appeals in juvenile proceedings. See
    In re D.A.S., 
    973 S.W.2d 296
    , 299 (Tex. 1998). Counsel advised J.L.C. and his guardian that
    counsel had filed the motion and brief pursuant to Anders and provided J.L.C. a copy of
    the record, advised J.L.C. and his guardian of the right to review the record and the right
    to submit a response on J.L.C.’s behalf. See 
    id. at 299.
    Neither J.L.C. nor his guardian
    submitted a response.
    Counsel asserts in the Anders brief that counsel has made a thorough review of the
    appellate record for non-frivolous issues, including a review of the admonishments,
    waiver of jury trial, sufficiency of the petition, the plea, and the waiver of and right to an
    appeal in the initial adjudication and disposition hearings, and a review of the hearing,
    reasonableness of the sentence, and the sufficiency of the evidence in the modification
    hearing. After the review, counsel reluctantly concluded there was no non-frivolous
    issue to raise in this appeal. Counsel's brief evidences a professional evaluation of the
    record for error, and we conclude that counsel performed the duties required of
    appointed counsel. See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 812 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1978); see also In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
    Upon the filing of an Anders brief, as the reviewing appellate court, it is our duty
    to independently examine the record to decide whether counsel is correct in determining
    that an appeal is frivolous. See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    ,
    511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Arguments are frivolous when they "cannot conceivably
    persuade the court." McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 
    486 U.S. 429
    , 436, 
    108 S. Ct. 1895
    , 100 L.
    Ed. 2d 440 (1988). Having carefully reviewed the entire record and the Anders brief, we
    have determined that the appeal is frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826-27
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).               Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's Order Modifying
    Disposition—Determinate Sentence signed on February 14, 2018.
    In the Matter of J.L.C., a Juvenile                                                     Page 2
    Counsel's motion to withdraw from representation of J.L.C. is granted, and
    counsel is discharged from representing J.L.C. in this appeal.1 Should J.L.C. wish to seek
    further review of this case by the Texas Supreme Court, he or his guardian must either
    retain an attorney to file a petition for review or must file a pro se petition for review. No
    substitute counsel will be appointed. Any petition for review must be filed within 45
    days from the date of this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
    for en banc reconsideration has been overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.7.
    Any petition and all copies of the petition for review must be filed with the Clerk of the
    1
    Although some courts have decided to extend the decision in In re P.M. to Anders appeals in juvenile cases,
    we do not. See, e.g. In re C.F., No. 03-18-00008-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4128 *2 fn.1 (Tex. App.—Austin
    June 8, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); In re A.H., 
    530 S.W.3d 715
    , 717 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.);
    In re A.C., Nos. 01-15-00931-CV, 01-15-00932-CV, 01-15-00933-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 4285 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). First, whereas the statutes in the Family Code
    governing the appointment of counsel and counsel’s continued representation in State-initiated
    termination cases provide no alternative but to appoint counsel and retain appointed counsel until the
    appellate process is final, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.013; 107.016 (West 2014), the statutes in the
    Juvenile Justice Code are different. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.10; 51.101 (West 2014). There are
    different situations in which a juvenile may or must be represented by counsel. 
    Id. Counsel may
    even be
    waived in certain situations. See 
    id. § 51.10.
    And, when counsel is appointed, counsel is not always required
    to represent the child until “the case is terminated.” When a motion or petition is filed seeking to modify
    a disposition by committing the child to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department, as we have in this case,
    appointed counsel continues to represent the child only “until the court rules on the motion or petition….”
    Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.101 (a), (b), and (d) with (e) (West 2014). Second, the Texas Supreme
    Court has already addressed whether the child is required to be represented by counsel after a court in an
    Anders appeal has determined the appeal to be frivolous when it decided to extend the Anders procedures
    to juvenile cases. See In re D.A.S., 
    973 S.W.2d 296
    (Tex. 1998). When determining whether to extend Anders
    to juvenile cases, the Supreme Court noted that the court of appeals was reluctant to allow an attorney to
    withdraw because the juvenile, unlike a criminal defendant, could not then proceed pro se. 
    Id. at 299.
    The
    Supreme Court determined, however, that “this limitation should not be an impediment to extending
    Anders to juvenile cases.” 
    Id. It reasoned
    that if after an attorney and the court of appeals determines the
    appeal is without merit counsel is permitted to withdraw, the “juvenile would then have the ability to
    advance his or her appeal through a parent, legal guardian, next friend, or guardian ad litem.” 
    Id. This basic
    maxim has not changed over the years. Accordingly, for these reasons, this Court will continue to
    follow the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in In re D.A.S. rather than extending the Texas Supreme Court’s
    decision in In re P.M. to Anders appeals in juvenile cases.
    In the Matter of J.L.C., a Juvenile                                                                   Page 3
    Supreme Court. 
    Id. Any petition
    for review should comply with the requirements of
    Rule 53.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2.
    Notwithstanding counsel's discharge, counsel must send J.L.C. and his guardian
    a copy of our decision, notify them of J.L.C.’s right to file a pro se petition for review. See
    In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n.22. Because a juvenile proceeding is quasi-criminal in
    nature, we will also require counsel to send this Court a letter certifying counsel's
    compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 48.4. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed August 8, 2018
    [CV06]
    In the Matter of J.L.C., a Juvenile                                                      Page 4