Samuel Leal v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                                NUMBER 13-18-00012-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    SAMUEL LEAL,                                                                  Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                            Appellee.
    On appeal from the 319th District Court
    of Nueces County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
    Appellant Samuel Leal appeals from his conviction for aggravated robbery, a first-
    degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
    In a single issue, Leal complains that the trial court should have granted a mistrial after a
    police detective testified during trial that he was investigating a series of robberies. We
    affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Leal was indicted for aggravated robbery. See 
    id. The indictment
    included an
    allegation that Leal was a habitual felony offender and had previously been convicted of
    two previous aggravated robberies in Nueces County in 2003 and in 2008. See 
    id. § 12.42(d).
    Cornelius Robinson testified at trial that he was robbed of his wallet and personal
    papers at knife-point on March 6, 2016. He testified that he left work at his refinery security
    job and was driving along Leopard Street in the predawn hours of March 6, 2016. He was
    looking for his friend Lucy Siller, so he could return her birth certificate card. According to
    Robinson, Lucy1 had given the card to him as collateral for a loan of $40 several years
    earlier. Robinson had been looking for Lucy for several months to return her card. He
    thought he had seen her on this portion of Leopard Street within the past few months, but
    he did not have her card with him at the time. Robinson saw a woman who looked like
    Lucy near the La Siesta Motel on Leopard. Robinson pulled into the parking lot to talk to
    the woman and discovered she was not Lucy. When asked whether she knew Lucy, the
    woman, whose name was Destiny Rodriguez, said she did and offered to get in touch with
    Lucy for Robinson. Robinson testified that he followed Destiny2 into her room at the motel.
    There was a man in the room, lying on the bed who paid no attention to Robinson.
    Robinson followed Destiny into a second room, and within a few minutes another man
    entered. The second man asked Robinson if he had any money. According to Robinson,
    he told the man he had five dollars. The man aggressively asked Robinson if he had more
    1   We refer to Lucy Siller the way the witnesses at trial did, by her first name.
    2   We similarly refer to Destiny Rodriguez the way the witnesses at trial did, by her first name.
    2
    money, pulled out a pocket knife with a four-inch blade, and held the blade close to
    Robinson’s chest and neck; the man roughly searched Robinson’s pockets. Although the
    incident was brief, no more than five to seven minutes long, Robinson feared that the man
    would stab him. Robinson explained that the man allowed Robinson to leave on the
    condition that Robinson bring back $100 to trade for his wallet, notebook, and credit cards.
    Robinson testified that he drove to another motel where he stopped and telephoned
    his bank to cancel his credit and debit cards and then called the Corpus Christi Police
    Department (CCPD) to report that he had been robbed. Officers responded, and later
    Robinson met with a detective.
    Detective Augustine Maldonado of the CCPD testified at trial regarding his
    investigation into the aggravated robbery of Robinson. He first became involved because
    he “was investigating a series of robberies.” Defense counsel began to object but instead
    asked for a bench conference. The trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard
    the statement by Detective Maldonado and then denied counsel’s subsequent motion for
    mistrial.3 The detective continued his testimony describing the investigation he conducted
    which included obtaining a video statement by Robinson.                            In addition, Detective
    Maldonado prepared photo arrays for Robinson’s review. From these arrays, Robinson
    identified photographs of Destiny Rodriguez and Samuel Leal. CCPD videotaped the
    interview and Robinson’s identification of Leal during the photo arrays. Portions of the
    recording were shown to the jury. Detective Maldonado testified that he prepared the
    3 The trial court told the jury, “You-all will disregard the last answer to the question.” Counsel then
    requested a mistrial after the instruction and during a subsequent bench conference, “And, Your Honor . . .
    to this witness’s mention of this, I’m going to ask the Court to find that the jury has been prejudiced by this
    remark of other robberies and I’m going to have to move for a mistrial.”
    3
    affidavit for Leal’s arrest after Robinson’s identification. Leal was arrested on June 10,
    2016, on three separate warrants for aggravated robbery.
    The trial court admitted into evidence recordings of portions of Leal’s telephone
    calls from jail to a woman believed to be his mother. Leal urged the woman to get in touch
    with Destiny and tell her to stay away from her house, her mother’s house, and just lay low
    until after the trial. He emphasized to his mother that she should make sure to let Destiny
    know the investigator looking for Destiny was driving an unmarked car. Leal further
    emphasized that if Destiny did not appear, the only witness Leal had to worry about was
    “this black dude,” by which he meant Robinson.
    Monica Lewis, an investigator for the Nueces County district attorney’s office,
    testified at trial that she served a subpoena on Destiny, but she did not appear for trial.
    The trial court issued a writ of attachment for her as a material witness against Leal.
    Investigator Lewis was not able to find Destiny before trial to serve the writ. Her state-
    issued vehicle is an unmarked car.
    The jury convicted Leal of aggravated robbery. Leal elected to have punishment
    by the trial court. Before the subsequent punishment hearing, the State and Leal reached
    a plea agreement as to the other two pending indictments and as to his sentence. In
    exchange for Leal’s plea of no contest to the remaining two cases, and his pleas of true to
    the enhancements, the State agreed to recommend a thirty-five-year sentence of
    imprisonment for each case to run concurrently and to recommend that Leal retained his
    right to appeal in this case. The State asked the trial court to make an affirmative deadly
    weapon finding in this case, which the trial court did. The trial court accepted the parties’s
    agreement and sentenced Leal accordingly. This appeal ensued.
    4
    II. MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
    Leal’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court denied his motion for mistrial after
    Detective Maldonado testified he was investigating a string of armed robberies.
    A.       Standard of Review
    We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse-of-discretion.
    We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and uphold the
    trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Webb v. State,
    
    232 S.W.3d 109
    , 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Wead v. State, 
    129 S.W.3d 126
    , 129 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2004). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court but rather
    decide whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Thus, a trial court
    abuses its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial only when no reasonable view of the
    record could support the trial court’s ruling. Charles v. State, 
    146 S.W.3d 204
    , 208 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2004).
    A mistrial is the appropriate remedy when the objectionable event is so emotionally
    inflammatory that a curative instruction is unlikely to prevent the jury from being unfairly
    prejudiced against the defendant. Young v. State, 
    137 S.W.3d 65
    , 71 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2004).4
    4  In Young v. State, a prosecution for sexual abuse of a child, a prospective juror was questioned
    during voir dire and stated her opinion that in twenty-five years of working in child welfare, a child who makes
    an accusation is generally telling the truth. 
    137 S.W.3d 65
    , 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The trial court denied
    the defense motion for mistrial. 
    Id. The court
    of appeals reversed, holding that an instruction could not cure
    the prejudicial effect on the defendant’s rights. 
    Id. However, the
    court of criminal appeals reversed after
    finding that an instruction that the defendant did not request, could have cured any prejudicial effect. 
    Id. 5 B.
         Discussion
    During the second day of trial, Detective Maldonado was asked why he was tasked
    with this case and he responded, “I was investigating a series of robberies.” Counsel
    objected, and the trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard. Counsel moved
    for a mistrial which the trial court denied. No further mention of other robberies occurred
    during the three-day trial. Leal argues that this evidence was harmful because the only
    evidence of robbery in the record came from Robinson. Leal argues further that the
    evidence in this case was not so strong that he would have been convicted without these
    seven words.
    We disagree. Robinson’s testimony was clear, direct, and consistent. In addition,
    the jury had Leal’s own words instructing his mother to keep a witness away from trial so
    that Robinson would be the only witness. The detective’s words did not implicate Leal in
    the other robberies and constituted only a minute or two out of a three-day trial. In addition,
    the jury received an immediate instruction to disregard.
    “On appeal, we generally presume the jury follows the trial court's instructions in
    the manner presented. The presumption is refutable, but the appellant must rebut the
    presumption by pointing to evidence that the jury failed to follow the trial court's
    instructions.” Thrift v. State, 
    176 S.W.3d 221
    , 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (presuming the
    jury followed the trial court’s instruction to limit its consideration of nude photographs of
    young men to one of several charged offenses); Archie v. State, 
    340 S.W.3d 734
    , 741
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that the trial court’s instruction to the prosecutor that he
    could not continue his line of argument and instructing the jury to disregard the argument
    because it was an improper comment on the defendant’s failure to testify was sufficient);
    6
    Waldo v. State, 
    746 S.W.2d 750
    , 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Leal points to nothing in the
    record to indicate that the jury disregarded the trial court’s instruction. We overrule Leal’s
    sole issue.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    GINA M. BENAVIDES,
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
    Delivered and filed the
    9th day of August, 2018.
    7