Christopher Spees v. State ( 2019 )


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  • Opinion filed August 8, 2019
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    __________
    No. 11-17-00323-CR
    __________
    CHRISTOPHER SPEES, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 35th District Court
    Brown County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CR22063
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The jury convicted Appellant of the offense of possession of a controlled
    substance. Appellant and the State then entered an agreement as to punishment. By
    the terms of that agreement, punishment was assessed at confinement in the State
    Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of two years.
    The trial court suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed Appellant on
    community supervision for five years. By the terms of his community supervision,
    Appellant, among other things, was not to violate the law. As conditions of
    Appellant’s community supervision, the trial court also required that Appellant
    perform 250 hours of community service, pay a $140 lab fee, and complete a drug
    offender education program.
    Subsequently, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s community
    supervision and alleged that Appellant had violated multiple conditions of his
    community supervision, namely that Appellant had used narcotics, had failed to
    report, and had failed to complete community service restitution. After a hearing,
    the trial court found nine of the State’s allegations to be true but found the allegation
    that Appellant had failed to complete community service restitution “not true.” The
    trial court revoked Appellant’s community supervision and imposed a reduced
    sentence of confinement for eighteen months. We affirm.
    In two issues on appeal, Appellant argues that (1) due process of law mandates
    that proof of a violation of any condition of community supervision must be beyond
    a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when
    it revoked his probation. We disagree.
    In his first issue, Appellant argues that this court should reexamine the
    standard of proof required to revoke community supervision. Appellant contends
    that due process mandates that a violation of any condition of community
    supervision must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a
    preponderance of the evidence.
    The Court of Criminal Appeals has considered whether a defendant is
    “entitled to have the question of his revocation decided ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’”
    and has determined that “the standard of proof necessary to revoke probation should
    [not] be as stringent as the one necessary to support the initial conviction.” Kelly v.
    State, 
    483 S.W.2d 467
    , 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Thus, as we have explained,
    the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the State must prove a violation by a
    preponderance of the evidence and that proof of any one of the alleged violations is
    2
    sufficient to uphold the trial court’s decision to revoke. Cardona v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (burden of proof is by a preponderance of
    the evidence); Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    , 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
    1980) (“one sufficient ground for revocation will support the court’s order to revoke
    probation”). Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has held otherwise, we decline
    to hold that a violation of community supervision must be proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See Jones v. State, 
    472 S.W.3d 322
    , 324 (Tex. App.—Eastland
    2015, pet. ref’d). We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
    In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
    when it revoked Appellant’s community supervision because the evidence was
    insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Appellant committed the
    subsequent offense of possession of a controlled substance. Appellant asserts that
    we should remand this cause to the trial court for a new disposition hearing so that
    the trial court can reassess punishment because the State proved only two of the
    allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
    In Scott, the Austin Court of Appeals encountered a similar argument in a case
    that involved the revocation of deferred adjudication community supervision.
    Scott v. State, No. 03-16-00213-CR, 
    2017 WL 3996387
    , at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—
    Austin Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We find
    this language from that opinion to be instructive:
    [A]ppellant argues that “[i]t cannot be determined that had the trial
    court only found those two allegations true, [appellant] would still have
    been sentenced to eighteen of a possible twenty four month sentence,”
    . . . and that “[t]he trial court could have chosen an alternative to
    imprisonment had only the allegations about community service and a
    drug offender program been true.” Relying on these arguments,
    appellant asks this Court to remand the case to the trial court for a new
    disposition hearing that is based only on those two violations of the
    conditions of his community supervision. We decline to do so.
    3
    
    Id. at *3
    (second, third, and fourth alterations in original). We likewise decline to
    remand this case.
    In any event, Appellant does not dispute that the State proved two of the
    alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. As we have stated, we will
    uphold a trial court’s decision to revoke if any one of the alleged violations of the
    conditions of community supervision is supported by sufficient evidence. 
    Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926
    .
    We review a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision under an
    abuse of discretion standard. 
    Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493
    . After a review of the
    record from the revocation hearing, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
    support the trial court’s finding that Appellant violated the conditions of his
    community supervision. On each of Allegation Nos. 1 through 9, the State met its
    burden to prove the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence. The State
    introduced lab reports from Appellant’s drug tests in July 2016, November 2016,
    and January 2017, which indicated that Appellant tested positive for both
    amphetamine and methamphetamine on all three occasions as well as marihuana in
    November 2016. There were no objections to the introduction of those lab reports.
    Additionally, Appellant admitted that he relapsed and used methamphetamine in
    January 2017 and that he used marihuana one time.
    Moreover, Appellant’s community supervision officer and the deputy director
    at the Brown County Community Supervision and Corrections Department both
    testified that Appellant failed to report on December 12, 2016, and February 17,
    2017.
    Although Appellant offered excuses for the failed drug tests and for his failure
    to report, in probation-revocation cases, “the trial judge is the sole judge of the
    credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Hacker v.
    4
    State, 
    389 S.W.3d 860
    , 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial court, thus, could
    have found Appellant’s testimony not credible and the State’s evidence credible.
    We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found all but
    one of the alleged violations to be true and revoked Appellant’s community
    supervision. We overrule Appellant’s second issue on appeal.
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    JIM R. WRIGHT
    SENIOR CHIEF JUSTICE
    August 8, 2019
    Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
    Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1
    Willson, J., not participating.
    1
    Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland,
    sitting by assignment.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-17-00323-CR

Filed Date: 8/8/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/10/2019