Rickey Donnell Crawford v. the State of Texas ( 2021 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-20-00220-CR
Rickey Donnell CRAWFORD,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC7034
Honorable Steven C. Hilbig, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena Chapa, Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 29, 2021
AFFIRMED
In this appeal from an enhanced felony conviction of Injury to the Elderly causing serious
bodily injury and an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon, Rickey Donnell Crawford, Appellant,
argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements and
committed reversible error by refusing to allow a Castle Doctrine instruction. For the reasons
given below, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
04-20-00220-CR
BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2018, law enforcement officers and paramedics were called to a nursing
home for a male resident who was found severely beaten on the floor of Crawford’s bedroom. The
resident died of complications from his injuries. Crawford was the only suspect. When police
arrived, Crawford volunteered incriminating statements to one of the responding officers. Later,
after a detective read Miranda warnings, Crawford described the assault. The trial court denied
Crawford’s pretrial motion to suppress his statements and denied a request for a reasonableness
presumption instruction for the use of Crawford’s deadly force against the other resident.
Crawford now appeals, arguing for this court to reverse and remand his case for a new trial.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS (FIFTH AMENDMENT)
A. Parties’ Arguments
Crawford argues that his incriminating statements should have been suppressed because he
was in custody for purposes of Miranda when he gave them, and because his first statement was
“unwarned.” He argues that his second statement was a product of the first statement and that it
came after his invocation of his right to remain silent, which made it involuntary and subject to
suppression. The State argues that Crawford was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and that
his statements were, therefore, not subject to suppression.
B. Standard of Review
Generally, a trial court’s ruling refusing to suppress evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Guzman v. State, 955
S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). This standard gives almost total deference to a trial court’s
determination of historical facts, especially when resolving the mixed questions of law and fact
turning on evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48 (citing St. George v.
State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Howard v. State, 570 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex.
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App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). If the review depends on an interpretation of law rather
than a witness’s demeanor and credibility, the matter may be reviewed de novo. Howard, 570
S.W.3d at 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Carmouche v. State, 10
S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). But typically, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will not be overturned absent
an abuse of discretion. Citizen v. State, 39 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001,
no pet.) (citing Oles, 993 S.W.2d at 106).
C. Applicable Law
“[A]n accused, held in custody, must be given the adequate and effective warnings ‘prior
to questioning,’ not merely before signing a written statement after all the custodial interrogation
is complete.” Martinez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 615, 619 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966)). “The failure to give timely warnings generally results in
the state being required to forfeit the use of any statement obtained during that interrogation during
its case-in-chief.” Id. However, statements that are volunteered by a suspect “are not barred by
Miranda, even when the accused is in custody.” Pugh v. State, 624 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2021) (citing Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987)). Furthermore, when a suspect
invokes his right to remain silent and then reinitiates communication with law enforcement
officers, he then waives his Fifth Amendment rights, and its protections fall away. See Cross v.
State, 144 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Andrus v. State, No. AP-76,936, 2016 WL
11737288, at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016) (not designated for publication) (citing Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981)).
D. Analysis
The victim in this case was a nursing home resident with dementia who would occasionally
wander into Crawford’s room. Crawford disapproved of these intrusions. On this occasion,
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Crawford beat the resident severely. Video footage provided by officers’ body cameras shows
that Crawford was waiting outside of his room for paramedics to remove the beaten resident.
Crawford was asked by a nurse to move his wheelchair to the side of the hallway, and a paramedic
asked who was “in charge of” Crawford because he was blocking the hall. An officer who had
newly arrived at the scene asked Crawford to move his wheelchair, and Crawford beckoned him
over to talk to him. Crawford’s speech is difficult to understand in the video, and no transcript
was provided, but Crawford can be intermittently heard complaining about the beaten resident
stealing money from him and taking his glasses and breaking them on another occasion. The
officer asked Crawford if he was confined to a wheelchair, and Crawford explained that he has
cerebral palsy and can sometimes walk with the assistance of a walker. Crawford continued to
talk unprompted, complaining that the beaten resident had previously taken his glasses and broken
them. He explained that if the resident came into his room again, Crawford was going to beat him
up. The officer discouraged Crawford from talking and asked Crawford if he knew the name of
the man who wandered into his room. Crawford said that he did not. Crawford then continued
talking, but the hallway in the video is noisy, and it is difficult to hear him.
In a later video, the investigating detective, Detective Kammlah, approached Crawford in
a noisy dining area where Crawford had a food tray at a table, and an officer stood watch. Detective
Kammlah introduced himself and asked whether Crawford and he could talk in a nearby room,
and Crawford agreed. Detective Kammlah offered to have someone watch Crawford’s food, but
Crawford insisted on bringing the tray with him. Detective Kammlah led Crawford to an office
where he cleared the desk to make room for Crawford’s tray. Crawford followed in his wheelchair,
talking unprompted about how he was “right.” Detective Kammlah read Crawford the Miranda
warnings, and Crawford invoked his right to remain silent. Detective Kammlah began to move
Crawford and his food tray back to the dining area, and Crawford said, “I’ll talk to ya; I’ll talk to
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ya.” Detective Kammlah asked, “Are you sure?” and Crawford replied, “Yeah.” Their
conversation and Crawford’s statements followed.
Again, there is no transcript, and Crawford’s speech is, at times, difficult to understand,
but Crawford explains that he had warned the beaten resident on another occasion not to come into
his room. When the resident came into his room on this occasion, Crawford described hitting the
resident. Crawford used onomatopoeias like “pow” to describe the altercation. Detective
Kammlah asked how many times Crawford thought he hit the resident, and Crawford estimated
four times at first and then six times. The estimate is difficult to understand, but Crawford
describes sets of strikes. He also seems to say the man wanted to leave the room, but it was too
late, since he had already entered after being warned against coming into Crawford’s room. He
laughed as he described the assault to Detective Kammlah.
In the pretrial phase of Crawford’s case, Crawford moved to suppress his incriminating
statements, which the trial court denied. At trial, the first statement was not entered into evidence
but a redacted version of the second statement was.
The redacted statement shows Detective Kammlah read Crawford the Miranda warnings,
and accepted Crawford’s invocation of his right to remain silent. When Crawford reinitiated the
conversation, Crawford voluntarily waived any right when he answered “Yeah” to Detective
Kammlah’s question, “Are you sure?” The statements provided by Crawford after these
circumstances were not subject to suppression under the Fifth Amendment, and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Crawford’s motion to suppress. See Cross, 144 S.W.3d at 527;
Andrus, 2016 WL 11737288, at *9.
We overrule Crawford’s suppression argument and next address his Castle Doctrine issue.
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CASTLE DOCTRINE
A. Parties’ Arguments
Crawford argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury charge instruction
on justification regarding his assault of the nursing home resident who wandered into his room.
The State argues that no evidence supported Crawford’s requested instruction and that the court
did not commit error by denying it.
B. Standard of Review
“Our first duty in analyzing a jury-charge issue is to decide whether error exists.” Ngo v.
State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450,
453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). If we find error, then the standard of review “depends on whether
the error was preserved.” Gonzalez v. State, 610 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing
Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020)); see also Almanza v. State, 686
S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g). Error is reversible if it was preserved
with a timely objection and if it caused some harm. Gonzalez, 610 S.W.3d at 27; Almanza, 686
S.W.2d at 171. If error was not preserved, the error is reversible if the court determines that the
error caused the defendant egregious harm. Gonzalez, 610 S.W.3d at 27; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at
171.
C. Applicable Law
Texas Penal Code section 9.32 provides a reasonableness presumption for deadly force in
defense of a person in their home or business, known as the Castle Doctrine. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 9.32; Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Villarreal v.
State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Krajcovic v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). A defendant must satisfy the requirements of the statute before he is entitled
to a justification defense under section 9.32. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32; Preston v. State,
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756 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d); Williams v. State, No. 11-
12-00261-CR, 2014 WL 4809938, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 25, 2014, no pet.). As applied
to this case, the statute requires the assailant to know or have reason to know that an intruder has
entered their home with force or is attempting to do so before he may commit an assault without
legal repercussion. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(b)(1)(A); Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d
185, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Dearborn v. State, 420 S.W.3d 366, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
D. Analysis
At trial, Crawford requested a jury instruction on the Castle Doctrine, arguing that he was
justified to attack an intruder in his room. However, Crawford admitted he had no legal basis to
support his argument that the intruder need not necessarily enter with force in order for the Castle
Doctrine to apply. Contra TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32. Further, no evidence was presented
that Crawford believed his use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself from
the victim or that the victim had entered with force. The record before us indicates that the victim
in this case wandered into Crawford’s room, and that Crawford believed the man wanted to steal
from him, though the victim apologized for being in the room. The record does not show any
evidentiary support for a jury charge instruction on justification. Therefore, Crawford’s request
for such instruction was properly denied. We overrule Crawford’s argument regarding the trial
court’s ruling on his request for a Castle Doctrine instruction.
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CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crawford’s motion
to suppress. We also conclude that Crawford was not entitled to a Castle Doctrine instruction.
Therefore, we overrule Crawford’s issues on appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
PUBLISH
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