Lynne C. Renfo and G. Lee Finley v. New Rez LLC D/B/A Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing ( 2022 )


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  • DISMISS and Opinion Filed December 15, 2022
    S  In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-22-00843-CV
    LYNNE C. RENFRO AND G. LEE FINLEY, Appellants
    V.
    NEW REZ LLC D/B/A SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING AND
    NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 366-04946-2019
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Carlyle, and Justice Garcia
    Opinion by Justice Garcia
    This appeal challenges three summary judgment orders. Because the orders
    are not appealable, we dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
    The underlying suit stems from a home equity loan obtained by Lynne Renfro
    and secured by a deed of trust on a house she now shares with Lee Finley. Renfro
    filed the suit after she defaulted on the loan and was threatened with foreclosure.
    She asserted various claims, including breach of contract, against New Rez LLC
    d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (“Shellpoint”), the “current” mortgagee and
    mortgage servicer, and Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, Shellpoint’s predecessor-in-
    interest. Nationstar and Shellpoint answered, seeking attorney’s fees. In addition,
    Shellpoint asserted counterclaims against Renfro for breach of contract, judicial
    foreclosure, and “equitable lien/subrogation,” and asserted the latter two claims as
    third-party claims against Finley as well.
    The first appealed order granted Shellpoint an equitable lien on the house.
    The second order granted Shellpoint’s no-evidence and traditional summary
    judgment motions on Renfro’s claims and its remaining claims and read, in relevant
    part: “The court having reviewed the motions, responses and replies, if any, and
    arguments of counsel, GRANTS the motions in their entirety. Judgment will follow
    by separate order.”
    The third order addressed Nationstar’s joinder and adoption by reference in
    Shellpoint’s no-evidence and traditional summary judgment motions. It read, in
    relevant part, as follows
    The Court, having considered the Motions, any responses or replies and
    oral argument, finds that the Motions have merit and are hereby
    GRANTED.
    IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Nationstar Mortgage
    LLC is granted summary judgment on all claims asserted against it by
    Plaintiff . . .
    FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall bear all costs.
    Because the orders did not determine the amount of fees to which Shellpoint
    was entitled or address Nationstar’s request for fees and the order granting
    –2–
    Shellpoint’s no-evidence and traditional summary judgment motions specifically
    stated that judgment would follow by separate order, we questioned our jurisdiction
    over the appeal. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 205 (Tex. 2001)
    (when no conventional trial has been held, judgment is final for purposes of appeal
    only if it actually disposes of all pending claims and parties or unequivocally states
    it finally disposes of all parties and claims). In a letter brief filed at our direction,
    Shellpoint and Nationstar agree their requests for attorney’s fees remain pending and
    note the second order is not definite with respect to Shellpoint’s other affirmative
    claims. See Hinde v. Hinde, 
    701 S.W.2d 637
    , 639 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (to be
    appealable, judgment must not only be final but also “sufficiently” definite and
    certain concerning parties’ rights) (quoting Steed v. State, 
    183 S.W.2d 458
    , 460 (Tex.
    1944)). Renfro and Finley respond that Shellpoint and Nationstar “waived” their
    requests for fees because they failed to submit supporting evidence. Renfro and
    Finley further argue the third order is the “separate order” referenced in the second
    order as it awarded costs.
    An award of costs, by itself, however, does not make a judgment final, and
    even if Shellpoint and Nationstar “waived” their fees, their requests would still need
    to be denied by written order. See id.; see also Farmer v. Ben E. Keith, 
    907 S.W.2d 495
    , 496 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (appellate timetable runs from signing of order
    even when signing order is ministerial). Because the appealed orders do not actually
    –3–
    dispose of the requests for fees or unequivocally state that they do, they are not final.
    Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
    /Dennise Garcia/
    DENNISE GARCIA
    JUSTICE
    220843F.P05
    –4–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    LYNNE C. RENFRO AND G. LEE                   On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
    FINLEY, Appellants                           District Court, Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 366-04946-
    No. 05-22-00843-CV          V.               2019.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia,
    NEW REZ LLC D/B/A                            Chief Justice Burns and Justice
    SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE                          Carlyle participating.
    SERVICING AND NATIONSTAR
    MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellees
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal.
    We ORDER that appellees New Rez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage
    Servicing and Nationstar Mortgage, LLC recover their costs, if any, of this appeal
    from appellants Lynne C. Renfro and G. Lee Finley.
    Judgment entered December 15, 2022.
    –5–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-22-00843-CV

Filed Date: 12/15/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2022