Lacy Miller v. People of the State of Calif. , 644 F. App'x 783 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               MAR 17 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LACY MILLER,                                      No. 13-17588
    Petitioner - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01351-JKS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
    CALIFORNIA; GARY SWARTHOUT,
    Warden,
    Respondents - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    James K. Singleton, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 14, 2016**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    Lacy Miller appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas relief
    from his conviction for second degree murder and possession of a controlled
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    substance. The sole issue certified for appeal is whether Miller was denied his
    Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because a juror in his trial was dating
    Miller’s ex-girlfriend. See Irvin v. Dowd, 
    366 U.S. 717
    , 722 (1961) (“[T]he righ to
    a jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
    ‘indifferent’ jurors.”).
    Our review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
    Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. A finding of actual
    bias (or a lack thereof) is a question of fact. Fields v. Brown, 
    503 F.3d 755
    , 768
    (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Under AEDPA, we may grant habeas relief only where
    the state court’s determination was “based on an unreasonable determination of the
    facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Taylor v.
    Maddox, 
    366 F.3d 992
    , 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).
    Specific factual findings by the state court are presumed correct and are rebuttable
    only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Murray v.
    Shriro, 
    745 F.3d 984
    , 999-1001 (9th Cir. 2014). We review the district court’s
    application of these standards de novo. Crittenden v. Chappell, 
    804 F.3d 998
    , 1006
    (9th Cir. 2015).
    The state court’s finding that the juror did not realize that defendant Miller
    was the same Miller who had previously dated his girlfriend was not an
    2
    unreasonable factual finding for purposes of AEDPA. There was no direct
    evidence that the juror ever made the link between Miller and the girlfriend, and
    the state court was not required to draw an inference that the juror must have made
    the connection. The state court heard extensive testimony, and its evaluation of
    that testimony deserves deference. See McClure v. Thompson, 
    323 F.3d 1233
    , 1241
    (9th Cir. 2003) (deferring to state court’s decision when it simply asserted that it
    accepted the credibility of a witness). That there was a substitution of the judge in
    the state court on the final day of hearings does not change the statutory burden to
    “rebut[] the presumption of correctness [of factual findings] by clear and
    convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
    Even if the juror’s testimony was difficult to believe, the state court did not
    solely rely on his testimony to discredit the girlfriend’s testimony or to find that a
    link was missing. This is not a case where a juror’s “pattern of lies, inappropriate
    behavior, and attempts to cover up his behavior introduced ‘destructive
    uncertainties’ into the fact-finding process.” Green v. White, 
    232 F.3d 671
    , 676
    (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). As the state court noted, there was no evidence
    in the record that the juror had acted in a biased manner during the trial, or that he
    shared the information about the connection with any other juror.
    3
    Even if we were to construe Miller’s claim as an implied bias challenge, see
    
    Fields, 503 F.3d at 770
    , his claim would be barred under AEDPA because our
    circuit cases recognizing an implied bias claim are not “clearly established federal
    law.” Hedlund v. Ryan, No. 09-99019, 
    2016 WL 851821
    , at *12 (9th Cir. Mar. 4,
    2016).
    AFFIRMED.
    4