STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ROBERT G. STOECKEL (01-18, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4023-17T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT G. STOECKEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted February 4, 2019 – Decided February 27, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Municipal Appeal No.
01-18.
Robert E. Ramsey, attorney for appellant.
Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Robert Stoeckel appeals from the Law Division's April 3, 2018
order denying his post-sentence motion to vacate his guilty plea to driving while
intoxicated ("DWI"), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. We affirm.
We derive the following facts from the record. On November 10, 2010,
defendant appeared before the Mount Laurel municipal court to plead guilty to
one count of DWI. Defendant was represented by an attorney at the hearing.
The municipal court judge questioned defendant about his decision to
plead guilty. Defendant represented that his attorney had answered all his
questions, that he had no questions for the court or for his attorney, and that he
understood that he was waiving his right to a trial. Defendant further
represented that he was voluntarily pleading guilty and that he was not
threatened, coerced, or induced into pleading guilty.
Defendant then provided a factual basis for his plea. Defendant admitted
that on October 6, 2010, he operated his motor vehicle after consuming six beers.
Defendant stated that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was negatively
affected and that he was unable to successfully perform field sobriety tests.
Defendant also did not object to the admission of an Alcotest result indicating
that at the time of the incident defendant had blood alcohol concentration
("BAC") of .14.
A-4023-17T3
2
The municipal court judge accepted defendant's guilty plea and heard
arguments as to sentencing. Defense counsel argued that the step-down
provision, N.J.S.A. 39:4-10(a)(3), should apply because defendant's previous
conviction was from 1992. The judge agreed and sentenced defendant as a first-
time offender. The judge imposed a seven-month suspension of defendant's
driving privileges, twelve hours at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, and
applicable fines. Defendant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction.
More than seven years later, on January 2, 2018, defendant, represented
by new counsel, filed a motion in the municipal court to withdraw his plea
pursuant to Rule 7:6-2(b). In this motion, defendant argued that his plea was
not made knowingly because the court failed to advise defendant of the penalties
he would face if his guilty plea were accepted. The municipal court denied
defendant's motion.
Defendant appealed to the Law Division. On de novo review, the Law
Division denied defendant's motion to vacate the guilty plea. The Law Division
judge found that defendant's plea was made knowingly and that the plea was
supported by an adequate factual basis.
This appeal followed. On appeal, defendant contends his plea should be
vacated because the municipal judge failed to advise him of the penalties he
A-4023-17T3
3
would face if his plea were accepted as required by Rule 7:6-2(a). Therefore,
defendant argues that the plea was not made knowingly. Defendant does not
challenge whether the plea was voluntary or whether the factual basis for the
plea was adequate. Indeed, at oral argument before the Law Division, defense
counsel stated, "Our entire argument is hinged on one narrow issue – was the
plea done knowingly, which is one of the requirements of the court rule."
Accordingly, we focus our review on this narrow issue.
On an appeal such as this, we "consider only the action of the Law
Division and not that of the municipal court[,]" State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super.
244, 251 (App. Div. 2001), because the Law Division's determination is de novo
on the record from the municipal court. R. 3:23-8(a)(2). Although we are
ordinarily limited to determining whether the Law Division's de novo factual
findings "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence
present in the record[,]" State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964), we owe no
such deference here because the Law Division decided the motion under review
on the papers without taking testimony. See State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421
(2004). Our review of purely legal issues is plenary. State v. Goodman, 415
N.J. Super. 210, 225 (App. Div. 2010).
A-4023-17T3
4
We begin with the standards governing motions to withdraw guilty pleas.
Rule 7:6-2(b), which applies to municipal courts, provides, "A motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty shall be made before sentencing, but the court may
permit it to be made thereafter to correct a manifest injustice." Accordingly, as
defendant moved to withdraw his plea over seven years after sentencing, he
"must show [his] conviction was manifestly unjust[.]" State v. Slater, 198 N.J.
145, 156 (2009). In this regard, "efforts to withdraw a plea after sentencing
must be substantiated by strong, compelling reasons." Id. at 160. "[T]he burden
rests on the defendant, in the first instance, to present some plausible basis for
his request, and his good faith in asserting a defense on the merits." Id. at 156(quoting State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 416 (1990)).
In Slater, the Supreme Court delineated a four-factor balancing test to
guide courts in exercising their discretion to set aside guilty pleas. Id. at 157-
58. The Court, however, instructed "when the issue is solely whether an
adequate factual basis supports a guilty plea, a Slater analysis is unnecessary."
State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015). Such an issue is reviewed de novo,
because "[a]n appellate court is in the same position as the trial court in assessing
whether the factual admissions during a plea colloquy satisfy the essential
elements of an offense." Ibid.A-4023-17T3
5
In this case, we similarly consider the issue of whether defendant entered
into the plea knowingly to be a threshold determination that precedes a Slater
analysis and is subject to de novo review. 1 See ibid.; State v. Lipa, 219 N.J.
323, 332 (2014) ("Once it is established that a guilty plea was made voluntarily,
it may only be withdrawn at the discretion of the trial court." (emphasis added)).
Other than this threshold issue, we review the Law Division's decision on
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea for an abuse of discretion. See Lipa,
219 N.J. at 332 ("[T]he trial court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw his
guilty plea will be reversed on appeal only if there was an abuse of discretion
which renders the lower court's decision clearly erroneous.").
Guided by these standards, we turn to defendant's contention that his plea
did not adhere to the requirements of Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) and was not made
knowingly. Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by Rules 7:6-2, 7:6-3, and
7:12-3, the court shall not, however, accept a guilty plea
without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining by inquiry of the defendant and, in the
court's discretion, of others, that the plea is made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea and that there
is a factual basis for the plea.
1
In this regard, the Law Division judge did not discuss or apply the Slater
factors in his oral decision.
A-4023-17T3
6
[(emphasis added).]
"The Rule thus contemplates that the plea be made in open court, that the
municipal court judge make a sufficient inquiry to conclude that any plea is
knowing and voluntary, and that there be a factual basis for the plea. " Maida v.
Kuskin, 221 N.J. 112, 123 (2015).
"For a plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant must
understand the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." State v.
Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 236 (2005). In performing the inquiry into whether a
defendant understands the consequences of a plea, "a court is not responsible for
informing a defendant of all consequences flowing from a guilty plea, [but] at a
minimum the court must ensure that the defendant is made fully aware of those
consequences that are 'direct' or 'penal.'" Id. at 237 (quoting State v. Howard,
110 N.J. 113, 122 (1988)). "Even misinformation about a collateral
consequence may vitiate a guilty plea if the consequence is a material element
of the plea." State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J. Super. 220, 225 (App. Div. 2003).
Having considered the record in light of these legal principles, we reject
defendant's contention that his plea should be vacated because he allegedly did
not know the consequences of his plea. Although defendant correctly notes that
the municipal court judge did not specifically advise defendant of the range of
A-4023-17T3
7
penalties before accepting defendant's guilty plea, 2 defendant does not submit a
certification or any other evidence substantiating that he did not know or
understand either the direct or collateral consequences of his plea. Cf. Lipa, 219
N.J. at 333-35 (holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw plea where
defendant presented a certification asserting the reasons for his innocence and
some evidence that contradicted the charges).
In this regard, defendant was sentenced immediately following his plea
and therefore knew the direct consequences of his plea for over seven years
before he moved to withdraw the plea in the municipal court. Indeed,
defendant's seven-month license suspension was likely completed well before
2
We note that courts should ordinarily advise defendants at the plea stage of
the possible sentences they may receive to ensure that defendants know and
understand the consequences of their pleas. Additionally, in DWI cases,
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(c) requires:
Upon conviction of a violation of this section, . . . [t]he
court shall inform the person convicted that if he is
convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle
during the period of license suspension imposed
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, he shall, upon
conviction, be subject to the penalties established in
[N.J.S.A.] 39:3-40. . . . [T]he court shall notify the
person convicted, orally and in writing, of the penalties
for a second, third or subsequent violation of this
section.
A-4023-17T3
8
he moved to withdraw his plea years later in the municipal court. We find that
defendant's exceedingly lengthy delay in moving to withdraw his plea
significantly undermines his argument that he pleaded guilty without knowledge
of the consequences he faced. See Slater, 198 N.J. at 160 ("In general, the longer
the delay in raising a reason for withdrawal, or asserting one's innocence, the
greater the level of scrutiny needed to evaluate the claim.").
Furthermore, defendant does not identify, either through certification or
legal argument, a particular penal or collateral consequence he now faces that
would warrant vacating his plea to correct a manifest injustice. 3 Defendant does
not assert that he misunderstood any component of the sentence he received or
that the sentence was excessive.4 In light of the fact that defendant presents no
evidence beyond bald legal argument to substantiate his assertion that he did not
know and understand the consequences of his plea, we find that defendant has
3
We can envision different factual scenarios, such as where a defendant is not
advised of the increased penalties for subsequent DWI convictions and later is
convicted of a subsequent DWI, in which relief may be warranted long after
sentencing to correct a manifest injustice. In this case, however, defendant
presents no such evidence.
4
Indeed, the municipal court applied the step-down provision and imposed the
minimum statutory penalties for a first-time offense with a BAC of greater than
.10. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(1)(ii).
A-4023-17T3
9
failed to establish that the Law Division's finding that his plea was made
knowingly is erroneous.
Moreover, our consideration of the Slater factors5 supports the Law
Division's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Slater instructs
courts to consider: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of
innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3)
the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in
unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." Id. at 157-58.
With respect to the first factor, because defendant does not contend that
he was innocent of DWI or challenge the factual basis for his plea, this factor
distinctly weighs against vacating defendant's plea. With respect to the second
factor, a court considers "whether defendant has presented fair and just reasons
for withdrawal, and whether those reasons have any force." Id. at 159. Although
defendant contends that his plea should be vacated because he did not
understand the consequences of his plea, we find this reason to carry little force
because, as discussed above, defendant waited over seven years to move to
5
Given the focus of defendant's argument, we are not required to reach the
Slater factors, but do so for the sake of completeness.
A-4023-17T3
10
withdraw his guilty plea and presents no evidence as to what penal or collateral
consequence he was unaware of when he entered into the plea.
The third factor is inapplicable in our analysis, as plea agreements are
prohibited in DWI cases in New Jersey. See Guidelines for Operation of Plea
Agreements in the Municipal Courts of New Jersey, Pressler & Verniero,
Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix to Part VII, Guideline 4 (2019) ("No plea
agreements whatsoever will be allowed in drunken driving . . . offenses.").
Similarly, the fourth factor is not heavily implicated in our analysis, because
"[t]he State is not required to show prejudice if a defendant fails to offer proof
of other factors in support of the withdrawal of a plea." Id. at 162. Thus, the
first two Slater factors weight against vacating defendant's plea and the
remaining factors are largely inapplicable. Therefore, based on a balancing of
the Slater factors, we conclude that the Law Division did not misapply its
discretion in denying defendant's motion.
For these reasons, on the record before us, we find defendant failed to
carry his burden to present "strong, compelling reasons" that his plea should be
vacated to correct a manifest injustice. Slater, 198 N.J. at 160. Defendant
presents insufficient evidence to support that he did not know the consequences
of his plea or to establish any other grounds to vacate his plea.
A-4023-17T3
11
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining arguments
raised by defendant, we find they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-4023-17T3
12