United States v. Juan Hernandez , 408 F. App'x 51 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 07 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-50461
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01354-PSG-2
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    JUAN CARLOS HERNANDEZ,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 9, 2010
    Pasadena, California
    Before: NOONAN, BERZON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Juan Carlos Hernandez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
    suppress evidence. Hernandez argues that his inculpatory statements should be
    suppressed because those statements were the product of his illegal detention. For
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    reasons below, we conclude that even if Hernandez’s detention were illegal an
    intervening event attenuated the taint of that illegality. We therefore affirm.
    We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress evidence and the
    underlying findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Song Ja Cha, 
    597 F.3d 995
    , 999 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jennen, 
    596 F.3d 594
    , 597-98 (9th Cir.
    2010). We also review de novo whether probable cause existed to arrest a
    defendant. United States v. Lopez, 
    482 F.3d 1067
    , 1071 (9th Cir. 2007). We
    further review de novo whether the exclusionary rule applies in a given case.
    United States v. Quoc Viet Hoang, 
    486 F.3d 1156
    , 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).
    We assume without deciding that Hernandez’s detention was illegal until the
    time his co-defendant, Pedro Ismael Soltero, incriminated him. Thus, the
    admissibility of Hernandez’s inculpatory statements depends on whether those
    statements were “‘come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
    sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” Wong Sun v.
    United States, 
    371 U.S. 471
    , 488 (1963) (citation omitted). Brown v. Illinois, 
    422 U.S. 590
     (1975), sets forth factors for making this determination: (1) as a threshold
    requirement, “[t]he voluntariness of the statement”; (2) the existence of Miranda
    warnings; (3) “[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession”; (4) “the
    presence of intervening circumstances”; and (5) “particularly, the purpose and
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    flagrancy of the official misconduct.” 
    Id. at 603-04
    . See also United States v.
    Manuel, 
    706 F.2d 908
    , 912 (9th Cir. 1983). We take up each of these factors in
    turn.
    The first Brown factor weighs against suppression because we have no
    indication that Hernandez’s statements were involuntary. Hernandez made his
    statements after receiving Miranda warnings and without any apparent direct
    coercion.
    For similar reasons, the second Brown factor also weighs against
    suppression because Hernandez twice received Miranda warnings.
    The third Brown factor, by contrast, favors Hernandez because the
    supposedly illegal arrest was in fairly close temporal proximity to his inculpatory
    statements. Police detained Hernandez seven hours before he made his statements.
    See Taylor v. Alabama, 
    457 U.S. 687
    , 690-91 (1982). Police interviewed Soltero
    shortly before interviewing Hernandez.
    The fourth factor, importantly, weighs against suppression because the
    police interviewed Hernandez as a result of Soltero’s incriminating statements and
    those statements were independent of any illegality. The police questioned Soltero
    after completing their search of the Summershade residence and the record does
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    not suggest that the questioning was in any way connected to Hernandez’s
    detention. Police then interrogated Hernandez after Soltero had incriminated him.
    Lastly, the fifth factor weighs against suppression because any police
    misconduct here was not flagrant. The police detained Hernandez to determine his
    connection to the residence being searched, not to extract a confession from him.
    Although Hernandez’s detention lasted approximately seven hours, he was
    permitted to the use the bathroom when needed, and he was given water when
    requested.
    On balance, we conclude that the factors above militate in favor of not
    suppressing the evidence here. In particular, the intervening event of Soltero’s
    incriminating statements and the lack of flagrant police misconduct outweigh any
    temporal proximity between Hernandez’s supposedly illegal detention and his own
    statements.
    AFFIRMED.
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