State v. Ralph Miller ( 1998 )


Menu:
  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    MAY 1998 SESSION
    FILED
    July 14, 1998
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,              )
    )    C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9709-CC-00361
    Appellee,           )
    )    FAYETTE COUNTY
    VS.                              )
    )    HON. JON KERRY BLACKWOOD,
    RALPH MILLER,                    )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.          )    (Sentencing)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                    FOR THE APPELLEE:
    GARY ANTRICAN                         JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    District Public Defender              Attorney General & Reporter
    SHANA C. McCOY-JOHNSON                JANIS L. TURNER
    Asst. Public Defender                 Counsel for the State
    P.O. Box 700                          John Sevier Bldg.
    Somerville, TN 38068                  425 Fifth Ave., North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    ELIZABETH T. RICE
    District Attorney General
    302 Market St. East
    Somerville, TN 38068
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    JOHN H. PEAY,
    Judge
    OPINION
    The defendant was indicted for felony escape, a Class E felony. He pled
    guilty, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III career offender. In this appeal as
    of right, the defendant contends that the State failed to prove he qualified for sentencing
    as a Range III career offender. We affirm.
    In seeking enhanced sentencing for the defendant, the State relied upon
    T.C.A. § 40-35-108(a)(3), which provides for sentencing as a career offender if the
    defendant’s current offense is a Class D or E felony and he has at least six prior felony
    convictions of any classification. In its notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment, the
    State listed convictions for nine prior felony offenses. The presentence report recites
    these same convictions plus two others. Although both parties acknowledge that a
    sentencing hearing was held, the record on appeal does not include a transcript of the
    sentencing hearing. The record on appeal does include two “exhibits,” which include
    certified copies of court records from less than six prior convictions, but without a
    transcript, it is unclear whether these documents were introduced into evidence or
    otherwise used in sentencing the defendant.
    The essence of the defendant’s argument is that the State has failed to
    sufficiently prove that the defendant has the six prior felony offenses necessary to justify
    career offender sentencing under T.C.A. § 40-35-108(a)(3). The defendant’s argument
    must fail, however, as he has not shown reversible error from the record.
    When the State is seeking an enhanced sentence for a defendant, the State
    may prove a defendant’s prior convictions by entering into evidence certified copies of the
    2
    court records of the prior convictions. See T.C.A. § 40-35-202; Tenn. R. Evid. 902(4).
    However, the State need not prove a prior conviction in that manner if the prior conviction
    “is set forth in the presentence report and it is not contradicted.” State v. Roland Hayes
    Edmonds, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9308-CR-00291, Hamilton County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed
    January 27, 1995, at Knoxville). The presentence report filed in this case attributes
    enough prior felony convictions to the defendant to justify career offender status under
    § 40-35-108(a)(3), but without a transcript of the sentencing hearing, this Court cannot
    discern whether the defendant contradicted the information contained in the presentence
    report. Without a sufficient record, then, we must presume that the trial court did not err
    in sentencing the defendant as a career offender.
    _______________________________
    JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
    ______________________________
    THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9709-CC-00361

Filed Date: 7/14/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014