Intermountain Systems v. C C Farm ( 1997 )

NO. 96-522
IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
INTERMOUNTAIN SYSTEMS, INC.
a Montana Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C & C FARM AND RANCH SUPPLY,
a Montana Corporation
Defendant,
and
STATE OF MONTANA,
Defendant-Intervenor and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Beaverhead,
The Honorable Frank Davis, Judge presiding.
COUNSELOF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Clay Smith,
Solicitor, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Mark David Hoffman, Hoffman & Suenram, Dillon,
Wl:z;a (Intermountain); Vincent J. Kozakiewicz,
, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 14, 1996
.Decided: January 2, 1997
ClerM
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited.as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public
document with the Clerk of this Court and by a report of its result
to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company.
Appellant, the State of Montana (State), appeals the grant of
a preliminary injunction by the Fifth Judicial District Court,
Beaverhead County, enjoining the State from enforcing §§ 39-g-101
to -410, MCA, which mandates the registration of construction
contractors. We affirm.
The 1995 session of the Montana Legislature passed the
Contractor Registration act, codified as § 39-g-101, MCA, et seq.
The Contractor Registration act provides that construction
contractors must register with the Montana Department of Labor and
Industry. It further provides that a non-registered contractor who
advertises for or performs construction work is subject to fines,
penalties, and misdemeanor criminal prosecution. The statute also
mandates that a contractor seeking to register must provide, among
other things, his or her social security number and the names and
addresses of all partners if the applicant is a firm or
partnership. By law, such information is to be open to public
inspection. Section 39-g-202, MCA.
Respondent Intermountain Systems, Inc. (Intermountain) is a
contractor as defined by § 39-g-102, NCA. In a suit for breach of
contract against Defendant C & C Farm and Ranch SUPPlY,
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Intermountain asserted that the Contractor Registration act was
unconstitutional. Notified of the constitutional challenge, the
State of Montana intervened to defend the constitutionality of the
law. Intermountain moved the District Court for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the State from enforcing the law pending a
final determination on the merits. The District Court granted the
motion and the State appeals.
The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is a
discretionary ruling. Van Loan v. Van Loan (1995), 271 Mont. 176,
178-79, 895 P.2d 614, 615. This Court will not disturb a district
court's grant or denial of a preliminary injunction unless there is
a manifest abuse of discretion by the district court. Van Loan,
895 P.2d at 615. See also Knudson v. McDunn (1995), 271 Mont. 61,
64, 894 P.2d 295, 297; Porter v. K & S Partnership (1981), 192
Mont. 175, 181, 627 P.2d 836, 839.
A preliminary injunction has the effect of preserving the
status quo pending an adjudication on the merits. Knudson, 894
P.2d at 297-98 (citing Porter, 627 P.2d at 839). In determining
whether a preliminary injunction should issue, a district court
should in no matter anticipate the ultimate determination
of the questions of right involved. Rather, the court
should decide merely whether a sufficient case has been
made out to warrant the preservation of the property or
rights in status quo until trial, without expressing a
final opinion as to such rights.
Porter, 627 P.2d at 840.
A preliminary injunction may be granted "when it appears that
the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation
would produce a great or irreparable injury to the applicant."
3
.
Section 27-19-201(2), MCA. Intermountain asserted that the
enforcement of the law would cause it great damage because it would
be forced to choose between registering and refusing to register.
Intermountain asserted it would be compelled to disclose
information in violation of its constitutional right to privacy if
it chose to register. It also asserted that it would be subject to
fines, penalties and criminal prosecution if it chose not to
register. Rather than be required to make such a choice,
Intermountain asserted that a preliminary injunction should issue,
enjoining enforcement of the law until an ultimate determination of
its constitutionality was made.
The District Court agreed. In issuing the injunction, the
District Court found:
while the simple act of registering could prevent the
enforcement of the sanction provisions of the Act, there
is from the evidence a genuine and good faith concern
regarding constitutional violations of privacy, and a
reasonable expectation thereof, created by information
sought on the State's proposed registration form. There
was a total absence of evidence showing any compelling
State interest in overcoming these claimed privacy
rights.
On appeal, the State contends that the District Court "failed to
assess carefully Intermountain's privacy claim to determine
likelihood of success or to explain in manner allowing meaningful
review the nature of the injury Intermountain would suffer were it
required to submit the application."
The nature of the injury asserted by Intermountain was the
violation of its right to privacy. While the State may argue that
such violation is unlikely to occur, the District Court apparently
4
disagreed. Rather than risk muddying the waters with additional
constitutional issues and asserted constitutional violations, the
District Court instead preserved the status quo by issuing the
preliminary injunction.
An injunction is an equitable remedy fashioned according to
the circumstances of a particular case. Section 27-19-101, MCA;
Talley v. Flathead Valley Community College (1993), 259 Mont. 479,
491, 057 P.2d 701, 708 (citation omitted). While the State sets
forth detailed legal arguments why a preliminary injunction should
not have issued, we cannot conclude, under the unique facts of this
case, that the issuance of the injunction was a manifest abuse of
the District Court's discretion.
The order of the District Court is affirmed.
We Concur: