United States v. Savage , 161 F. App'x 256 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-5127
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DARYL SAVAGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-04-96)
Submitted: November 30, 2005 Decided: January 3, 2006
Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Arthur Robbins, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L. Dwyer, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Daryl Savage was convicted by a jury of one count of
felon in possession of a firearm and one count of felon in
possession of ammunition, both in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2000). Savage was sentenced to imprisonment for 180
months. We find no error and affirm Savage’s convictions and
sentence.
Savage first contends the district court erred when it
denied the defense’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained
during law enforcement’s search of Savage’s residence. Savage
asserts the defense witnesses were more credible than those
presented by the Government. Therefore, Savage concludes the
search was performed prior to the issuance of a search warrant.
We review the factual findings underlying the denial of
a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005). The evidence is construed in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. United
States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). As weighing
the evidence and reviewing the credibility of witnesses are
functions reserved for the trier of fact, we conclude the district
court did not clearly err in its determination that a signed, valid
search warrant was issued prior to the search of the Savage
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residence. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234
(4th Cir. 1997).
Next, Savage contends the district court erred in its
conclusion that the statements made by him during the search of his
residence were voluntary. To determine whether a statement was
voluntarily made, we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances,’
including the characteristics of the defendant, the setting of the
interview, and the details of the interrogation.” United States v.
Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1071 (4th Cir. 1987). Though “[a]n
appellate court must make an independent determination on the issue
of voluntariness[,] . . . the district court’s findings of fact on
the circumstances surrounding the confession are to be accepted
unless clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1072 (citations omitted).
Savage was twenty-four years old. He committed the first
of five offenses at the age of fifteen. Upon entry, both the
premises and the eight individuals present were secured by police.
Officers provided appropriate warnings under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), before questioning Savage, and Savage verbally
acknowledged he understood his rights. Though Detective Moran
stated while questioning Savage that everyone in the house could be
arrested if any guns or illegal narcotics were found, this is not
sufficient to render Savage’s statement involuntary as “[t]he mere
existence of threats, violence, implied promises, improper
influence, or other police activity . . . does not automatically
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render a confession involuntary.” United States v. Braxton, 112
F.3d 777, 780 (4th Cir. 1997). Therefore, under these
circumstances, we conclude Savage’s statements were voluntary.
Finally, Savage contends the district erred when it
classified him as an Armed Career Criminal. Savage maintains his
two 1999 offenses should be counted as a single conviction as they
were consolidated for sentencing purposes.
When reviewing a district court’s application of the
sentencing guidelines, we review legal determinations de novo.
United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 503 (4th Cir. 1996). A
district court may enhance a sentence based on the “fact of a prior
conviction” regardless of whether or not it was admitted to by the
defendant or found by a jury. United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d
278, 282 (4th Cir. 2005). Therefore, a district court may
determine if a defendant has been convicted of the predicate
offenses required by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) so long
as the facts necessary to support the enhancement “inhere in the
fact of conviction” rather than being “extraneous to it.” Id. at
283.
Since Savage’s offenses occurred on different dates, at
different locations, involved different individuals, and were
charged separately, we conclude the district court appropriately
characterized them as separate offenses for ACCA purposes. See
United States v. Williams, 187 F.3d 429, 431 (4th Cir. 1999).
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Furthermore, Savage’s argument is in direct contradiction to this
Court’s conclusion that “[t]he federal interest of providing for
substantial sentences for repeat offenders stands independent of
state sentencing practices.” United States v. Allen, 50 F.3d 294,
299 (4th Cir. 1995).
Accordingly, we affirm Savage’s convictions and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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