United States v. Vaughnta Jones , 453 F. App'x 297 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-5283
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    VAUGHNTA MARKEES JONES,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
    Judge. (0:06-cr-01169-CMC-1)
    Submitted:   November 1, 2011             Decided:   November 9, 2011
    Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Scarlet B. Moore, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant.
    Robert C. Jendron, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Vaughnta Markees Jones appeals his 168-month sentence
    for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon (“Count Five”) and
    possessing a sawed-off shotgun (“Count Seven”), in violation of
    18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) and 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and
    5871 (2006), respectively.           Jones’ counsel has filed a brief
    pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), in which
    she states that she could identify no meritorious issues for
    appeal, but questions whether Jones’ guilty plea was valid and
    whether his sentence is reasonable.              Jones has filed a pro se
    informal     brief,     raising    several     issues    relating   to   his
    conviction and sentence.          Having reviewed the record, we affirm
    the judgment of the district court.
    Jones dedicates significant portions of his informal
    brief to protesting the merits of the district court’s denial of
    his pretrial motion to suppress.             However, a valid guilty plea
    waives     such    an   alleged     antecedent     jurisdictional   defect.
    Tollett v. Henderson, 
    411 U.S. 258
    , 267 (1973); United States v.
    Willis, 
    992 F.2d 489
    , 490 (4th Cir. 1993).              Although the record
    suggests that the parties contemplated that Jones would be able
    to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, his guilty plea
    is not expressly conditioned on his ability to pursue that issue
    on appeal.        Because “direct review of an adverse ruling on a
    pre-trial motion is available only if the defendant expressly
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    preserves that right by entering a conditional guilty plea,”
    this court can consider Jones’ motion to suppress only in the
    context of determining whether Jones’ guilty plea was voluntary.
    United States v. Wiggins, 
    905 F.2d 51
    , 52 (4th Cir. 1990).
    Because Jones did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea
    below, this court reviews it for plain error.                       United States v.
    Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 524-27 (4th Cir. 2002).                          To establish
    plain error, Jones must show that “(1) an error was made; (2)
    the   error    is   plain;     and   (3)       the    error    affects    substantial
    rights.”      United States v. Massenburg, 
    564 F.3d 337
    , 342–43 (4th
    Cir. 2009).         “If all three of these conditions are met, an
    appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a
    forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the
    fairness,      integrity,       or     public          reputation        of   judicial
    proceedings.”       United States v. Carr, 
    303 F.3d 539
    , 543 (4th
    Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations
    omitted).
    Even assuming that Jones would not have entered an
    unconditional guilty plea had the district court advised him of
    its effect on his ability to appeal the denial of the motion to
    suppress, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the
    error,   because     it   is   clear    that         the   motion   to    suppress   is
    without merit.       
    Carr, 303 F.3d at 543
    .                Jones’ motion challenged
    the search of the rental car he was driving, despite the fact
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    that he was not an authorized driver under the rental agreement.
    It has been long-settled in this circuit that Jones, “as an
    unauthorized driver of the rented car, had no legitimate privacy
    interest      in   the    car     and,    therefore,        the       search    of    which    he
    complains      cannot     have     violated         his    Fourth      Amendment       rights.”
    United States v. Wellons, 
    32 F.3d 117
    , 119 (4th Cir. 1994).
    Because any error deprived Jones only of the ability to pursue
    an    argument     that    is     conclusively            foreclosed      by    longstanding
    precedent, neither the fairness nor integrity of the proceedings
    below was impaired, and we decline to notice the error.                                     
    Carr, 303 F.3d at 543
    .
    With respect to Jones’ sentence, our review is for
    reasonableness,          applying        an    abuse        of    discretion          standard.
    Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).                             We first ensure
    that    the   district         court     committed         no    significant         procedural
    error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
    the    Guidelines        range,    treating         the     Guidelines         as    mandatory,
    failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
    based    on    clearly     erroneous          facts,       or    failing       to    adequately
    explain the chosen sentence.”                   
    Id. If no
    procedural error was
    committed,         we      review         the         sentence          for         substantive
    reasonableness,          taking        into    account          the    “totality       of     the
    circumstances.”          
    Id. In this
    respect, “an appellate court must
    defer to the trial court and can reverse a sentence only if it
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    is unreasonable, even if the sentence would not have been the
    choice of the appellate court.”                    United States v. Evans, 
    526 F.3d 155
    ,     160    (4th   Cir.     2008)      (emphasis     in    original).     A
    sentence    that       falls   within    a       properly   calculated     Guidelines
    range is presumptively reasonable.                  United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
    We have thoroughly reviewed the arguments raised by
    Jones in his informal brief pertaining to his sentencing and
    determine that they are without merit.                      See United States v.
    Hampton, 
    628 F.3d 654
    , 659 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating standard of
    review).       See also United States v. Hood, 
    628 F.3d 669
    , 672-73
    (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 2138
    (2011).                         Nor do
    we     discern    any    other    error——procedural         or    substantive——with
    respect to the within-Guidelines sentence imposed upon Jones.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.     We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
    This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of
    the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.         If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but
    counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel    may    move    in     this   court      for   leave    to    withdraw    from
    representation.         Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on Jones.
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    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions   are   adequately   presented    in   the    materials
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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