United States v. Snyder , 95 F. App'x 57 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS            April 15, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-50628
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CARLOS ARTURO SNYDER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. P-03-CR-1-ALL
    --------------------
    Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Carlos Arturo Snyder appeals his conviction after a jury
    trial of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).
    Snyder argues that the evidence was not sufficient to prove
    that he knowingly possessed marijuana.    Snyder failed to renew
    his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the
    evidence.   Snyder acknowledges that when defense counsel fails to
    renew a motion for judgment of acquittal, this court reviews
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 03-50628
    -2-
    challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine
    whether affirmance would result in a manifest miscarriage of
    justice.   See United States v. McIntosh, 
    280 F.3d 479
    , 483 (5th
    Cir. 2002).   Snyder argues, however, that the manifest
    miscarriage of justice standard should not be applied because it
    finds no support in the plain language of FED. R. CRIM. P. 29,
    contravenes Supreme Court precedent on reasonable doubt as set
    forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979), and
    undermines the requirements established for ensuring that waivers
    of constitutional rights are knowing and voluntary.
    Because only the court sitting en banc can reverse
    precedent, Snyder’s insufficiency claim must be reviewed under
    the “miscarriage of justice” standard.     See United States v.
    Laury, 
    49 F.3d 145
    , 151 and fn.15 (5th Cir. 1995).    This court
    will find a manifest miscarriage of justice only where the record
    is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt or contains evidence on a
    key element of the offense that is so tenuous that a conviction
    would be shocking.   McIntosh, 
    280 F.3d at 483
    .   Moreover, as the
    following discussion indicates, the evidence, when viewed in the
    light most favorable to the Government, establishes that a
    reasonable jury could have found guilty knowledge beyond a
    reasonable doubt.    See Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    .   Therefore, even
    under the standard set forth in Jackson, the evidence was
    sufficient to convict Snyder.
    No. 03-50628
    -3-
    Snyder, a commercial driver, was apprehended after Border
    Patrol Agents discovered 257 pounds of marijuana with a value of
    over $200,000 in the trailer that he was hauling.   Since the
    evidence does not establish that the marijuana was clearly
    visible or readily accessible, Snyder’s control of the trailer
    alone is insufficient to establish knowledge.   United States v.
    Pennington, 
    20 F.3d 593
    , 598-99 (1994).
    Circumstantial evidence, however, supports the jury verdict.
    Based upon trial testimony and exhibits, it was reasonable for
    the jury to conclude that Snyder took possession of a sealed
    trailer, that the seal was then broken for the purpose of loading
    a significant amount of marijuana with a value of over $200,000
    into the trailer, and that this valuable cargo would not have
    been entrusted to Snyder if he had not been part of the drug
    trafficking scheme.   See United States v. Villarreal, 
    324 F.3d 319
    , 324 (5th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Resio-Trejo,
    
    45 F.3d 907
    , 911 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasonable inferences are to be
    resolved in favor of the verdict).   Moreover, the record
    indicates that Snyder detoured from his claimed route, which
    provided an opportunity to load the marijuana into the trailer.
    Thus, the jury’s decision that Snyder knowingly possessed
    marijuana was rational based on the evidence.   See Pennington, 
    20 F.3d at 598-99
     (issue is whether jury made a rational decision to
    convict or acquit based on the evidence); see also United States
    v. Cano-Guel, 
    167 F.3d 900
    , 905 (5th Cir. 1999) (no single piece
    No. 03-50628
    -4-
    of circumstantial evidence need be conclusive when considered in
    isolation).    The evidence of Snyder’s knowledge is therefore not
    so tenuous that his conviction is shocking, and affirmance of the
    conviction therefore does not result in a manifest miscarriage of
    justice.    See McIntosh, 
    280 F.3d at 483
    .   Moreover, the evidence,
    when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
    establishes that a reasonable jury could have found guilty
    knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.     See Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    .
    Snyder also argues that the district court committed error
    when it failed to grant his oral motion and written motion in
    which he made a fair cross section challenge to the jury venire.
    Snyder concedes that his challenge does not meet the requirements
    of the Jury Selection and Service Act.     The Sixth Amendment and
    the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment require that a jury
    be drawn from a fair cross section of the community.     United
    States v. Williams, 
    264 F.3d 561
    , 567 (5th Cir. 2001).     Snyder
    has not shown that the district court erred by failing to grant
    either the oral or written motion.    Snyder did not argue in the
    district court and fails to argue here that the claimed
    underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group
    in the jury selection process.    
    Id. at 567-68
     (setting forth
    elements of prima facie violation of fair cross section
    requirement).    Snyder has therefore failed to establish an
    essential element of the fair cross section challenge, and,
    No. 03-50628
    -5-
    accordingly, has not shown that the district court erred by
    failing to grant his motion.   See United States v. Steen, 
    55 F.3d 1022
    , 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1995) (declining to decide whether jury
    pool reasonably mirrored racial composition of community when
    appellant did not provide evidence of systematic exclusion of
    group from jury selection process).
    For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court
    is AFFIRMED.